The Attorney General instituted this action on behalf of the State of Arkansas against the defendant, Eagle Lumber Company, a foreign corpora*9tion, to recover unpaid taxes alleged to be due on its capital stock since the time it began doing business in this State in the year 1899' up to the time of the commencement of the suit in 1919. The facts are undisputed, and are set forth in a -written stipulation signed by counsel on both sides.
The defendant is a private corporation, organized under the laws of the State of Iowa, and it began doing business in the State of Arkansas on March 3, 1899, and complied with the laws of the State with respect to foreign corporations doing business in the State. Its authorized and paid-up capital stock was originally $250,-000, and subsequently raised to $500,000, “all of which,” according to the recitals of the agreed statement of facts, “has always been employed in Arkansas.” The written stipulation as to facts reads as follows:
“(2) The tangible assets of the company consist wholly of a sawmill, lumber, logs and merchandise at Eagle Mills, and of the timber lands situated in Ouachita, Dallas and Calhoun counties, all in the State of Arkansas. It owns no property located elsewhere, and for all the years covered by this suit its sole business was the manufacture and sale of timber products at Eagle Mills, Arkansas. ’ ’
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“ (4) The company has paid the State and local taxes on all of its tangible property, real and personal, including certain ‘moneys and credits’ to the proper authorities in Arkansas in accordance with the revenue laws of this Státe.”
“ (5) It is agreed as a stipulation of fact that, during the period of years covered by the complaint herein, the shares of stock representing the capital stock of the company had the same value and no greater than the aggregate property owned by the corporation, all of whose physical assets had an actual situs within the State of Arkansas. It is further stipulated that during said period the property of the company assessed in Arkansas ■was valued for taxation in the several counties in which *10it was located at an amount equal to the actual average assessment of other similar property in the State of Arkansas.”
“Provided, it is further agreed that if the court holds that the company as a foreign corporation is in any event taxable in Arkansas upon its intangible property or its capital stock, the extent of its liability for such taxes is stipulated to be one thousand ($1,000) dollars and no more, unless the proper basis for assessment be held to be fifty (50%) per cent of true value as per the Tax Commission order recited in paragraph 6 herein.”
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“(7) It is further agreed that if all issues of law are finally determined adversely to the defendant, judgment will be entered against the company for two thousand dollars (or in lieu thereof one thousand dollars in the event the court upholds as the true taxable criterion the actual average assessed basis rather than the Tax Commission’s 50% basis. * * *”
The court rendered judgment in favor of the State for the recovery of the sum of $1,000, and both parties have appealed.
The Attorney General and his associate counsel argue with much earnestness the question whether the intangible property or capital stock of a foreign corporation doing business in this State is subject to assessment against the corporation for the purposes of taxation. That question is very thoroughly covered by the learned counsel on each side. But it seems to us that under the stipulation of facts in this case it is not proper for us to decide that question for the reason that the capital stock has no value in excess of the value of the property otherwise taxed in this State and that the corporation owns' no property elsewhere, either tangible or intangible. The substance of the agreement is that all of the capital of the corporation is and has always been employed in the State of Arkansas, that all of its tangible assets are situated in the State of Arkansas, and that it *11owns no property located elsewhere, that the shares of stock have the same value as the aggregate property owned by the corporation, and that it has paid taxes on all of its tangible property, including moneys and credits.
The rule announced in the decisions of this court is that the taxable value of shares of stock of a corporation is ascertained by deducting the value of its tangible property otherwise assessed from the market value of the shares of stock. State v. Bodcaw Lumber Co., 128 Ark. 505; State v. Fort Smith Lumber Company, 131 Ark. 40; Crossett Lumber Co. v. State, 139 Ark. 397; State v. Gloster Lumber Company, 147 Ark. 461. Under the agreement of facts there is no taxable value of the capital stock, as it does not exceed the aggregate value of the other property assessed in this State. Nor is it shown in the agreed statement of facts that the corporation owns any other property elsewhere. We do not, therefore, feel at liberty to follow counsel far enough in the argument to decide the question not applicable to the facts set forth in the record.
The court erred in rendering a decree against the defendant for any sum, and the decree is therefore, on the appeal of the defendant, reversed, and the cause is dismissed.