The appellant, Hubert Ramage, was charged with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver. His pretrial motion to suppress evidence was denied. He then entered a conditional plea of guilty pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b). On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.
Officer Michael Coleman of the Pine Bluff Police Department testified that, at approximately 1:00 a.m. on July 10, 1996, he stopped the vehicle that appellant was driving because the license plate was not illuminated as required by law. Appellant was unable to produce a driver’s license, registration for the car, or proof of insurance. The officer also determined that the license *176plate was fictitious. When appellant went to the passenger side of the car to look in the glove compartment for a registration card and proof of insurance, the officer reached in the driver’s side window and lowered the sun visor in what he described as an “attempt[ ] to assist [appellant] in locating his registration.” A package of cigarettes and a matchbox fell from the visor to the seat. The officer picked up both items and inspected them “to see if there was anything out of the ordinary there.” Apparently, there was nothing unusual about the cigarette package. The officer then shook the matchbox to see if it sounded as though it contained matches. The officer testified that it sounded inconsistent with matches being inside, so he opened the matchbox. Inside, he found crack cocaine.
The trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress evidence of the cocaine on two grounds: (1) that the officer legally could help appellant look for his papers, the matchbox lawfully came into plain view, and, once the officer’s training and experience told him that the box did not contain matches, he had probable cause to open it; and (2) alternatively, that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered as the result of an inventory anyway, as the officer testified that, without a driver’s license and the necessary paperwork, he would not have allowed appellant to leave in the car but would have impounded it and inventoried its contents. Appellant attacks both of these grounds on appeal. He does not contest the legality of the initial traffic stop.
The State first contends that we should affirm without reaching the merits of appellant’s arguments because appellant failed in his burden of establishing that he had any standing to contest the search. We agree.
Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures are personal in nature. McCoy v. State, 325 Ark. 155, 925 S.W.2d 391 (1996). Thus, a defendant must have standing before he can challenge a search on Fourth Amendment grounds. Dixon v. State, 327 Ark. 105, 937 S.W.2d 642 (1997). The pertinent inquiry regarding standing to challenge a search is whether the defendant manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched and whether society is prepared to recog*177nize that expectation as reasonable. McCoy v. State, supra; Littlepage v. State, 314 Ark. 361, 863 S.W.2d 276 (1993). It is well settled that the defendant, as the proponent of a motion to suppress, bears the burden of establishing that his Fourth Amendment rights have been violated. McCoy v. State, supra; Rockett v. State, 319 Ark. 335, 891 S.W.2d 366 (1995). A person’s Fourth Amendment rights are not violated by the introduction of damaging evidence secured by the search of a third person’s premises or property. Davasher v. State, 308 Ark. 154, 823 S.W.2d 863 (1992); Rankin v. State, 57 Ark. App. 125, 942 S.W.2d 867 (1997). A defendant has no standing to question the search of a vehicle unless he can show that he owns the vehicle or that he gained possession of it from the owner or someone else who had authority to grant possession. McCoy v. State, supra; Littlepage v. State, supra; State v. Barter, 310 Ark. 94, 833 S.W.2d 372 (1992). One is not entitled to automatic standing simply because he is present in the area or on the premises searched or because an element of the offense with which he is charged is possession of the thing discovered in the search. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980); see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). This court will not reach the constitutionality of a search where the defendant has faded to show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the object of the search. McCoy v. State, supra; Rankin v. State, supra.
Here, the record contains no evidence on which one could base a finding that appellant had standing to contest the search. Appellant presented no proof whatsoever that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in either the vehicle or the matchbox that fell from the sun visor. Appellant did not testify at the suppression hearing and assert the proprietary or possessory interest necessary to establish standing, although he could have done so without danger of self-incrimination. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Gass v. State, 17 Ark. App. 176, 706 S.W.2d 397 (1986). The only witness who testified at the suppression hearing was Officer Coleman, and his testimony demonstrated only that the vehicle bore a fictitious license plate and that appellant could not produce a driver’s license, registration, or proof of insurance *178for the vehicle. No evidence was offered that appellant either owned or lawfully possessed the vehicle. Nor did appellant ever assert ownership of or a right to possess the matchbox that was found above the sun visor. Because appellant failed to prove lawful possession of the objects of the search, we conclude that he failed in his burden of establishing standing to challenge the search. Therefore, we do not reach the merits of his arguments on appeal. See McCoy v. State, supra. 1
Affirmed.
*179Arey, Jennings, and Stroud, JJ., agree.
Neal and Griffen, JJ., dissent.