This is an appeal from the decree in the Greene Chancery Court, dismissing appellant’s hill to enforce an option to lease a building in Paragould, owned by appellee, Mrs. Minnie Noble. The option contract was entered into between Mrs. Minnie Noble and E. B. Ashmore on the 10th day of April, 1919, and is, in part, as follows:
“In consideration of $10 now paid by the lessee to the lessor, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the lessor shall have the option of taking a lease of the premises described as follows:
“The one-story brick building on South Pruet street now occupied as a pool room, in the city of Paragould, Ark., for a term of one year at the monthly rental of $60 per month, and the privilege of extending three (3) years additional at same rental, provided said premises shall be vacated by the tenant who now occupies said premises at any time within two years from the date of this option.
“This option shall be exercisable by notice in writing by the lessee to the lessor at any time within two years from the date hereof that the present tenant shall vacate said premises, and if and when so exercised then the lessor shall grant and the lessee shall accept a lease of the said premises for the said term which shall commence from the date of the exercise of the option, at the said rent, and the said sum of $10 paid for this option shall be applied to the payment of the first month’s rent; provided that the lessee must exercise his option within ten days from the date he shall receive written notice from the lessor that said premises will be' vacant and ready to be occupied by lessee within said ten days.”
At the time the contract was executed the building was occupied by Hugh Stutts, as tenant of Mrs. Noble, at a rental of $50 per month. On May 7 following Hugh Stütts sold his business and equipment to appellees, G, *378T. Breckenridge and Sam Hays, who thereafter occupied the building under a monthly rental contract with Mrs. Noble for $75 per month. Appellant obtained knowledge that Stutts had sold and delivered possession of his business and equipment to Breckenridge and Hays a week or ten days after the sale. He occupied an adjoining building to the building in question, for which he paid $30 per month, and, on that account, did not attempt to exercise his option under the option contract until September 20, 1920. Appellant first made a verbal request for the fulfillment of the option contract, and, when Mrs. Noble refused to execute a lease pursuant to its terms, he gave her written notice of his intention to exercise his rights under the option, then instituted this suit for specific performance of the option.
Appellant’s contention is that he had a right under the option contract to lease the building at any time within two years from its date after being vacated by the tenant then occupying the building, by giving written notice to the lessor, Mrs. Noble, of his intention to exercise the option, and that it was not incumbent upon him to give written notice of his intention until Mrs. Noble first gave written notice that said tenant had vacated the building. We do not place that construction upon the contract. The two-year period in the contract had relation to the life of the contract, and not the time of the accrual of appellant’s right to exercise the option. It is made manifest by the proviso in the first paragraph of the contract set out that the right to exercise the option accrued if the occupancy was changed — of course, with the knowledge of the lessee — at any time within two years from the date of the option. We see nothing in other parts of the contract in conflict with this plain proviso, which is as follows-: “Provided said premises shall be vacated by the tenant who now occupies said premises at any time within two years from the date of this option.” It is argued that the last proviso in the contract is in conflict with this construction, because, by it, the lessee is not required to exercise his option until *379the lessor gives him ten days’ written notice that the occupancy had changed. This was not the purpose of the last proviso in the option contract. The purpose of that proviso was to prevent a lapse between the time of the departure of the then tenant and the entry of the optionor, if he desired to take advantage of his option. The last proviso was clearly for the benefit of the lessor, as it permitted her to 'give the notice which accelerated the right to exercise the option even before the vacancy occurred. Having thus construed the contract, the only remaining question to be determined on this appeal is whether appellant attempted to exercise his option within a reasonable time after his right to specific performance accrued. The rule is that one entitled to specific performance of a contract must proceed to enforce it within a reasonable time. This court, in the case of Uzzell v. Gates, 103 Ark. 191, quoted approvingly the rule announced by Lord Cranworth to the effect that “specific performance is relief which this court will not give, unless in cases where the parties seeking it come as promptly as the nature of the case will permit.” In the instant case, the appellant delayed before taking steps to enforce his option about sixteen months after receiving notice of a change in occupancy of the building in question. In the meantime, without objection or protest on the part of appellant, Mrs. Noble leased the building to others from month to month, at a rental of $75 per month. Appellant’s lack of diligence prevents him now from calling on a court of equity for specific performance.
The decree is therefore affirmed.