**703This certified appeal arises from a consolidated zoning appeal and enforcement action relating to a manufacturing facility located in Jewett City, which had been subject to a long-standing stipulated judgment imposing various restrictions on its operation since 1997 (1997 stipulated judgment). After **704a short calendar hearing held on November 16, 2015, the trial court opened and modified the 1997 stipulated judgment by agreement of the parties. The issue on appeal concerns the fact that the public had been informed that the parties' joint motion to open and modify the judgment would not be heard until one week later, at a short calendar hearing scheduled to occur on November 23, 2015. A landowner who resides near the manufacturing facility, Kathryn B. Londé, appeared at the publicly noticed short calendar hearing on November 23, 2015, intending to a file a motion to intervene pursuant to General Statutes § 22a-191 for the purpose of raising claims of environmental harm, only to learn that the hearing had occurred one week earlier and that the 1997 stipulated judgment already had been modified. Londé nonetheless filed her motion to intervene. On December 9, 2015, another proposed intervenor, Jeffrey Ryan, also filed a motion to intervene pursuant to § 22a-19, alleging environmental harm. The trial court denied the motions to intervene as untimely.
Londé and Ryan (proposed intervenors) appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court. Griswold v. Camputaro , 177 Conn. App. 779, 802, 173 A.3d 959 (2017). The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court's *514expedited consideration of the parties' joint motion to open and modify the 1997 stipulated judgment "violated our rules of practice," "violated the [proposed] intervenors' right to timely, **705accurate notice," and denied the proposed intervenors "their statutory right[s] to intervene pursuant to § 22a-19 (a)" and to "participate in the hearing on the stipulated settlement" pursuant to General Statutes § 8-8 (n). (Emphasis in original.) Id., at 796, 799, 173 A.3d 959. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The record reflects the following relevant facts and procedural history. Pasquale Camputaro owned and operated an asphalt manufacturing facility, American Sand & Gravel, Inc., located at 630 Plainfield Road in Jewett City. On December 2, 1994, the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Griswold issued a cease and desist order directing the original defendants-Pasquale Camputaro and American Sand & Gravel, Inc.2 -to discontinue the use and operation of the property as an asphalt manufacturing facility. The original defendants moved to dismiss the cease and desist order, but their motion was denied. The original defendants subsequently filed an appeal with the Griswold Zoning Board of Appeals, which refused to consider the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. They then filed an appeal in the Superior Court (administrative appeal).
In the meantime, on January 10, 1995, the plaintiff, the town of Griswold (town), filed a complaint and request for injunctive relief against the original defendants, alleging that the operation of the property as an asphalt manufacturing facility violated the town's zoning regulations (zoning enforcement action). The original defendants responded that their use of the property predated the zoning regulations and, therefore, was a valid preexisting nonconforming use. The trial court consolidated the original defendants' administrative appeal with the town's zoning enforcement action.
In 1997, Camputaro died, and his son and executor of his estate, Pasquale Camputaro, Jr., was substituted **706as a defendant. Soon thereafter, the parties reached a settlement, and the 1997 stipulated judgment was approved by the court on August 4, 1997.
Approximately seventeen years later, the town began to receive complaints that the operation of the asphalt manufacturing facility violated the 1997 stipulated judgment. Although there had been no activity in the case since the entry of the 1997 stipulated judgment, Camputaro, Jr., moved on October 28, 2015 to cite in American Industries, Inc., which is the operator of the asphalt manufacturing facility, as an additional party because it "has been an integral party responsible for the compliance with" the 1997 stipulated judgment. Camputaro, Jr., also filed a second motion to substitute himself as a defendant for Pasquale Camputaro.
On November 12, 2015, the parties filed a joint motion to open and modify the 1997 stipulated judgment. As pertinent to this appeal, the proposed modified judgment included changes to "the restrictions on the operation" of the asphalt manufacturing facility "[i]n recognition of the fact that governmental projects now require that paving occur during nighttime hours ...." Most significantly, the modified judgment permitted the asphalt manufacturing facility more than twice the amount of "extra *515operating hours" per year.3 The clerk of the court scheduled all pending motions in the case to be heard at a short calendar hearing on November 23, 2015, and notice thereof was posted on the Judicial Branch website.
Unbeknownst to the public, however, the hearing date was moved up to November 16, 2015, after the defendants filed a caseflow request, with the consent of the town, asking the trial court to add the motion **707"to [the] Monday, November 16, 2015 short calendar in order to expedite judicial approval of a stipulated judgment modification." The trial court granted the defendants' caseflow request and, at the rescheduled November 16, 2015 short calendar hearing, granted (1) the motion to substitute Pasquale Camputaro, Jr., for Pasquale Camputaro, (2) the motion to cite in American Industries, Inc., as a defendant, and (3) the parties' joint motion to open and modify the 1997 stipulated judgment. The trial court ordered that, on or before December 17, 2015, "the complaint be amended to state facts showing the interest of the plaintiff." Moreover, because the new defendant, American Industries, Inc., had not yet been named in the complaint or served with process, the court also ordered that American Industries, Inc., be summoned to appear as a defendant on or before the second day following December 29, 2015. An amended complaint and a return of service were filed on December 1, 2015.
In the meantime, on November 23, 2015-the date on which the parties' joint motion to open and modify the judgment originally was scheduled to be heard-proposed intervenor Londé filed a verified motion to intervene pursuant to § 22a-19. Approximately sixteen days later, on December 9, 2015, proposed intervenor Ryan also filed a verified motion to intervene pursuant to § 22a-19. The proposed intervenors both averred that they each owned property less than one quarter of one mile from the defendants' asphalt manufacturing facility and "the activities conducted and proposed by [the] defendants ... are reasonably likely to have the effect of unreasonably polluting, impairing or destroying the public trust in the air, water or other natural resources of the state ...." Camputaro, Jr., American Industries, Inc., and the town objected and jointly argued that the motions to intervene should be denied because, among other reasons, "[t]here is no matter pending **708before this court, and, therefore, no proceeding in which to intervene to raise environmental issues, if there are any," in light of the entry of the modified judgment on November 16, 2015. The trial court agreed with the parties that "[t]he case was resolved by a stipulated judgment on November 16, 2015," and, therefore, denied the motions to intervene.
The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's denial of the motions to intervene. See Griswold v. Camputaro , supra, 177 Conn. App. at 802, 173 A.3d 959. The Appellate Court reasoned that the expedited consideration of the parties' joint motion to open and modify the judgment violated Practice Book § 11-15, which provides in relevant part that short calendar matters may not be "assigned unless filed at least five days before the opening of court on the short calendar day...." (Emphasis added.) "By granting the defendants' request that the matter be written on the November 16, 2015 short calendar," only four days after the filing of the parties' joint motion to open and modify, the *516Appellate Court determined, the "[trial] court violated our rules of practice." Griswold v. Camputaro , supra, 177 Conn. App. at 795, 173 A.3d 959.
The Appellate Court also held that the expedited consideration of the parties' joint motion to open and modify the judgment "violated the [proposed] intervenors' right to timely, accurate notice" of the proceedings. (Emphasis in original.) Id., at 796, 173 A.3d 959. The Appellate Court pointed out that § 22a-19 provides prospective intervenors with "a right to intervene ... for the purpose of raising environmental issues," but, despite this statutory right of intervention, "no notice" was provided that the joint motion to open and modify was "to be heard on November 16, 2015, rather than on November 23, 2015." Id., at 797, 173 A.3d 959. "Without accurate notice of the date the motion to open and modify the stipulated judgment was to be heard, the [proposed] intervenors were deprived of the right to file motions to intervene in a pending **709action." Id., at 798, 173 A.3d 959. Therefore, the "the public nature of the hearing was not adequate for the purposes of § 22a-19 (a)." Id.
Lastly, the Appellate Court held that the "almost instantaneous" "opening and closing of the action" on the same day, with no notice to the public; id., at 797-98, 173 A.3d 959 ; denied the proposed intervenors of "their statutory right[s] to intervene pursuant to § 22a-19 (a)"; id., at 796, 173 A.3d 959 ; and to "participate in the hearing on the stipulated settlement" pursuant to § 8-8 (n). Id., at 799, 173 A.3d 959. We granted the joint petition of Camputaro, Jr., American Industries, Inc., and the town for certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court. See Griswold v. Camputaro , 328 Conn. 904, 177 A.3d 1159 (2018).
We agree with the Appellate Court's thorough and well reasoned opinion and adopt it as our own, with one exception. We write separately to clarify that, although Practice Book § 11-15 provides that "[n]o [short calendar] matters shall be ... assigned unless filed at least five days before the opening of court on the short calendar day," this default rule is subject to the discretion of the judicial authority. See Practice Book § 11-13 (a) ("[u]nless otherwise provided ... by the judicial authority ... all motions and objections to requests when practicable, and all issues of law must be placed on the short calendar list"). Practice Book § 11-13 (a) reflects the well established rule that the trial court has broad discretion in matters of case management, including the scheduling of short calendar motions. See, e.g., Krevis v. Bridgeport , 262 Conn. 813, 818-19, 817 A.2d 628 (2003) (noting that "[t]he case management authority is an inherent power necessarily vested in trial courts to manage their own affairs in order to achieve the expeditious disposition of cases" and that trial courts have "wide latitude" to "manage cases" consistent with "judicial economy and justice");
**710Peatie v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 112 Conn. App. 8, 12, 961 A.2d 1016 (2009) (noting that trial court has "broad discretion" in "matters involving judicial economy, docket management [and control of] courtroom proceedings" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Thus, the trial court generally has broad discretion to schedule a short calendar motion for a hearing less than five days before the opening of court on the short calendar day, provided the expedited consideration of the motion affords the parties, and others who may have a legal interest in the proceeding, with "fair notice" and "sufficient time to prepare themselves upon the issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
*517Byars v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. , 101 Conn. App. 44, 49, 920 A.2d 352 (2007) (explaining purpose of five day rule in Practice Book § 11-15 ); see also Udolf v. West Hartford Spirit Shop, Inc. , 20 Conn. App. 733, 736, 570 A.2d 240 (1990) (noting that predecessor to Practice Book § 11-13"allows for the expeditious, alternative, discretionary hearing of motions").
In the present case, however, the trial court's discretion to reschedule the short calendar hearing on the parties' joint motion to open and modify the 1997 judgment was circumscribed by §§ 8-8 (n) and 22a-19, which provide "environmental intervenors [with] standing to raise environmental concerns regarding settlements of administrative appeals" and permit such intervenors to "block the approval of settlements on that basis." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Griswold v. Camputaro , supra, 177 Conn. App. at 799, 173 A.3d 959. These statutes require "timely, accurate notice" to nonparty members of the general public who may wish to exercise their statutory right to intervene, including accurate notice of the date on which the proposed hearing is scheduled to occur. (Emphasis in original.) Id., at 796, 173 A.3d 959. Here, the trial court's rescheduling of the statutorily mandated hearing in response to the defendants' caseflow request and its "almost instantaneous" opening and closing of the 1997 **711stipulated judgment are "hardly the sort of ['fair notice' or] 'hearing' our law contemplates." Id., at 798, 173 A.3d 959. Accordingly, with the exception of the Appellate Court's analysis of Practice Book § 11-15, we adopt the Appellate Court's thorough and well reasoned opinion as a proper statement of the issues and the applicable law concerning those issues. See, e.g., Brenmor Properties, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission , 326 Conn. 55, 62, 161 A.3d 545 (2017) ; Recall Total Information Management, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co. , 317 Conn. 46, 51, 115 A.3d 458 (2015).
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.