(after stating the facts). According to the testimony of Reed, Mrs. Gannon let him have the jewelry for the purpose of obtaining a loan on it. Mrs. Gannon denied this, and said that she deposited the jewelry with him for safe-keeping. She did not know that he had obtained a loan on the jewelry until after he had done so. Hence, according to the undisputed evidence, Reed did not act or assume to act as the agent of Mrs. Gannon in obtaining the loan. In such cases the owner may subsequently confirm the sale or pledge of the property, but this he cannot do by a simple ratification. His confirmation must rest upon some consideration upholding the confirmation, or upon an estoppel.
In Lafargue v. Markley, 55 Ark. 423, where a husband sold his wife’s horse, in her absence and without her consent, and executed a bill of sale therefor, this court affirmed a judgment for the recovery of the horse by the wife on the ground that there was no evidence in the case tending to show either an estoppel against her or a consideration for the confirmation of the sale of her horse by her husband. In discussing the question- the court said: ‘ ‘ There was no evidence that he was or assumed to act as her agent, There was no question of agency, and *568consequently there was nothing to ratify. She could have confirmed the sale, but this could not have been done by a simple ratification. A confirmation, to have been binding upon her, must have rested upon some consideration upholding it, or upon an estoppel.” (Citing authorities).
Here the facts are essentially different. The undisputed evidence shows that Reed executed a bill of sale to Mrs. Gannon to the jewelry in question on the 16th day of May, 1921. Mrs. Gannon, with full knowledge that he had deposited the jewelry with the Citizens’ National Bank as security for a loan of $2,600, accepted the bill of sale and sent a copy of it to the bank. According to her own testimony, she had become discouraged about the matter, after waiting so long for Reed to redeem his pledge of the jewelry, and wanted something to show that she had title to it. He had had the jewelry pledged for a loan for eighteen months, and Mrs. Gannon knew that fact.
The recital in the bill of sale by Reed to her that it was made subject to a loan of $2,600 from-the Citizens’ National Bank, and with directions to the bank to deliver the jewelry to Mrs. Gannon, upon the payment of the loan by either Mrs. Gannon or Reed, was a sufficient consideration for the execution of the bill of sale. This was the fixing of a definite basis of their rights in the property, and amounted to a compromise or a settlement between Mrs. Gannon and Reed.
This court is committed to the doctrine that the compromise of a disputed claim furnishes a sufficient consideration to uphold the terms of a compromise, though the asserted claim is without merit and could not have been sustained in the courts. First National Bank of Mena v. Allen, 141 Ark. 328, and cases cited; Bankers’ & Planters’ Mutual Insurance Assn. v. Archie, 145 Ark. 481, and Fair v. Beal-Burrow Dry Goods Co., 148 Ark. 340. The reason for the rule is that parties unable to agree about matters in dispute may go into court and have their rights adjudicated, or they have the right to *569settle their differences between themselves in any way they choose.
The bill of sale in this case recognized the rights of the bank to hold the jewelry as security for the loan made to Reed by it, and directed that the jewelry be delivered to Mrs. Gannon upon payment of the loan either by herself or by Reed. This, as we have already seen, was in effect a settlement between Mrs. Gannon and Reed of their differences in the matter, and this was in itself a sufficient consideration for the bill of sale. The testimony in this respect is undisputed. We have no concern as to which party was right. It is sufficient that it settles their differences.
It follows that the court erred in not directing a verdict in favor of the bank, and for that error the judgment must be reversed.
Inasmuch as the case has been fully developed, no good purpose could be served by remanding it for a new trial, and the case will be dismissed here.