The appellee, Mrs. Almyra O. Brown, was, on February 9, 1921, the owner of a farm in Washington County, containing 285 acres, which is the subject-matter of this controversy, and on that day she conveyed it to Thomas E. Baldwin, the sum of $7,000 being recited in the deed as the consideration for the conveyance. This consideration was in fact paid by the delivery to Mrs. Brown by Baldwin of seven so-called gold bonds of the 'Southwestern Oil & Livestock Association, of Fort Worth, Texas, an unincorporated concern doing business as a common-law trust. The b'onds were- each of the denomination of $1,000, bearing *5interest at eight per centum per annum, payable annually. Baldwin conveyed the land to Josephine Bradley, wife of F. L. Bradley, by deed dated February 12, 1921, but which was not filed for record until February 28, 1921; and on the last-mentioned date Mrs. Bradley mortgaged the land to Mrs. Lucy Wilson to secure a loan of money in the sum of $1,200. This mortgage was filed on the same date. On that date (February 28, 1921) Mrs. Brown instituted this action in the chancery court of Washington County against Baldwin to-cancel the conveyance on account of alleged misrepresentations concerning the value -of the -bonds which were delivered as the consideration for the conveyance. S. K. Leskey was joined as defendant in the suit, on an allegation that he claimed a lien on the land, but it does not appear that Leskey was ever served with process, and he has passed out of the -suit. Appellee filed a lis pendens under the statute -on the day that the suit was instituted. At that time appellant was not apprised of the conveyance from Baldwin to Mrs. Bradley, nor of the mortgage executed by Mrs. Bradley to Mrs. Wilson. Subsequently appellee amended her complaint and joined as defendants Mrs. Bradley. and Mrs. Wilson, alleging that neither of them were innocent purchasers for value, and also bringing in, as parties defendant, F. L. Bradley and George A. Hurst, alleging that they participated in the fraudulent misrepresentations by aiding Baldwin in inducing appellee to convey her land for the consideration named. Mrs. Wilson filed an answer, denying that she had knowledge of the fraud alleged to have been perpetrated on appellee, and she asked that appellants, Baldwin, Bradley and Hurst, be made parties, and that, if the court canceled her mortgage, she have judgment over against appellants for the amount of her debt.
The cause was heard by the court upon the pleadings and exhibits and the depositions -of numerous witnesses, whose names were set forth in the decree, and the court found in favor of appellee upon the charge *6of fraudulent misrepresentations, and canceled her deed to Baldwin and the deed from Baldwin to Mrs. Bradley, but found that Mrs. Wilson was an innocent mortgagee, and the decree vested title to the land in appellee, subject to Mrs. Wilson’s lien as mortgagee. The court also rendered a decree in favor of appellee for the recovery from Baldwin, Bradley and Hurst of the amount of Mrs. Wilson’s mortgage debt, with interest.
Baldwin, Bradley, Mrs. Bradley and Hurst prayed .an appeal, which was granted by the chancery court, and appellee also prayed an appeal from the decree in favor of Mrs. Wilson. This decree was rendered on November 23, 1922, and none of the appeals were perfected within ninety days, as required by statute, but on May 7,1923, Baldwin, Bradley, Hurst and Mrs. Bradley filed an authenticated copy of the record with this court and prayed an appeal, which was granted by the clerk of this court. Appellee obtained a cross-appeal on November 11, 1923.
There is a conflict in every phase of the testimony, and w.e are unable to determine where the preponderance lies, for the reason that the deposition of one of the witnesses, J. C. Barthell by name, is omitted from the’transcript. The record entry of the decree recites the name of this witness as one of the deponents in the trial of the case, but his deposition is not in the record. The clerk certifies that the record is complete, but,' there being a conflict between the recital of the decree and the certificate of the clerk, the former must prevail. Weaver-Dowdy Co. v. Brewer, 129 Ark. 193; Massey v. Kissire, 119 Ark. 222. The absence from the transcript of part of the testimony in the case raises the presumption that the decree was correct. It is therefore unnecessary, to discuss the testimony in further detail.
.It is insisted by appellant that some of the testimony of the witnesses was incompetent, but we must indulge the presumption that the court only gave consideration to such testimony as was competent and relevant. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Boon, 76 Ark. 153.
*7It is .also contended that the personal decree in favor of appellee for recovery of the amount of Mrs. Wilson’s mortgage debt is erroneous on its face, for the reasons, (1) that appellee’s complaint contained no prayer for such relief, and (2) that appellee had no right of action for such recovery until she was compelled to pay the debt.
It is true that the complaint contained no specific prayer for such relief, but it contained a prayer for general relief, in addition to the specific prayer for cancellation of all the deeds, including the mortgage to Mrs. Wilson.
The rule established by decisions of this court is that the statement of facts, and not the prayer for relief, constitutes the cause of action, and that the court may grant any relief that the pleaded facts warrant under a prayer for general relief, or without any prayer at all. Kelly’s Heirs v. McGuire, 15 Ark. 555; Chaffee v. Oliver, 39 Ark. 531; Sannoner v. Jacobson & Co., 47 Ark. 31; Ashley v. Little Rock, 56 Ark. 391; Waterman v. Irby, 76 Ark. 551. An exception to this rule is that “the court will not suffer the defendant to be taken by surprise and permit the plaintiff to take a decree that is not responsive to the issues and which is not justified by a full development of the case by the testimony.” Mason v. Gates, 90 Ark. 241. This case falls within the rule and not within the exception. Appellants were made parties at the request of Mrs. Wilson to answer for alleged fraud in inducing her to accept a mortgage on the land. They were also made parties by appellee, and the question of their conduct in obtaining the deed from appellee and in obtaining the loan from Mrs. Wilson were issues directly raised by the pleadings. For that reason there could have been no surprise in granting relief on the general prayer. In fact, a personal decree for recovery of the amount of the incumbrance wrongfully placed on the land was the only available relief against appellant Hurst, for he was not an actual party *8to the conveyance and was not a proper party to this litigation for any other purpose.
. The right of action was not prematurely sustained, even though appellee had not paid the mortgage debt, for the recovery of this amount was a part of appellee’s damage in having her land wrongfully incumbered by the mortgage to Mrs. Wilson. She could not obtain a cancellation of the mortgage for the reason that Mrs. Wilson was an innocent party, but she was entitled to the only available reparation, which was to allow her to recover the amount necessary to redeem from the mortgage — otherwise she is without relief.
Appellee 'did not perfect her original appeal from the decree in favor of Mrs. Wilson within ninety days after the rendition of the decree, as required by statute (Crawford & Moses’ Digest, § 2135); in fact, she did not perfect the original appeal at all. If the transcript had been filed by any of the appellants within the prescribed time, this would have been sufficient to perfect all of the appeals which had been granted by the court below, but no transcript was filed by any of the appellants within the prescribed time. The present appellants — Baldwin, Bradley, Hurst and Mrs. Bradley— abandoned their original appeal, and, within six months, took a new appeal as provided by statute, Crawford & Moses’ Digest, § 2140. The granting of this appeal to the appellants did not have the effect of perfecting the original appeal granted to the appellee by the lower court. The statute (Crawford & Moses’ Digest, § 2166) provides that a cross-appeal may be granted to an appellee against an appellant 'or any co-appellee at any time before the trial of the cause in the Supreme Court. Appellee was not entitled to a cross-appeal against Mrs. Wilson, for the reason that the latter was not an appellant in the case, nor a co-appellee. The controversy between appellee and Mrs. Wilson 'Concerning the foreclosure of the latter’s mortgage was distinct from the controversy between appellee and the appellants, therefore appellee was not entitled to a cross-appeal. Shapard *9v. Nixon, 122 Ark. 530; Meyers v. Linebarger, 144 Ark. 389. It has been the practice here, in instances where a cross-appeal was improperly granted within the period of six months allowed by statute for obtaining original appeals, to treat the cross-appeal as an original appeal, but, in the present instance, the cross-appeal was not granted until after the expiration of six months from the date of the rendition of the judgment. Therefore it was too late to operate as an original appeal.
Opinion delivered April 21, 1924.
It follows from what we have said that the cross-appeal of appellee must be dismissed and that the decree of the chancery court against appellants must be affirmed. It is so ordered.