After the petitioner had filed his initial brief with this court, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in McCoy v. Louisiana , supra, 138 S.Ct. 1500. In that case, the defendant, Robert McCoy, was charged with shooting and killing the mother, stepfather, and son of his estranged wife in Louisiana. Id., at 1505-1506. A few days later, police in Idaho arrested the defendant and he subsequently was extradited to Louisiana. Id., at 1506. A grand jury indicted the defendant on three counts of first degree murder, and the prosecutor provided notice of intent to seek capital punishment. Id."[The defendant] pleaded not guilty. Throughout the proceedings, he insistently maintained he was out of State at the time of the killings and that corrupt police killed the victims when a drug deal went wrong." Id.
The defendant initially had been represented by assigned counsel, but after that relationship had broken down irretrievably, his parents hired Attorney Larry English to represent their son. Id."English eventually concluded that the evidence against [the defendant] was overwhelming and that, absent a concession at the guilt stage that [the defendant] was the killer, a death sentence would be impossible to avoid at the penalty phase." Id. When, two weeks before the trial, English informed the defendant that he planned to concede that the defendant had committed the killings, the defendant was " 'furious' ...." Id. The defendant specifically instructed English to refrain from making that concession and to pursue an acquittal. Id.
*524The trial court refused the defendant's request to end English's representation and to obtain a different lawyer. Id. During his opening statement to the jury, English, over the defendant's protest, conceded that the defendant had committed the three murders. Id. During the defendant's testimony, he maintained his innocence; however, during closing argument and at the penalty phase English again conceded to the jury that the defendant had killed the three victims. Id., at 1507. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction, concluding that "[t]he concession was permissible ... because counsel reasonably believed that admitting guilt afforded [the defendant] the best chance to avoid a death sentence." Id.
The United States Supreme Court concluded that the decision to determine whether the assertion of innocence, rather than avoidance of capital punishment, was the objective of the defense, belonged to the client and not the attorney. Id., at 1508. "If, after consultations with English concerning the management of the defense, [the defendant] disagreed with English's proposal to concede [that the defendant] committed three murders, it was not open to English to override [the defendant's] objection. English could not interfere with [the defendant's] telling the jury 'I was not the murderer,' although counsel could, if consistent with providing effective assistance, focus his own collaboration on urging that [the defendant's] mental state weighed against conviction." Id., at 1509. Stated differently, "counsel may not admit her client's guilt of a charged crime over the client's intransigent objection to that admission." Id., at 1510.
Next, the court distinguished the facts of McCoy from Florida v. Nixon , supra, 543 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct. 551, because in Nixon , the client had been "generally unresponsive during discussions of trial strategy, and never verbally approved or protested counsel's proposed approach." (Internal *525quotation marks omitted.) McCoy v. Louisiana , supra, 138 S. Ct. at 1509. The court also determined that *306claims of a violation of a client's autonomy, pursuant to the sixth amendment, are distinct from and not within the analytical framework of Strickland v. Washington , supra, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, or United States v. Cronic , supra, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039. McCoy v. Louisiana , supra, at 1510-11. "Here ... the violation of McCoy's protected autonomy right was complete when the court allowed counsel to usurp control of an issue within McCoy's sole prerogative." Id., at 1511. Finally, the court concluded that a violation of a client's sixth amendment autonomy right is not subject to harmless error review and constituted structural error. Id.
In his brief, the respondent argued that the petitioner had raised a "new" claim, distinct from what had been presented to the habeas court. Specifically, he contended that the petitioner had raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim at the habeas trial. The respondent maintains that it is contrary to our jurisprudence to permit the petitioner to change course for the appellate proceedings and allow him to present a claim that the petitioner's right of autonomy had been violated.7 Finally, the respondent stated that "[t]he United States Supreme Court did not invent a new theory in McCoy v. Louisiana , [supra, 138 S.Ct. 1500 ] .... Rather, it applied prior holdings on the right of autonomy and agreed with academic writings and state court decisions that a defendant has a right not to have counsel concede guilt over his objection ... and that a violation of this right is structural error .... This autonomy theory was thus available to the petitioner." (Citations omitted.) The petitioner relied on McCoy in his reply brief. We agree with the respondent.
*526"It is well settled that [t]he petition for a writ of habeas corpus is essentially a pleading and, as such, it should conform generally to a complaint in a civil action.... The principle that a plaintiff may rely only upon what he has alleged is basic.... It is fundamental in our law that the right of a plaintiff to recover is limited to the allegations of his complaint.... While the habeas court has considerable discretion to frame a remedy that is commensurate with the scope of the established constitutional violations ... it does not have the discretion to look beyond the pleadings and trial evidence to decide claims not raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Adkins v. Commissioner of Correction , 185 Conn. App. 139, 167, 196 A.3d 1149, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 946, 196 A.3d 326 (2018) ; see also Nelson v. Commissioner of Correction , 326 Conn. 772, 780-81, 167 A.3d 952 (2017) ; Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction , 131 Conn. App. 336, 351, 27 A.3d 404 (2011), aff'd, 312 Conn. 345, 92 A.3d 944 (2014). "The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lewis v. Commissioner of Correction , 166 Conn. App. 22, 32, 140 A.3d 414, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 905, 150 A.3d 679 (2016).
We have reviewed the November 7, 2016 amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the operative pleading in this case. The sole legal claim alleged therein is the ineffective assistance by the petitioner's criminal defense lawyers, Attorneys Donald *307and Deron Freeman. The amended petition further states that the ineffective assistance occurred due to (1) the concession of guilt without the petitioner's consent in violation of the fifth, sixth and fourteen amendments to the United States *527constitution, and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, and (2) that the concession of guilt violated the petitioner's rights to plead not guilty, to testify, and to have the state prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus does not, explicitly or implicitly, set forth a claim that the petitioner's sixth amendment right to client autonomy was violated by the actions of criminal trial counsel. As the United States Supreme Court made clear in McCoy v. Louisiana , supra, 138 S. Ct. at 1510-11, a claimed violation of the right to client autonomy is separate and distinct from one of ineffective assistance of counsel. Here, all of the alleged constitutional violations fell within the ambit of the solitary legal claim alleged in the operative pleading, that is, that the petitioner had been denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. "[T]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court .... The modern trend, which is followed in Connecticut, is to construe pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically.... Although essential allegations may not be supplied by conjecture or remote implication ... the complaint must be read in its entirety in such a way as to give effect to the pleading with reference to the general theory upon which it proceeded, and do substantial justice between the parties.... As long as the pleadings provide sufficient notice of the facts claimed and the issues to be tried and do not surprise or prejudice the opposing party, we will not conclude that the complaint is insufficient to allow recovery." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Carpenter v. Commissioner of Correction , 274 Conn. 834, 842, 878 A.2d 1088 (2005) ; see also Practice Book § 23-22.
Additionally, we note that in the habeas court's memorandum of decision, it focused its analysis solely on *528the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and did not address the claim that the petitioner's right to client autonomy had been violated. The court conducted its legal analysis through the lens of the two prongs of Strickland , performance and prejudice. The habeas court's reasoning supports our interpretation that the petitioner did not plead a violation of the right to client autonomy.
"This court is not bound to consider claimed errors unless it appears on the record that the question was distinctly raised ... and was ruled upon and decided by the court adversely to the [petitioner's] claim.... This court is not compelled to consider issues neither alleged in the habeas petition nor considered at the habeas proceeding ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Adkins v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 185 Conn. App. at 168-69, 196 A.3d 1149 ; see also Thiersaint v. Commissioner of Correction , 316 Conn. 89, 126, 111 A.3d 829 (2015) (appellate review of claims not raised before habeas court would amount to ambuscade of that court); Hankerson v. Commissioner of Correction , 150 Conn. App. 362, 369, 90 A.3d 368 (well established that appellate courts will not entertain claims not presented to habeas court but raised for first time on appeal), cert. denied, 314 Conn. 919, 100 A.3d 852 (2014). Put differently, "[h]aving not raised [an] issue before the habeas court, [a] petitioner is barred from raising it on appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
*308Walker v. Commissioner of Correction , 176 Conn. App. 843, 846 n.2, 171 A.3d 525 (2017).8 For these reasons, we decline to consider the merits of the petitioner's claim that his sixth amendment right to client autonomy was violated in this case.
*529II
The petitioner next claims that the habeas court improperly determined that he had not been denied the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he argues that the nature of the claimed deficient performance9 warranted an application of the Cronic exception and, therefore, prejudice should have been presumed. In the alternative, he claims that he established prejudice, contrary to the conclusion of the habeas court. The respondent counters that the habeas court properly (1) concluded that the prejudice presumption of Cronic did not apply and (2) determined that the petitioner had failed to establish prejudice. We agree with the respondent.
Before addressing the specifics of the petitioner's claim, we identify the relevant legal principles and our standard of review. Criminal defendants have the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at all critical states of criminal proceedings. Salmon v. Commissioner of Correction , 178 Conn. App. 695, 702, 177 A.3d 566 (2017) ; see also *530Kellman v. Commissionerof Correction , 178 Conn. App. 63, 69, 174 A.3d 206 (2017) (axiomatic that right to counsel is right to effective assistance of counsel).
"A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as enunciated in Strickland v. Washington , supra, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, consists of two components: a performance prong and a prejudice prong. To satisfy the performance prong ... the petitioner must demonstrate that his attorney's representation was not reasonably competent or within the range of competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law.... Our Supreme Court has stated that the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances, and that [j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential....
*309"An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.... To satisfy the second prong of Strickland , that his counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense, the petitioner must establish that, as a result of his trial counsel's deficient performance, there remains a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict that resulted in his appeal.... The second prong is thus satisfied if the petitioner can demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for that ineffectiveness, the outcome would have been different.... In making this determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim [based on counsel's failure to investigate] must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or the jury.... Some errors will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect. Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support....
*531"A petitioner's claim will succeed only if both prongs are satisfied.... Unless a [petitioner] makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction ... resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unworkable.... A court can find against a petitioner, with respect to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, on either the performance prong or the prejudice prong, whichever is easier." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kellman v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 178 Conn. App. at 69-70, 174 A.3d 206.
In certain circumstances, however, a petitioner is relieved of the burden of proving prejudice. "In United States v. Cronic , [supra, 466 U.S. at 659-60, 104 S.Ct. 2039 ], which was decided on the same day as Strickland , the United States Supreme Court elaborated on the following three scenarios in which prejudice may be presumed: (1) when counsel is denied to a defendant at a critical stage of the proceeding; (2) when counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing; and (3) when counsel is called upon to render assistance in a situation in which no competent attorney could do so. Notably, the second scenario constitutes an actual breakdown of the adversarial process, which occurs when counsel completely fails to advocate on a defendant's behalf....
"The United States Supreme Court has emphasized ... how seldom circumstances arise that justify a court in presuming prejudice, and concomitantly, in forgoing particularized inquiry into whether a denial of counsel undermined the reliability of a judgment ...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Taylor v. Commissioner of Correction , 324 Conn. 631, 644-45, 153 A.3d 1264 (2017). Guided by these principles, we address the petitioner's specific claims in turn.
*532A
The petitioner first contends that the habeas court should have applied Cronic and presumed prejudice as a result of Donald Freeman's comments to the jury during closing argument. Specifically, he argues that "Freeman's admissions of [the] petitioner's guilt without consulting with [the] petitioner, who would have expressly directed counsel to the contrary, was a paradigm of a breakdown in the adversarial process under Cronic ." The respondent counters that the habeas court properly *310determined that Cronic , and the corresponding presumption of prejudice, did not apply in the present case. We agree with the respondent.
Cronic established a narrow exception to the general two part Strickland test for determining whether a petitioner's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel has been violated. See Smith v. Commissioner of Correction , 89 Conn. App. 134, 137, 871 A.2d 1103, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 909, 882 A.2d 676 (2005). " Cronic instructed that a presumption of prejudice applies in certain limited circumstances when although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance of counsel is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate .... The court explained that no showing of prejudice is required when counsel is either totally absent or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage in the proceeding, when counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing and when a defendant is denied the right of effective cross-examination.... The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated that [a]part from these rare instances ... the Strickland two-part test of ineffectiveness generally applies....
*533"The exception articulated in Cronic has become known as constructive denial of the assistance of counsel.... [C]ourts have been cautious in invoking Cronic 's dictum and its corresponding presumption of ineffectiveness.... [T]he [United States Court of Appeals for the] First Circuit has limited Cronic 's reach to extreme cases ... the rare instance ... and certain particularly egregious situations .... The United States Supreme Court recently emphasized just how infrequently the surrounding circumstances [will] justify a presumption of ineffectiveness .... Florida v. Nixon , [supra, 543 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct. 551 ]." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 89 Conn. App. at 137-38, 871 A.2d 1103.
The petitioner does not claim that he was denied counsel at a critical stage or that no competent attorney could have provided assistance in his circumstances; instead, he focuses his argument on the second Cronic scenario, that is, the petitioner's criminal trial counsel entirely failed to subject the state's case to meaningful adversarial testing. See, e.g., Hutton v. Commissioner of Correction , 102 Conn. App. 845, 855, 928 A.2d 549, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 917, 931 A.2d 936 (2007) ; see also Davis v. Commissioner of Correction , 319 Conn. 548, 555, 126 A.3d 538 (2015), cert. denied sub nom. Semple v. Davis , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1676, 194 L.Ed.2d 801 (2016). "[C]ases have emphasized that the second Cronic exception is exceedingly narrow.... For it to apply, the attorney's failure must be complete.... [C]ourts have rarely applied Cronic , emphasizing that only non-representation, not poor representation, triggers a presumption of prejudice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hutton , supra, at 856, 928 A.2d 549.
Our Supreme Court has noted that in determining whether Cronic or Strickland applies in a particular case, courts have held "that specific errors in representation, for which counsel can provide some reasonable *534explanation, are properly analyzed under Strickland .... Counsel's complete failure to advocate for a defendant, however, such that no explanation could possibly justify such conduct, warrants the application of Cronic .... In the spirit of Bell [v. Cone , 535 U.S. 685, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) ], *311courts have drawn a distinction between maladroit performance and non-performance ... by applying Cronic in cases where counsel's conduct goes beyond bad, even deplorable assistance and constitutes no representation at all .... Put differently, in ineffective assistance of counsel claims, prejudice may be presumed when counsel wasn't really acting as a lawyer at all." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Davis v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 319 Conn. at 556, 126 A.3d 538.
In Davis , after the victim's family members spoke at the sentencing hearing following the petitioner's guilty plea, the prosecutor requested that the court sentence the petitioner to twenty-five years of incarceration, the maximum permitted under the plea. Id., at 550-51, 126 A.3d 538. "Defense counsel immediately responded as follows: 'Your Honor, I agree with everything that everybody said so far, and I don't think there's anything left to say from my part." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 551, 126 A.3d 538.
The issue before our Supreme Court was whether defense counsel's complete agreement with the prosecutor's recommendation regarding the imposition of the maximum sentence, even though the plea agreement contained a provision allowing defense counsel to argue for a lesser sentence, required analysis under Strickland or Cronic . Id., at 549-50, 126 A.3d 538. It determined that when defense counsel's agreement with the prosecution is reasonably calculated to further the interests of the defendant, courts apply Strickland . Id., at 559, 126 A.3d 538. Stated differently, the relevant case law demonstrates "a willingness to apply Cronic when counsel agrees with the *535prosecution in a way that cannot reasonably be deemed to be in a defendant's interest." Id., at 560, 126 A.3d 538.
Our Supreme Court concluded that a complete breakdown of the adversarial process had occurred in Davis . Id., at 561, 126 A.3d 538. It noted that counsel did not advocate for the petitioner at the sentencing hearing, but instead agreed with the state's recommendation that the court impose the maximum sentence. Id. As a result, "defense counsel entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing .... Thus, we conclude that defense counsel's forfeiture of his right to argue for a lesser sentence to agree with the prosecutor's recommendation warrants application of Cronic ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 568, 126 A.3d 538.
The present case differs from Davis . Here, the actions of the petitioner's criminal trial counsel were reasonably calculated to further the petitioner's interest in avoiding a conviction of the more serious murder charge and did not amount to nonrepresentation of the petitioner. Thus, these facts and circumstances warrant an application of Strickland , and not Cronic . Accordingly, prejudice is not presumed, but rather the petitioner bore the burden of proving that he had been prejudiced as a result of any deficient performance by Donald Freeman. The habeas court properly concluded that Donald Freeman "clearly attempted to perform his duties as the petitioner's legal advocate throughout the petitioner's criminal trial. There was no complete failure of representation, as required under the Cronic doctrine ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
This conclusion is consistent with the reasoning of our Supreme Court in Davis v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 319 Conn. at 555-68, 126 A.3d 538, as well as federal case law. See *312United States v. Thomas , 417 F.3d 1053, 1056-59 (9th Cir. 2005) ( Cronic did not apply where *536defense counsel's strategy was to concede guilt for one criminal charge without consultation or consent of defendant in order to enhance counsel's credibility for other counts where evidence was not as strong and punishment was significantly greater), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1121, 126 S.Ct. 1095, 163 L.Ed.2d 909 (2006) ; see also Bell v. Cone , supra, 535 U.S. at 696-97, 122 S.Ct. 1843 (defense attorney must entirely fail to test prosecutor's case for Cronic rule to apply). Thus, we conclude that the habeas court properly determined that Strickland , and not Cronic , applied in this case and that the burden of demonstrating prejudice remained with the petitioner.
B
Finally, the petitioner argues that the habeas court improperly concluded that he had not been prejudiced by Donald's Freeman's statements during closing argument. Specifically, he contends that the challenged comments to the jury eliminated any chance of the jury returning a not guilty verdict or a guilty verdict on the less serious offense of criminally negligent homicide. The respondent counters that the petitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for Donald's Freeman's statements to the jury, the results of the criminal trial would have been different. We agree with the respondent.
We iterate that "[u]nder the two-pronged Strickland test, a defendant can only prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if he proves that (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance resulted in actual prejudice .... To demonstrate actual prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel's errors ." (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Davis v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 319 Conn. at 555, 126 A.3d 538 ; see also *537Skakel v. Commissioner of Correction , 329 Conn. 1, 40, 188 A.3d 1 (2018), cert. denied sub nom. Connecticut v. Skakel , --- U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 788, 202 L.Ed.2d 569 (2019).
"[I]n making this determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or the jury.... Some errors will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect. Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.... [T]he ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged.... The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Commissioner of Correction , 313 Conn. 360, 376-77, 98 A.3d 23 (2014), cert. denied sub nom. Semple v. Anderson , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 1453, 191 L.Ed.2d 403 (2015) ; see also Spearman v. Commissioner of Correction , 164 Conn. App. 530, 565, 138 A.3d 378 (petitioner must demonstrate reasonably likely result of proceeding would have been different), cert. denied, 321 Conn. 923, 138 A.3d 284 (2016).
In the present case, there was no dispute that the petitioner had shot the victim and caused her death. The question was whether her death had occurred as a result of an accident or conduct that rendered *313the petitioner criminally liable.10 At the petitioner's criminal *538trial, the court instructed the jury, inter alia, as to the crime of murder and the lesser included offenses of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm (intentional), manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm (reckless indifference) and criminally negligent homicide. State v. Leon , supra, 159 Conn. App. at 531, 123 A.3d 136. The jury found him guilty of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm (reckless indifference) in violation of §§ 53a-55 (a) (3)11 and 53a-55a.12
In addressing the prejudice prong, the habeas court stated: "Assuming, arguendo, that Attorney [Donald] Freeman's approach was deficient, the court concludes that such deficiency played no role in producing the jury's guilty verdict to [manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of §§ 53a-55 (a) (3) and 53a-55a ]. Having reviewed all the evidence, the result procured by Attorney [Donald] Freeman's efforts appears surprisingly successful.
"The petitioner's avowal that he brandished his loaded pistol to 'calm' the agitated victim strikes the court as ludicrous. The medical examiner definitively located the muzzle of the handgun against the victim's skin when fired. The petitioner admitted to drinking and arguing with the victim when the disagreement turned violent. The petitioner abandoned the victim, still gasping for air, and sought no medical assistance for her. It is very unlikely that the jury would have *539reached a verdict other than the one it returned based on this evidence."
The state presented significant evidence that the petitioner had violated §§ 53a-55 (a) (3) and 53a-55a. The elements of this crime are as follows: "[T]he statute on manslaughter in the first degree ... provides in relevant part: A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when ... (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person. For the defendant to have been found guilty of this offense, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following: (1) that the defendant engaged in conduct that created a grave risk of death; (2) that in doing so the defendant acted recklessly; (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life; and (4) the defendant caused the death of the victim.... Additionally, the state had to prove that the defendant had the general intent to engage in conduct that created a grave risk of death to another person under circumstances evincing *314extreme indifference to human life." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown , 118 Conn. App. 418, 423, 984 A.2d 86 (2009), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 901, 988 A.2d 877 (2010) ; see also State v. Tomlin , 266 Conn. 608, 625, 835 A.2d 12 (2003) (setting forth elements of reckless manslaughter in first degree with firearm).
There was evidence that, on the night of the shooting, the petitioner and the victim consumed alcohol and argued while at various nightclubs in Hartford. State v. Leon , supra, 159 Conn. App. at 529, 123 A.3d 136. After returning home, the argument continued as the two went upstairs to their shared bedroom. Id. There, the petitioner pushed the victim onto the bed, placed his hand around her neck and held the gun to her neck. Id. The petitioner claimed that he undertook these actions in an effort to *540" 'calm' " the victim. Id. The gun discharged and a bullet entered and exited the victim's neck, also severing one of the petitioner's fingers. Id.
On the basis of this evidence, we agree with the habeas court that it was "very unlikely" that the jury would have reached a different verdict even if Donald Freeman had not made the challenged comments during closing argument. Simply stated, the petitioner failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that it was reasonably likely that the outcome of the trial would have been different. The evidence strongly supported the jury's verdict with respect to §§ 53a-55 (a) (3) and 53a-55a. See, e.g., Buie v. Commissioner of Correction , 187 Conn. App. 414, 422, 202 A.3d 453, cert. denied, 331 Conn. 905, 202 A.3d 373 (2019). Because the petitioner has not persuaded this court of the reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different, we conclude that the habeas court properly determined that the petitioner was not deprived of the right to the effective assistance of counsel.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.