Cecil Shoptaw and Lucille Shoptaw appeal a decree of the Pope County Chancery Court finding appellees, Robert Shoptaw and Darlene Shoptaw, husband and wife, to be the owners of a parcel of real property in Atkins, Arkansas. We disagree with appellants’ contention that the trial court’s decision is not supported by the evidence and affirm.
This action originated with appellee Robert Shoptaw’s complaint for divorce against appellee Darlene Shoptaw. Darlene filed an answer and a counterclaim for divorce and later filed a third party complaint against appellants, Robert’s parents. In her third-party complaint, Darlene alleged that appellants had conspired to defraud her of her interest in a house and lot in Atkins, Arkansas, and that the property was originally purchased by Robert and herself from Cecil’s father, W.L. Shoptaw, but that the deed actually transferred the property to Lucille. Darlene also alleged in her third-party complaint that this failure to transfer the property to Robert and herself was part of a scheme to defraud her of her interest in the property.
At trial, the evidence was in sharp conflict. Darlene testified that the property was purchased in 1969 from Robert’s grandfather, W.L. Shoptaw, for $1,000.00; that the property was put in Lucille’s name without Darlene’s knowledge; that Robert told her the property was put in Lucille’s name because a lawsuit had been *142filed against him; that she and Robert had built the house with money borrowed from Cecil, and that this money was fully repaid; that she and Robert paid taxes on the land to Cecil; and that there was never any question as to whom the house belonged.
Robert testified that he had not paid his grandfather for the property; that the property was purchased in 1970 because Robert and his family were living with Cecil and Lucille at the time and Cecil wanted them out of the house; that Cecil paid for the material to build the house; that W. L. Shoptaw, Robert and Cecil built the house; that he had never paid Cecil any money for taxes on the property; and that the arrangement with Lucille was that she provide a roof over the heads of Robert and his family but that the property actually belonged to Cecil and Lucille.
Cecil Shoptaw testified that Lucille had always paid taxes on the property; that Robert and Darlene did not pay him anything for the purchase of the land or the materials to build the house; and that the house was put in Lucille’s name simply because she is a better business person than he (Cecil).
Lucille Shoptaw testified that the property was put in her name because Cecil’s mother, Mae Shoptaw, did not want the land to get out of the family’s ownership; that Cecil, Robert and W. L. Shoptaw helped build the house but that Cecil paid for it; that she (Lucille) paid taxes on the property every year; and that there was never an agreement that anyone else would own the property. On cross-examination, Lucille admitted that Cecil took care of the business and that she did not consider herself to be a good business person.
Defendant’s Exhibit “A,” which is a copy of the tax record regarding the property, indicates that the house on the property belongs to Robert Shoptaw and that it is on land which is leased and listed in the name of Lucille Shoptaw.
On August 11, 1988, the chancellor entered a decree in which he denied both petitions for divorce and found that Robert and Darlene are the owners of the property as tenants by the entirety. On appeal, appellants argue that the trial court’s decision is not supported by the evidence.
It is the province of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses and resolve any conflicting testimony. *143 First State Bank of Crossett v. Phillips, 13 Ark. App. 157, 681 S.W.2d 408 (1984). Cases on appeal from the chancery court are tried de novo, but we do not reverse unless the findings of the chancellor are clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, giving due deference to the trial judge’s superior position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Day v. Day, 20 Ark. App. 48, 723 S.W.2d 378 (1987).
In the case at bar, the chancellor obviously believed Darlene’s testimony that appellees provided the money for the purchase of the property and that the property actually belonged to appellees. We, therefore, defer to the chancellor’s opportunity to personally observe the witnesses and to evaluate their credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Accordingly, we hold that the chancellor’s finding that Robert and Darlene are the owners of the property is not clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.
Mayfield, J., dissents.