Appellant Myrna Wallis, an employee of appellee, Whirlpool Corporation, sustained injuries to both wrists on February 9, 1981. Appellant initially filed an application for benefits under her employer’s group health insurance plan, contending that the injuries resulted from a non-job-related fall at home. She maintained that the injuries were non-job-related until about August 19, 1981, at which time she filed for workers’ compensation benefits. Appellee controverted the claim in its entirety and raised the defense of lack of notice as required by Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1317 (Supp. 1983).
The administrative law judge held that the injuries to appellant’s wrists had been sustained out of and in the course of her employment with appellee, and that appellee had not been prejudiced by the untimely filing of the claim. However, the law j udge held that appellant was disqualified from receiving benefits because she failed to comply with the timely notice requirements and that no satisfactory reason had been shown by appellant to excuse her from compliance. The full Commission affirmed.
Appellant’s first point for reversal is that the Commission erred in its interpretation of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1317, which provides as follows:
(a) Notice of injury or death for which compensation is payable shall be given within sixty (60) days after the date of such injury or death to the employer, or written notice to the Commission which shall notify the employer immediately.
(b) Failure to give such notice shall not bar any claim (1) if the employer had knowledge of the injury or death, (2) if the employee had no knowledge that the condition or disease arose out of and in the course of employment, or (3) if the Commission excuses such failure on the grounds that for some satisfactory reason such notice could not be given. Objection to failure to give notice must be made at or before the first hearing on the claim.
*103The Commission found that appellant had not brought herself within the limits of any of the statutory exceptions which excuse a claimant from the responsibility to give notice of injury within sixty days. There was no allegation, and the evidence does not support any finding, that the employer had knowledge of the injury; in fact, the employer was notified that the injury was non-job-related. There is evidence that appellant had knowledge, or belief, that her condition arose out of and in the course of her employment. She testified that she had believed since February 1981 that her inj ury arose ou t of her employment, but was afraid to tell her employer because she had been harassed about a previous claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The third statutory exception gives the Commission discretion to excuse failure to give notice on grounds that for some satisfactory reason such notice could not be given. It was the Commmission’s conclusion that appellant gave no satisfactory reason why the notice could not be given.
The court has held that it must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission’s decision. Silvicraft, Inc. v. Lambert, 10 Ark. App. 28, 661 S.W.2d 403 (1983). The Commission’s findings will be upheld if there is any substantial evidence to support their action. Hawthorne v. Davis, 268 Ark. 131, 594 S.W.2d 844 (1980). It is our opinion that there is substantial evidence to support the Commission’s finding that the appellant’s reason for not providing notice did not come within any of the three statutory exceptions.
It is true that there is evidence that the employer in this case was not prejudiced by appellant’s failure to make a timely report of her injury. However, § 81-1317, supra, was amended by the legislature in 1979 to remove that part of the section which provided that failure to give a timely notice would not bar a claim if the Commission determined that the employer had not been prejudiced by the failure.
Appellant next contends that the Commission erred in ignoring her argument that her failure to give the notice should be excused under the provision of § 81-1343 (Repl. 1976) which enumerates the powers and duties of the *104Commission, including the power to “excuse failure to give notice either of injury or death of any employee.” She argues that this section enlarges the provisions of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1317 (Supp. 1983) and gives the Commission full discretionary power to excuse the failure for reasons other than the three enumerated in the earlier section. Appellee concedes in its brief that § 81-1343 does have that effect but contends that the Commission did not ignore this section.
We need not determine what effect § 81-1343 has upon the provisions of § 81-1317. Even assuming that the section does have that effect, we agree with appellee that on the evidence we find no basis for the exercise of that power. It is clear to us that the Commission fully considered appellant’s excuse for failing to give notice and found it insufficient. In its opinion the Commission stated:
We have carefully examined the three bases set out in subsection (b) of the statute for excusing failure to give notice, and we find none of them applicable to this case. . .Ark. Stat. Ann. §81-1317 is plain and unambiguous as applied to the facts in this case. In such a, situation we cannot distort the obvious and intendment of the statute by applying the well known and laudable principles of liberal statutory construction operative in workers’ compensation law. [Emphasis supplied]
The opinion of the administrative law judge adopted by the Commission contained the following finding and conclusion:
The only evidence presented to explain why proper notice of the injury was not given, was the claimant’s own testimony that she intentionally concealed the fact that her wrist condition may have been related to her employment activities until August of 1981 for fear of harassment by her employer. In light of the evidence presented in this case it is my opinion that this has not been sufficiently established to be a. satisfactory reason as to why such notice ‘could’ not be given. [Emphasis supplied]
*105We find no error and affirm.
Cooper, Cloningér and Glaze, JJ., dissent.