The petitioner, G. EL Speer, is •prosecuting attorney in and for the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, and is under indictment returned by the grand jury of Garland county charging him with criminal misconduct. The circuit court is about to enter an order suspending the petitioner from office during the *185pendency of the indictment, and a writ of prohibition is sought to restrain the court from entering the order. The power to suspend petitioner from the office of prosecuting attorney is asserted under the terms of a statute approved March 1, 1917, amending sec. 7992 of Kirby’s Digest, which before being amended read as follows: “Whenever any presentment or indictment shall be filed in any circuit court of this State against any county or township officer for incompetency, corruption, gross immorality, criminal conduct amounting to a felony, malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance in office, such circuit court shall immediately order that such officer be suspended from his office until such presentment or indictment shall be tried. Provided, such suspension shall not extend beyond the next term after the same shall be filed in such circuit court, unless the court is continued on the application of the defendant.” The amendment merely incorporates the words “prosecuting attorney” so as to make the provisions of the Act apply to that officer. The indictments against petitioner were returned by the grand jury prior to the enactment of the statute referred to, and it is contended that even if the statute is valid so far as it operates prospectively it cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply to proceedings instituted prior to its passage. We pretermit discussion of the question of retroactive effect of the statute and also the suggestion that the indictments against petitioner each fail to charge a public offense, and we turn immediately to the real question at issue, whether the statute is valid in attempting to authorize the removal of a prosecuting attorney by judgment of the circuit court.
The contention of the petitioner is that the Constitution provides adequate methods for the removal of public officers, which are exclusive and do not contain authority for the circuit court to remove a State officer, and that it is beyond the power of the Legislature to confer such authority. It is contended on the other hand by the respondent that the constitutional pro*186visions on the subject only have reference to removal from office, and not being exclusive, leave the Legislature possessed of full power to provide for removal of officers as a part of the punishment for crime. The Constitution of 1874, art. 15, provides for the impeachment of State officers before the senate sitting as a court of impeachment, the sole power of initiating the proceedings being vested in the Hou^e of Representatives. It is provided that the impeachment “whether successful or not, shall be no bar to an indictment.” There is a further provision in that article for the removal of State officers by the governor upon the joint address of two-thirds of the members elected to each house of the General Assembly. Those provisions, it is to be observed, apply only to State officers, and it has been decided by this court that prosecuting attorneys are State officers within the meaning of the constitutional provisions. Griffin v. Rhoton, 85 Ark. 89. Sec. 27, art. 7, of the Constitution of 1874, reads as follows: “ The circuit court shall have jurisdiction upon information, presentment or indictment to remove any county or township officer from office for incompetency, corruption, gross immorality, criminal conduct, malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance in office.”
It is thus seen that there is a constitutional scheme provided for the removal of all officers, State, county and township. It is true that the method of impeachment before the General Assembly is a peculiar one, not analogous to other proceedings in civil or criminal jurisprudence, and the Constitution expressly provides, as before stated, that an impeachment shall not constitute a bar to indictments for any crime involved in the charge. The provision for impeachment of State officers might, if standing alone in the Constitution, be susceptible to the construction that it is not intended as an exclusive method of removal of such officers, but when considered in its relation to the other provisions prescribing a different method of removal of county and township officers, it is evident that the framers of the *187Constitution intended to erect an exclusive scheme of dealing with the subject of removals from office. The other provision with respect to the power of the circuit court was not intended merely as a method of removal, but also for the purpose of adding, to that extent, to the punishment of the criminal offense committed by the public official. Such is the construction placed on that section by this court. Haskins v. State, 47 Ark. 243. In that case the proceeding was against a county officer, but it was sought to remove him by information filed by the prosecuting attorney, and this court held that when the alleged cause of removal constituted an indictable offense, the proceeding must be by indictment, and not by information. That construction of the constitutional provision necessarily stamps it as one for the punishment of crime by removal from office. Unless we treat the provisions referred to as exclusive, then there is no effect at all given to the one concerning the jurisdiction of the circuit court to remove county and township officers, and it may as well have been omitted. The circuit count is, under the Constitution, the general residuum of all jurisdiction not otherwise vested, and in the absence of any constitutional provisions on the subject the Legislature would have power to authorize the circuit court to remove county and township officers. That section was, therefore, inserted, not merely as a grant of power, but also as a limitation, and we must so construe it to give it any effect at all. If, in other words, the framers of the Constitution had intended to leave intact the legislative power to remove officers both State and county as a punishment for crime, it would have been unnecessary to incorporate sec. 27 of art. 7. Judge Cooley laid down as one of the rules of construction “that when the Constitution defines the circumstances under which a right may be exercised or a penalty imposed, the specification is an implied prohibition against legislative interference to add to the condition, or to extend the penalty to other cases.” (Cooley’s Const. Lim. 7th Ed. p. 99). That rule of construction *188has been followed in many decisions, notably by the Kentucky court of appeals in the ease of Lowe v. Commonwealth, 3 Met. 241, where it was said “that wherever the Constitution has created an office and fixed its term, and has also declared upon what grounds and in what mode an incumbent of such office may be removed before the expiration of his term, it is beyond the power of the Legislature to remove or suspend Mm from office for any other reason or in any other mode than the Constitution itself has furnished.” To the same effect see Commonwealth v. Williams, 79 Ky. 42; State v. Wiltz, 11 La. Ann. 439; State v. Dunson, (La.) 70 Sou. 61. The same rule is stated by Mr. Throop in his work on Public Officers (p. 343) as follows: “It is well settled that where the Constitution creates or recognizes an office, and declares that the incumbent may be removed in a specified manner or for specified reasons, the Legislature can not constitutionally provide by statute for his removal for any other reason or in any other manner.” Sec. 2450, Kirby’s Digest, a part of the criminal code enacted in 1868, provides that “where justices of the peace, sheriffs, coroners, surveyors, jailers, county assessors, prosecuting attorneys, constables, city or police judges, clerks, and marshals shall be convicted upon an indictment for malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or for wilful neglect in the discharge of their official duties, or for any offense, which, by the statute law or Constitution, creates a forfeiture of their offices, the court shall render a judgment of removal from office, in addition to the other penalties and punishment prescribed by law.” That section has no application to suspension, but refers only to final judgments of removal from office, but it is argued in the brief for respondent that the inclusion of the office of prosecuting attorney witMn the terms of the statute ■ shows a legislative determination of the power of that body to provide for the removal of that officer by judgment of the circuit court. The statute thus referred to was enacted under the Constitution of 1868, and we need *189not determine whether it was valid at that time, foe if it is found to be in conflict with the Constitution of 1874, it must be held to have been displaced, although valid at the time it was enacted. It is1 worthy of notice that Kirby’s Digest, sec. 7992, et seq. which were amended by the recent statute under which the circuit court of Garland county is attempting to proceed, were enacted by the Legislature of 1877, which assembled less than three years after the adoption of the Constitution of 1874, and contained members of the constitutional convention, and that the statute was made to apply only to county and township officers, and this leads to the view that the Legislature at that time determined that it had no power to provide for the removal of any but county and township officers. Our attention is called to certain other provisions of the Constitution with respect to forfeitures of office by reason of commission of specific offenses, and that no method is prescribed for the enforcement of those forfeitures. For instance, it is provided in sec. 6, art. 3, that persons convicted of fraud, bribery and other corrupt and wilful violations of the election law of the State shall be disqualified from holding any office of trust or profit; and in see. 9, art. V, that persons convicted of embezzlement of public money, bribery, forgery or other infamous crime shall not be eligible to the General Assembly or capable of holding any office of trust or profit in this State; and in see. 2, art. 19, that no person who may fight a duel or assist in the same as second or send or accept or knowingly carry a challenge therefor shall hold any office, etc. We do not have to deal with those provisions of the Constitution in disposing of the case now before us, but when the question is presented it may be found that the power is implied for the Legislature to provide for a method ascertaining and declaring the forfeiture. Those additional provisions, however, rather strengthen the conclusion that the Constitution makers intended to provide a complete scheme for declaring forfeitures of offices and of removing officers. At any *190rate, the majority of the court reach the conclusion that the two provisions of the Constitution referred to in the outset were intended to operate exclusively, and that there is no power in the Legislature to provide for judgments of removal of State officers otherwise than by the court of impeachment. It follows that since the Legislature has no power to authorize the circuit court to remove a prosecuting attorney by final judgment of the court, it could not authorize the temporary suspension during the pendency of the indictments, for to do so would be to provide temporarily a greater punishment than was authorized by the Constitution. We hold, therefore, that the statute approved March 1, 1917, is void, and that the court can not proceed under it. The writ of prohibition is accordingly awarded to restrain the circuit court from proceeding beyond its jurisdiction and authority.