¶ 1 .This case concerns petitions to terminate the parental rights of both mother and father with respect to their child, N.L. The family division of the superior court granted the petition to terminate mother's parental rights but denied the petition concerning father. Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, and N.L. appeals the court's decision not to terminate father's parental rights. We affirm the termination of mother's parental rights and reverse the court's order declining to terminate father's parental rights. We remand the matter for the limited purpose of directing the family division to grant the petition to terminate father's parental rights.
I. Facts
¶ 2. N.L. was born in August 2014. In January 2016, she was taken into state custody because both parents were using illicit substances, father was facing jail time on a charge alleging domestic abuse against mother, and mother was unable to care for the child due to her drug addiction and homelessness. N.L. spent several months in foster care. A conditional custody order (CCO) returned N.L. to mother's care after mother completed a substance-abuse program, and they resided for several months in a residential treatment program at Lund Family Center. The CCO remained in effect until February 27, 2017, when the Department for Children and Families (DCF) closed the case.
¶ 3. The present case was initiated based on an incident that occurred in August 2017, at which time DCF was investigating reports of drug use and domestic violence in the home. Police responded to a report of persons slumped over in a car in a grocery store parking lot, one of whom was mother. N.L. was in the back seat of the car, which was strewn with drug paraphernalia.
*478Based on this event, mother was charged with cruelty to a child and pled guilty. N.L. was placed in DCF custody. Father, who was not involved in the incident, was living at mother's apartment, in violation of the terms of her voucher program. Neither parent appeared at the emergency care hearing the day after N.L. was taken into state custody. At an August 15, 2017 temporary care hearing, the family division ordered visitation between mother and N.L. three times a week, for two hours. Mother attended the visits regularly until late September 2017, when she stopped going.
¶ 4. Neither parent appeared for a scheduled October merits hearing. The hearing was rescheduled for December 19, 2017. Again, neither parent appeared for the hearing. The State presented evidence at the hearing, and the family division adjudicated N.L. a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS) after making findings on the record. Meanwhile, in November 2017, N.L. was placed with the foster family with whom she has remained ever since.
¶ 5. In January 2018, DCF filed a disposition case plan with a goal of adoption, as well as petitions to terminate both mother's and father's parental rights at initial disposition. The disposition hearing was held on January 24, 2018, at which time the parents, who both appeared for the hearing, were served with the termination petitions.
¶ 6. That same month mother completed a residential drug treatment program at Valley Vista and sought resumption of visits with N.L. But before that could happen, on February 13, 2018, mother was arrested on suspicion of aiding and abetting a bank robbery and brandishing a firearm while in the commission of a felony. At the time of the termination hearing in May 2018, mother was being held in a federal prison in Virginia. During this time, father had no contact with N.L.
¶ 7. The termination hearing was held on May 17, 2018. In its August 3, 2018 decision, after reviewing the best-interest criteria set forth in 33 V.S.A. § 5114(a), the family division granted the petition to terminate mother's parental rights but denied the petition concerning father. The court continued the CCO then in place with the foster family, changed the case plan goal from solely adoption to concurrent goals of adoption or reunification with father, ordered parent-child contact with father once he completed a required substance-abuse assessment, and adopted a timeframe of three-to-six months for father to achieve the reunification goal. The court expressly declined to require DCF to prepare a new case plan, finding that its original case plan adequately supported the court's adopted permanency goal. Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, and N.L. appeals the family division's decision not to terminate father's parental rights.
II. Mother's Appeal
¶ 8. Mother first argues that, in light of its acknowledgement that she shared a close bond with N.L., the family division erred by terminating her parental rights based on her pretrial incarceration and physical separation from N.L. Mother points to the court's finding that she had maintained her sobriety since completing the Valley Vista program in January 2018 and asserts that there was no evidence of her unfitness when she was sober. Mother states that there was no particularized evidence demonstrating that she would not be able to resume visiting N.L. if she were released from incarceration and maintained her sobriety. According to mother, the court violated her right to due process by basing its determination that she would *479not be able to resume her parental duties within a reasonable time on speculation that she would be indicted and convicted of the alleged federal offense. She contends that, in assessing N.L.'s best interests, the court failed to weigh the relevant factors concerning her preindictment or pretrial incarceration, including the strength of the criminal case against her and how her alleged conduct impacted her ability to resume her parental duties. In making these arguments, mother cites numerous out-of-state cases, but does not address our recent caselaw on the impact of parental incarceration-and particularly pretrial incarceration-on the family division's best-interests analysis.
¶ 9. The family division "may terminate parental rights at the initial disposition proceeding if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests." In re C.P., 2012 VT 100, ¶ 30, 193 Vt. 29, 71 A.3d 1142. "[T]o determine a child's best interests, the court must consider [the] four statutory factors" set forth in § 5114, the most important of which "is the likelihood that the natural parent can resume his or her parental duties within a reasonable period of time" from the perspective of the child's needs. In re D.S., 2014 VT 38, ¶ 22, 196 Vt. 325, 97 A.3d 882. Although this inquiry is forward-looking in the sense that the court must consider the parent's prospective ability to parent the child, "past events are relevant in this analysis." Id."As long as the court applied the proper standard, we will not disturb its findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and we will affirm its conclusions if they are supported by the findings." Id. (quotation omitted). "We leave it to the sound discretion of the family court to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh the evidence." Id. (quotation omitted).
¶ 10. The fact of a parent's incarceration "is a proper consideration in the court's analysis of [the parent's] fitness pursuant to the statutory standard." Id. ¶ 26. "[O]ur case law makes clear that a parent is responsible for the behavior that leads to incarceration and for the consequences that come with such incarceration." Id. (concluding that father's incarceration during most of child's life was "certainly relevant in assessing his relationship with [the child], his ability to parent [the child], and whether he has played a constructive role in [the child's] life" because it had "a direct impact on his availability as a parental resource to [the child]"); see also In re K.F., 2004 VT 40, ¶ 12, 176 Vt. 636, 852 A.2d 584 (mem.) (affirming termination of father's parental rights where father had not been available as parental resource to child for eleven months, and he continued to be unavailable due to his incarceration).
¶ 11. In In re M.W., we specifically addressed the question of how the family division should consider a parent's pretrial incarceration when examining the best-interest factors. 2016 VT 28, ¶¶ 18-22, 201 Vt. 622, 145 A.3d 1250. In that case, the father sought to distinguish D.S. and K.F. because of the lack of evidence of the father's past criminal convictions and the fact that he had not yet been convicted of the pending charges. We acknowledged that the facts of M.W. could be distinguished from those in D.S. and K.F. based on those points, but nonetheless concluded "that it was appropriate for the family court, irrespective of the fact that the criminal charges against him were still pending, to consider father's incarceration and the consequences of his incarceration in evaluating what course of action was in M.W.'s best interests." Id. We directed "the family court to review the individual circumstances of each child to determine how a parent's incarceration-whether *480pretrial or not-affects the child's best interests." Id. ¶ 22. We concluded that the court must consider all relevant factors,
including the nature of the relationship between the parent and child before incarceration, the terms of the incarceration, the needs of the child, and the effect of incarceration on the parent's ability to remain involved with the child and to be in a position to resume parental duties within a reasonable period of time from the perspective of the child.
Id.
¶ 12. Here, the family division found that mother had been N.L.'s primary caregiver for the first three years of N.L.'s life prior to the child's placement in DCF custody, and that during mother's supervised visits, she "was observed to have a strong bond with N.L. and have safe and appropriate parenting skills." In examining the best-interest factors, the court further found that: (1) mother had not seen N.L. since her parent-child contact was suspended in September 2017 due to her failure to consistently attend her court-ordered visitation; (2) N.L. had begun to form a bond with her foster family; (3) mother was "currently incarcerated on serious federal charges which may result in her being imprisoned for a significant length of time"; (4) although mother emphasized her possible release date due to the government's failure to indict her, "she currently is in no position to parent N.L., and ... she has not been able to parent her for several months"; (5) there was no evidence that mother "attempted to remain engaged with N.L., such as calling her or sending her cards"; and (6) although mother was an important part of N.L.'s life before initiation of the CHINS proceeding, the "precipitating incident leading to N.L. being taken into custody [and mother being charged with cruelty to a child] raises questions as to whether Mother was in fact playing a constructive role in N.L.'s life" and no evidence indicated "that Mother currently plays a constructive role in N.L.'s life."
¶ 13. In considering mother's incarceration, the family division's focus was not on the incarceration per se but rather the impact of her incarceration on her ability to resume parenting within a reasonable time. While mother and N.L. may have demonstrated a bond during the supervised visits that she attended, her failure to consistently attend those visits, which led to their suspension in September 2017, and her drug use undermined any claim that she played a constructive role in N.L.'s life. Shortly after mother's completion of the Valley Vista residential drug treatment program, at a time when she could have potentially renewed visitation with N.L., she was arrested on serious federal charges. During this period, the evidence indicated that mother made no effort to contact N.L. in any way. These findings and conclusions were sufficient to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that mother would not be able to resume her parental duties within a reasonable period of time from N.L.'s perspective.
¶ 14. Mother's due process claim is based on a faulty premise-that the court presumed she was guilty of the potential federal charges for which she was incarcerated. The court did not presume her guilt, but rather acknowledged the seriousness of the alleged crimes and the potential for lengthy incarceration, focusing mainly on the impact of her incarceration on her ability to parent N.L. within a reasonable period of time under all the circumstances.
¶ 15. Mother also argues that the family division erred in terminating her parental rights when the goal remained reunification with the noncustodial father. According *481to mother, the court failed to consider what N.L.'s relationship would be with mother if and when father became the custodial parent. Mother points to the lack of evidence that father would refuse contact with her. She argues that even assuming the pending charges against her rendered her unable to resume her duties as a primary parent within a reasonable period of time, there was no evidence suggesting that she would be unsuitable as a noncustodial parent. In short, mother asserts that there was no need to extinguish her bond with N.L. at initial disposition, given that N.L. was not freed for adoption and could end up in father's custody.
¶ 16. This argument loses force here, given our reversal of the family division's order with respect to father. In any event, it has no merit. This Court has explicitly rejected the argument that the family division is precluded from terminating one parent's parental rights while leaving the other parent's rights intact. See In re A.D.T., 174 Vt. 369, 376-77, 817 A.2d 20, 26 (2002) (rejecting mother's argument that because father's parental rights remained intact at time of order terminating her parental rights, "the [family] court should have allowed her to continue to work towards reunification"). "[W]e have repeatedly stated that a valid termination of parental rights does not depend on the availability of permanent foster care or adoption." In re S.B., 174 Vt. 427, 430, 800 A.2d 476, 480-81 (2002) (mem.) (quotation omitted). Thus, we have "rejected the claim ... that the court must consider less drastic alternatives to termination once it has determined the parent to be unfit and unable to resume his or her parental responsibilities." In re G.F., 2007 VT 11, ¶ 20, 181 Vt. 593, 923 A.2d 578 (mem.).
¶ 17. Here, the family division duly weighed the statutory criteria and determined by clear and convincing evidence that mother could not resume her parental duties within a reasonable period of time and that whatever bond mother had with N.L. did not overcome other criteria compelling termination of her parental rights. See S.B., 174 Vt. at 428, 800 A.2d at 478 (noting that termination proceeding is "a legislatively created ... proceeding in which the court is required to weigh specific statutory factors when determining whether to grant a petition for termination of residual parental rights"; see also In re J.F., 2006 VT 45, ¶ 13, 180 Vt. 583, 904 A.2d 1209 (mem.) (recognizing that court may consider strength of parent-child bond in considering appropriate disposition, but noting that bond is not to "be maintained regardless of the cost to the child" (quotation omitted) ). We discern no basis in the record to disturb that determination and thus we affirm the termination of mother's parental rights.
III. N.L.'s Appeal
¶ 18. N.L. joins DCF's brief in support of the family division's order terminating mother's parental rights but argues that the court erred in denying the petition to terminate father's rights. She asserts that the court usurped DCF's statutory duties by changing the disposition goal from adoption to reunification while continuing the plan of services in DCF's case plan that had a singular goal of adoption. She also argues that the record does not support the court's stated bases for declining to terminate father's parental rights. Because we agree with N.L.'s latter argument, we need not address her first argument.1
*482¶ 19. N.L. contends that the undisputed evidence demonstrates that father, who had never been the child's primary caregiver, basically abandoned her and made no attempt to contact her or even inquire about her well-being from the time she was taken into state custody in August 2017 until the termination petition was filed in January 2018. Specifically, N.L. challenges three of the court's findings, two that set forth father's contact with DCF between August 2017 and the termination hearing, and one that discusses the bond between N.L. and her foster family. According to N.L., in those findings the court appears to blame the DCF caseworker rather than father for his conscious choice not to be involved in N.L.'s life after she was taken into custody. N.L. points to father's testimony that: at the time she was taken into state custody he was living with mother in mother's apartment, in violation of her lease and a no-contact order; he did not contact DCF because of his living situation and his belief that mother would get N.L. back, as she had done before; he was aware of notifications mother received regarding N.L. but made no effort to contact DCF and seek visits with N.L. until the termination petition was filed; and he was responsible for not having contacted DCF or seen N.L. for the previous nine months at the time of the termination hearing. In N.L.'s view, the court failed to make findings acknowledging the undisputed evidence that father made virtually no effort to become involved in her life. Hence, N.L. argues, the record does not support the court's determination that her best interests require giving father more time to become part of her life.
¶ 20. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the family division made inadequate findings on N.L.'s best interests with respect to father-most particularly regarding whether he would be able to resume his parental duties within a reasonable period of time from N.L.'s perspective-and that clear and convincing evidence in the record, as well as the *483family division's limited findings, compel terminating father's parental rights.
¶ 21. It is undisputed that father, who had never been N.L.'s primary caregiver, was aware that N.L. had been taken into state custody in August 2017 but nevertheless made no effort to contact DCF between that time and January 2018 when the termination petition was filed. While he did appear at a September 2017 pretrial hearing, neither he nor mother appeared at either the scheduled October 2017 merits hearing or the rescheduled December 2017 merits hearing. Although the DCF caseworker testified that she made no extraordinary efforts to discover father's whereabouts, father was sent notifications of hearings through his last known address, and the caseworker unsuccessfully attempted to reach him on his cellphone. Father acknowledged that during this period he was living with mother in violation of the lease and a no-contact order.
¶ 22. Father did contact the DCF caseworker shortly before the scheduled January 2018 disposition hearing to request visits with N.L. The caseworker and father set up meetings to discuss contact with N.L., but father canceled those meetings. The caseworker and father finally met in early April 2018, one month prior to the termination hearing, at which time father was informed he would have to participate in a substance use assessment and provide a urine sample for urinalysis before visits could begin. Father participated in the assessment and supplied a sample, but because of an unspecified irregularity with the sample, he was required to submit a new sample and was informed of same. He did not do so in a timely manner and thus was required to participate in a new assessment, which he had not done at the time of the termination hearing in May 2018. Consequently, father had not seen or had any contact with N.L. since she was taken into state custody in August 2017.
¶ 23. The family division's limited findings on the lack of contact between N.L. and father are not clearly erroneous. The court found that: (1) father had had no contact with N.L. since she was taken into state custody in August 2017; (2) the DCF caseworker assigned to the case had limited contact information for father; (3) the caseworker did not ask mother for information regarding father's whereabouts; (4) father did not meet the caseworker until the January 2018 disposition hearing; (5) at a March 2018 hearing, the caseworker and father agreed to meet in early April; (6) the caseworker informed father at an April 2018 meeting that he needed to do a substance-abuse assessment before he could begin parent-child contact; (7) he underwent the assessment in mid-April but an irregularity with his sample required him to provide another sample, which he did not do because of transportation issues; (8) he had to do another assessment because of the delay in receiving an acceptable urine sample; and (9) as a result of the delay, father had still had no visits with N.L. at the time of the hearing.
¶ 24. On the other hand, the court did not discuss or evaluate father's failure to seek contact with N.L., notwithstanding the undisputed evidence that he made no effort to contact DCF or seek contact with N.L. from the time she was taken into state custody in August 2017 until the termination petition was filed in January 2018. As documented in the January 2018 disposition case plan adopted by the court, at that point N.L. had been in state custody for a significant period of her young life and was in need of permanency due to her attachment issues. As further noted in the case plan, at this time N.L. had overcome significant behavioral issues and was beginning to bond with her longtime foster *484family and to become fully engaged in her community.
¶ 25. The family division stated in its best-interests analysis that father had served as a caretaker for N.L. but had never been her primary caregiver and that his lack of contact with N.L. had been due in part to him not having consistent housing or transportation. The court concluded that father did not appear to play a constructive role in N.L.'s welfare by providing personal contact and emotional support and affection. To some extent, the court appeared to excuse father's lack of contact, attributing it in part to complications regarding DCF's requirement that he complete a substance-abuse assessment prior to commencing visits with N.L. Regarding the critical question as to whether father would be able to resume parental duties within a reasonable period of time, the court recognized that father did not appear to be in a position to parent N.L. but attributed the paucity of evidence on his parenting ability and the lack of visits between father and N.L. to father's lack of stable housing, transportation, or contact information and "administrative hurdle[s]"2 in his obtaining a substance-abuse assessment. In the end, the court declined to terminate father's rights at initial disposition and offered him another opportunity to establish regular contact with N.L. to demonstrate that he could resume a parental role in her life.
¶ 26. As noted above, when termination of parental rights is sought at the initial disposition stage, the family division is not being asked to modify a previous disposition order and thus does not initially consider whether there has been a substantial change of circumstances from an earlier order. Rather, the court determines only whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the child warrant termination of parental rights. C.P., 2012 VT 100, ¶ 30, 193 Vt. 29, 71 A.3d 1142. In making a disposition order, the family division is guided by the child's best interests, 33 V.S.A. § 5318(a), which do not include an evaluation of DCF's conduct during the case. It is incumbent upon the court to consider the child's best interests based on the statutory criteria set forth in 33 V.S.A. § 5114(a), the most important of which "is whether the parent will be able to resume parenting duties within a reasonable period of time." Id. As we have repeatedly emphasized, "[t]he reasonableness of the time period is measured from the perspective of the child's needs, and may take account of the child's young age or special needs." Id. (citations omitted).
¶ 27. Here, in considering the best-interests criteria, including the most critical criterion of whether father could resume his parental duties within a reasonable period of time from N.L.'s perspective, the family division's brief analysis focused primarily on the reasons for father's lack of contact with N.L., which it attributed primarily to administrative hurdles. Although "the level of assistance provided to parents is relevant to determining whether a parent is unlikely to be able to resume parental duties within a reasonable period of time," we have noted that "[t]he extent of DCF's efforts to achieve the permanency plan is not one of the best-interests *485factors to be considered at termination." In re D.C., 2012 VT 108, ¶¶ 32-33, 193 Vt. 101, 71 A.3d 1191 (quotations omitted) (noting that mother was content to play minimal role in child's life and did not consider herself candidate for reunification from beginning of DCF's involvement in case). Significantly, in its best-interests analysis, the court failed to make findings and conclusions assessing whether father would be able to resume parental duties from N.L.'s perspective. Given that he had never been considered a primary caregiver and had not seen this young child in over eighteen months, there was no evidence about any existing relationship between father and N.L.
¶ 28. Other than suggesting that administrative hurdles had played a role in father not seeing N.L. for a significant period of time, the family division did not explain why mother's rights were terminated for failing to remain engaged with N.L. while father's were not-even though mother had been N.L.'s primary caregiver for the first three years of N.L.'s life prior to the child's placement in state custody and mother was observed during supervised visits "to have a strong bond with N.L. and ... safe and appropriate parenting skills." As noted, the court terminated mother's parental rights because: (1) mother had not seen N.L. since her parent-child contact was suspended in September 2017 due to her failure to consistently attend her court-ordered visitation and her incarceration; (2) there was no evidence that mother "attempted to remain engaged with N.L., such as calling her or sending her cards"; (3) mother's actions indicated that she did not play a constructive role in N.L.'s life; (4) mother had not been able to parent N.L. for several months and was still in no position to do so; and (5) N.L. had begun to form a bond with her foster family, with whom she had lived for a significant period of her young life. Notably, the same was true for father, except, as the court found, there was virtually no evidence that father ever played a constructive role in N.L.'s life or formed a close bond with the child.3
¶ 29. This is one of those rare cases in which we need not remand the matter to the family division to make the appropriate findings because the record, as described above, demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory best-interests factors compel termination of father's parental rights. Cf. J.F., 2006 VT 45, ¶¶ 13, 17, 180 Vt. 583, 904 A.2d 1209 (reversing trial court's decision not to terminate parents' parental rights with respect to some of their children after finding no record support for decision). The record shows *486that father has never played a constructive role in N.L.'s life, that he made no effort to establish visits with N.L. for a critical period of several months after she was taken into state custody, that he was responsible for the lengthy delay in establishing any contact, and that he would not be able to resume any parenting role within a reasonable period of time from N.L.'s perspective, considering her age, the length of time she had spent in state custody, and her need for permanency.
¶ 30. We reject the dissent's suggestion that we are have overstepped our authority by ignoring the applicable standard of review, weighing the evidence, assessing the credibility of witnesses, and engaging in appellate factfinding. To the contrary, upon careful review of the record before us, we conclude that, in denying the termination petition, the family division abused its broad discretion by exercising that discretion based on untenable grounds. See In re T.S., 144 Vt. 592, 594, 481 A.2d 21, 22 (1984) ("To support a claim of abuse of discretion, a party must show that the court failed to exercise its discretion, or that its discretion was exercised for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable."). We need not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses in this case, where the undisputed testimony, as discussed above, demonstrated that father made no attempt to play a constructive role in N.L.'s life during a critical period while she was in state custody and that his belated efforts at seeking visitation after the filing of the termination petition were delayed as the result of his actions or inactions. The court did not find, and the record would not support, a finding that father's lack of contact with DCF or efforts to be part of N.L.'s life was the result of any failures on DCF's part. The primary basis for the court's decision not to terminate father's parental rights was the "administrative hurdles" father encountered, not whether father could resume his parental role within a reasonable period of time from N.L.'s perspective. In any event, as noted above, those hurdles, which caused further delay primarily because of father's actions or inactions, became an issue only after the filing of the termination petition and after many months during which father failed to seek contact with N.L. In short, the record, including the family division's findings, does not provide a tenable basis for the court to deny the termination petition as to father.
The family division's order terminating mother's parental rights is affirmed. The family division's order declining to terminate father's parental rights is reversed, and the matter is remanded for the court to grant the petition to terminate father's parental rights.