I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority in this case. I do so because I am convinced that the petitioner, Wanda Trinidad, has presented medical evidence that demands a conclusion that she is physically unable to perform her job as a bus monitor and that her disability is the natural and probable result of the injury that she sustained while in the course of her duties on January 26, 2011. Therefore, *707it is my opinion that her application for accidental-disability retirement benefits should have been granted.
As the majority has articulately explained, petitioner was examined by three orthopedic surgeons of the board's choosing in connection with her application for accidental-disability retirement benefits. Each of those physicians knew of her medical history, including her mental health history, and each had the benefit of the reports of her treating physician, Gregory Austin, M.D., who is also an orthopedic surgeon. Each of the doctors performed an independent medical examination at the behest of the board, and each was aware that Dr. Austin had begun his treatment with conservative therapy, but that lack of progress had caused Dr. Austin eventually to perform two surgeries on petitioner's left wrist.
The first of these independent medical examiners was Philip J. Reilly, M.D., who examined petitioner on April 19, 2016. Doctor Reilly reported that petitioner had been injured in the course of her employment and had tried, without success, to return to work. Doctor Reilly's physical examination revealed the presence of fluid in petitioner's hand and wrist. He also opined that there were objective signs that her chronic pain syndrome was causally connected to the injury that she sustained while in the course of her duties. Significantly, Dr. Reilly was of the "opinion to within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the patient has a permanent disability with regard to being employed as a bus monitor." It was further his "opinion within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that this disability is causally related to the January 26, 2011 accident."
Jack D. Goldstein, M.D., another orthopedic surgeon, examined petitioner on behalf of the board on April 28, 2016. Doctor Goldstein also recounted petitioner's medical and surgical history. His examination revealed a limited range of motion of petitioner's left wrist and, after examining her, he was of the opinion that it was not likely that she would improve to the extent that she could return to work. Indeed, Dr. Goldstein said, in no uncertain terms, that "[c]learly her injury as stated is the initial and only cause of her current disability. I feel that she is currently disabled from her previous job and this was entirely caused by the accident as described although it is difficult to assess what exactly was injured at the time of injury." Doctor Goldstein concluded by saying that it was unlikely that she would be able to return to her former job and that she should be retrained for some light duty occupation. His opinions were also set forth to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.
Finally, petitioner was examined by Arnold-Peter C. Weiss, M.D., on April 14, 2016. Although Dr. Weiss said that he was unable to connect petitioner's current complaint of pain to petitioner's on-the-job incident, a review of Dr. Weiss's report can lead to no conclusion other than that it lacks the clarity and definitiveness of the reports of the other examining physicians. For instance, Dr. Weiss refers to petitioner's injury as arising from a "fairly innocuous incident[,]" but in the very next sentence relates that she underwent "some significant surgery[.]" Moreover, far from rendering an opinion based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty, as the other two independent medical examiners had done, Dr. Weiss simply states that "I'm not sure that I can causally relate the patient's current upper extremity complaints of pain to her actual on-the-job incident[.]" He then suggests that perhaps the cause is "some other conversion disorder or other psychiatric reactive phenomenon."
*708Doctor Weiss's conclusions were, at best, equivocal. On the one hand, he reports that "from an objective examination perspective I do not believe this patient is totally disabled[,]" even though total disability is not the standard that is required.1 But, on the other hand, he opines that "[f]rom a subjective complaint, and the significant symptoms she's had, including her anxiety disorder, she may be disabled." Despite his misgivings over Ms. Trinidad's claimed inability to work, he nonetheless restricted her from lifting any weight in excess of five pounds with her left upper extremity.2
It is significant to me that the board chose to rely solely on the opinion of Dr. Weiss, the only examiner who did not unequivocally believe that the petitioner's disability was not work-related. The board held that it gave more weight to Dr. Weiss's opinion because he was a hand specialist, but it cannot escape mention that it was the board and the board alone who chose the examiners.
The majority has concisely, and quite correctly, set forth the appropriate standard of review, and it cannot be gainsaid that that standard is daunting. The majority has also correctly and accurately cited this Court's decision in Morse v. Employees Retirement System of City of Providence , 139 A.3d 385 (R.I. 2016). In Morse , this Court rejected the board's unofficial "unanimity rule" and held that there was no requirement that the physicians conducting independent medical examinations be unanimous in their opinions and findings of disability. See Morse , 139 A.3d at 393-94. It is also true that, in rejecting the board's unanimity rule, we opined that the board might be free to conclude that a single dissenting doctor's opinion was more persuasive than the conclusions reached by the other medical examiners. Id. at 393. We cautioned, however, that such a conclusion "must be based on a reasoned analysis of the evidence before the board." Id.
It is here that I find fault with the decision of the board and the reasoning of the majority. There can be no question that the pension system of the City of Providence, like the pension systems of so many other municipalities and states, is stressed and seriously underfunded. It is certainly laudable that the board has sought to endeavor to limit some of the generous disability findings that have resulted in pension abuse in the past. Nonetheless, this petitioner's case deserves to be assessed on its own merits, and it is apparent to me that the board has overlooked the great weight of the evidence and has failed to reasonably analyze the evidence before it in order to reach a decision denying Ms. Trinidad an accidental-disability pension. Morse , far from enabling such an action, in fact cautions against it.
It cannot escape notice that the board has seized on our decision in Morse to reach the decision that it has made in this case. In Morse , the board argued that the mere presence of a medical examiner's dissenting opinion was sufficient to deny disability benefits because the board construed *709the ordinance to require that the examiners be unanimous. See Morse , 139 A.3d at 386. In reversing the board, this Court rejected such a narrow construction. Now, the board argues that it need not credit the majority opinion if a dissenter believes there might not be a disability. In its post- Morse epiphany, the board urges that two strong majority opinions should be ignored while an internally contradictory and diffuse opinion should carry the day.3 It is my opinion that the majority's decision here sets our holding in Morse on its head and allows, and perhaps encourages, the board to find one doctor who will determine that an applicant is not disabled and then cling to that opinion to deny the application in the face of other multiple, unequivocal opinions to the contrary.
Finally, it is my opinion that the majority has also overlooked our holding in Prew v. Employee Retirement System of City of Providence , 139 A.3d 556 (R.I. 2016), in which we held firmly that ordinances such as the one at issue here are remedial in nature, and that any ambiguities should be construed liberally so that the purpose of the ordinance might be carried out. See Prew , 139 A.3d at 563. Such ordinances are designed to provide a more generous pension benefit to those employees who are injured in the course of their employment and are unable to return to their jobs because of disability. See id. Therefore, any ambiguities must be construed liberally, and in favor of the employee. See id. It is my opinion that the board has done, and the majority has affirmed, just the opposite here.
For all those reasons, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority in this case.