The appellant, Wesley R. McMurray, was charged with committing second-degree battery by causing serious physical injury to a person over sixty years of age in concert with two or more other persons. After a jury trial, he was convicted of that offense and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that he was denied due process by the trial judge’s allowing the jury to ask a question concerning accomplice liability, and that the trial court abused its discretion by giving accomplice-liability instructions in response to the jury’s question. We affirm.
At trial, there was evidence that the victim was beaten by a group of men. Appellant was not specifically charged as an accomplice. After deliberating some time, however, the jury sent a note to the judge, stating that they believed that appellant was in fact present when the beating occurred and asking to be instructed on accomplice liability. Over appellant’s objection, the trial judge instructed the jury with Arkansas Model Jury Instruction - Criminal (AMCI) 2d 401, defining accomplice liability; and AMCI 2d 404, stating that mere presence, silence, or knowledge of a crime is not, in the absence of a legal duty to act, sufficient to establish accomplice status.
Appellant’s objection at trial was based on lack of notice and his assertions that (1) accomplice liability must be specifically charged; and (2) there was no evidence that he acted in concert with others because the evidence that indisputably shows *363that he did so was admitted only for the purpose of the enhancement statute, not to show accomplice liability. These arguments are without merit. Appellant was expressly charged with committing battery in concert with two or more other persons. This is sufficient to put appellant on notice that accomplice liability may be an issue, see Purifoy v. State, 307 Ark. 482, 822 S.W.2d 374 (1991), and there is no need to expressly charge a defendant as an accomplice to obtain a conviction based on accomplice liability. Id.
Nor do we agree with appellant’s argument that the evidence of concerted action could not properly be considered to find accomplice liability because it was introduced as proof of enhancement. Because appellant, by virtue of the facts alleged in the charging instrument, should have known that accomplice liability was at issue, see Purifoy v. State, supra, he was required under Ark. R. Evid. 105 to request a limiting instruction if he wished to restrict the jury’s consideration of the evidence to enhancement alone. Having failed to do so, he cannot complain on appeal that the evidence should be restricted to the purpose for which he alleges it was admitted, Jackson v. State, 259 Ark. 780, 536 S.W.2d 716 (1976); see Kennedy v. State, 344 Ark. 433, 42 S.W.3d 407 (2001); Christian v. State, 54 Ark. App. 191, 925 S.W.2d 428 (1996).
Appellant’s remaining arguments are not properly before us. At trial, appellant made no argument, or mention, of Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.7, which requires instructions to be given upon the jury’s request unless certain factors are present. Nevertheless, Rule 33.7 is central to several of his arguments on appeal and, because the Rule was not raised at trial, those arguments are not preserved for appeal.
We note that the circumstances of the present case are markedly different from those of Rush v. State, 239 Ark. 878, 395 S.W.2d 3 (1965), which held that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on lesser-included offenses after the jury had been deliberating for over twenty-four hours. First, Rush involved the giving of an instruction permitting the jury to find the defendant guilty of entirely different crimes; here, the instruction concerned the identical offense with which appellant was charged — the law draws no distinction between the criminal liability of a principal and an accomplice. Tillman v. State, 364 Ark. 143, 217 S.W.3d 773 (2005). Second, the trial judge in Rush gave the lesser-included *364instructions on his own initiative, whereas the trial judge’s instructions in the present case were given in response to a request from the jury which, under Rule 33.7, must be answered unless certain factors are present. Finally, if we are to resort to the common law, there is much better precedent available than Rush. In Slim and Shorty v. State, 123 Ark. 583, 186 S.W. 308 (1916), the supreme court squarely held that it was within the trial court’s discretion, at the jury’s request after deliberations had begun, to give an instruction on the issue of accessories. Id. at 593. So, even had this argument been preserved — and it has not — it would be unavailing.
Affirmed.
Bird, Vaught, Heffley, and Miller, JJ., agree.
Gladwin, Robbins, Glover, and Marshall, JJ., dissent.