B
Constitutional Claims
The hearing justice concluded that Felkner failed to show genuine issues of material fact on any of his claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, alleging violations of his rights to freedom of expression, equal protection, and due process, as well as on his claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), alleging a civil conspiracy to violate these constitutional rights.9 On appeal, Felkner challenges her conclusions on each of these claims.10
1
Standard of Review
"This Court will review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo , employing the same standards and rules used by the hearing justice." Newstone Development, LLC v. East Pacific, LLC , 140 A.3d 100, 103 (R.I. 2016) (quoting Daniels v. Fluette , 64 A.3d 302, 304 (R.I. 2013) ). "We will affirm a trial court's decision only if, after reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Daniels , 64 A.3d at 304 ). "Furthermore, 'the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving by competent evidence the existence of a disputed issue of material fact and cannot rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, mere conclusions or mere legal opinions.' " Id. (quoting *447Daniels , 64 A.3d at 304 ). "[S]ummary judgment should enter against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case." Id. (deletion omitted) (quoting Lavoie v. North East Knitting, Inc. , 918 A.2d 225, 228 (R.I. 2007) ). "It is a fundamental principle that summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously." Botelho v. City of Pawtucket School Department , 130 A.3d 172, 176 (R.I. 2016) (alteration omitted) (quoting Tarro v. Checrallah , 60 A.3d 598, 601 (R.I. 2013) ).
2
Freedom of Speech and Expression
Felkner's first claim alleges that defendants deprived him of his rights to freedom of speech and expression secured by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 21 of the Rhode Island Constitution.11 He seeks redress under 42 U.S.C. §§ 198312 and 1988,13 as well as RICRA.
The freedom of speech and expression is perhaps our most cherished right as residents of the United States. "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette , 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943). "At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal." Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission , 512 U.S. 622, 641, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994). Moreover, "one important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak may also decide 'what not to say * * *.' " Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston , 515 U.S. 557, 573, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 132 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995) (quoting *448Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California , 475 U.S. 1, 16, 106 S.Ct. 903, 89 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (plurality opinion) ).
Nor can it be gainsaid that freedom of speech and expression is alive and well in our public educational institutions. "The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools. * * * The classroom is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District , 393 U.S. 503, 512, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents of University of State of New York , 385 U.S. 589, 603, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967) ). Rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, however, are not unlimited in the context of academia. See Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier , 484 U.S. 260, 273, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988).
In the case under review, both parties seemingly acknowledge that the Hazelwood case is instructive. Hazelwood stands for the proposition that "educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Hazelwood , 484 U.S. at 273, 108 S.Ct. 562.14
Our task in this appeal is not to determine the breadth of Felkner's constitutionally protected rights of speech and expression while a student in the MSW program at RIC, nor indeed to determine whether such rights are necessarily tempered by "legitimate pedagogical concerns." Hazelwood , 484 U.S. at 273, 108 S.Ct. 562. Rather, it is to conduct a de novo review of the record and determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist that would preclude the granting of summary judgment. See Newstone Development, LLC , 140 A.3d at 103. In that regard, we need go no further than the affidavit of Richard Gelles, Ph.D., submitted in support of Felkner's opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment.
At the time of his affidavit, Dr. Gelles was the Dean of the School of Social Policy & Practice at the University of Pennsylvania and a former member of the faculty at the University of Rhode Island. After reviewing the allegations in Felkner's verified complaint, Dr. Gelles attested that, if Felkner's claims were true, the alleged conduct by defendants was "contrary to the concepts of academic freedom and constitute a substantial departure from the norms of academic debate and scholarship that should prevail at colleges and universities, as well as in programs and/or schools offering the Masters of Social Work degree[.]"
Specifically, in his affidavit, Dr. Gelles referenced Felkner's allegations that: (1) Professor Ryczek sent an email to Felkner stating that the social work profession has "a mission devoted to the value of social and economic justice" and anyone who holds antithetical views "might ask themselves *449whether social work is the profession for them" and indeed whether RIC is "a good fit for them"; (2) Professor Weisman sent an email which stated that social work is a "values-based profession" and that the SSW has a "responsib[ility] to promote the values that underlie social work. For the most part, Republican ideology is oppositional to the profession's fundamental values"; (3) Felkner's statement that Professor Pearlmutter "led a fifty-minute in-class discussion assailing Mr. Felkner's conservative views" and allowed other students to "assault [his] views without allowing him to respond"; and (4) the fact that Felkner was prevented "from working on a welfare reform project with the Governor's office because" it was contrary to "the political perspective of the project."
In conducting our de novo review, we are mindful that neither "students [n]or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate[,]" but that such rights must be "applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment[.]" Tinker , 393 U.S. at 506, 89 S.Ct. 733. Accordingly, educational institutions are granted wide latitude to establish their curricula and "further [their] legitimate curricular objectives." Ward v. Polite , 667 F.3d 727, 733 (6th Cir. 2012) (discussing Hazelwood ). So, too, must teachers be given "broad discretion to give grades" and "in limiting speech when they are engaged in administering the curriculum." Settle v. Dickson County School Board , 53 F.3d 152, 156 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Tinker , 393 U.S. at 512-14, 89 S.Ct. 733 ). Moreover, "[s]o long as the teacher limits speech or grades speech in the classroom in the name of learning and not as a pretext for punishing the student for her race, gender, economic class, religion or political persuasion, the federal courts should not interfere." Id. at 155 ; see Ward , 667 F.3d at 734 ("[T]he First Amendment does not permit educators to invoke curriculum 'as a pretext for punishing a student * * *.' ") (alteration omitted) (quoting Settle , 53 F.3d at 155 ). Courts "should show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment. Plainly, they may not override it unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment." Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing , 474 U.S. 214, 225, 106 S.Ct. 507, 88 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985) (footnote omitted).
In light of these principles, we are of the opinion that Felkner's freedom of speech claims deserve to go to a jury. The record in this case is voluminous and replete with disputed facts. Resolving all such facts in the light most favorable to Felkner, the issue is whether he has made tenable claims that defendants have violated his constitutional rights to free speech and expression. We believe that he has. Felkner describes himself as a "conservative libertarian" and was no doubt a challenging student with a political agenda as robust as the agenda he ascribes to defendants. Given the broad discretion afforded to educational institutions, he may have a difficult road ahead of him. Nevertheless, he has raised genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the actions of defendants are "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns" or merely a pretext for punishing him for his conservative views. See Hazelwood , 484 U.S. at 273, 108 S.Ct. 562. "Although we do not second-guess the pedagogical wisdom or efficacy of an educator's goal, we would be abdicating our judicial duty if we failed to investigate whether the educational goal or pedagogical concern was pretextual."
*450Axson-Flynn v. Johnson , 356 F.3d 1277, 1292-93 (10th Cir. 2004) (emphases and footnote omitted). The fact that a student may be required to debate a topic from a perspective that is contrary to his or her own views may well be reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. That relationship is far more tenuous, however, when the student is told that he or she must then lobby for that position in a public forum or that his or her viewpoint is not welcome in the classroom because it is contrary to the majority viewpoint of the students and faculty.
There is ample evidence in the record which, if found credible by a factfinder, suggests that the MSW program had a strong predisposition toward so-called "progressive" social values. Viewing, as we must, the evidence most generously to Felkner, we are of the opinion that, in light of his avowedly conservative bent, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether defendants' justifications for their actions were truly pedagogical or whether they were pretextual. See Axson-Flynn , 356 F.3d at 1292-93. The subjective motivation of defendants is subject to conflicting interpretations; the duty of a trial justice, and this Court, in considering a motion for summary judgment "is not to resolve disputed factual issues but only to find them." Pound Hill Corporation, Inc. v. Perl , 668 A.2d 1260, 1264 (R.I. 1996). We find several here. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment as to count one and remand to the Superior Court for trial or other disposition.
3
Retaliation
Felkner's second claim alleges that defendants "engaged in actions that are retaliatory and have therefore deprived [him] of his clearly established free speech rights * * *." Felkner specifically alleges that the following conduct was retaliatory: "penalizing his grades, filing ethics charges against him, delaying his graduation, and denying him the opportunity to work on welfare reform in the Governor's office, among other things[.]" In his objection to defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment, Felkner expands on his enumerated list to include "[r]equiring him to stop taping classes and conversations with instructors; * * * [c]omplaining about a website he had created about the political bias he was experiencing; * * * [o]rganizing or supporting verbal attacks on him against his views; * * * [t]hreatening to dismiss him from the program; * * * [a]ttempting to require him to lobby the General Assembly in support of political positions he opposed;" and "[n]ot permitting him to complete his degree requirements."
To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) he "engaged in constitutionally protected conduct" and (2) "this conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse" action taken against him. McCue v. Bradstreet , 807 F.3d 334, 338 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Padilla-García v. Rodríguez , 212 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2000) ).
We begin by examining one of the alleged acts of retaliation. Felkner alleges that defendants impermissibly retaliated against him for exercising his constitutional right to record his classes and discussions with faculty. According to Felkner, he began recording conversations with faculty because "he believed that Ryczek had lied to the ASC about their conversations." Felkner also tape-recorded his classes. He would then post a rough transcript of some of these conversations on his personal website. Felkner further asserts that Professor Pearlmutter led a fifty-minute *451in-class discussion assailing his conservative views and the postings on his website. According to Felkner, Professor Ryzcek also allowed other students to criticize Felkner's views without allowing him to respond. In addition, Professor Pearlmutter filed a complaint with the ASC claiming that Felkner's recordings violated the NASW Code of Ethics. Felkner argues that these actions by defendants were in retaliation against him because he had exercised his constitutional right to free speech.
It is well settled that citizens may record government officials in the exercise of their official duties. Glik v. Cunniffe , 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011). "The act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily included within the First Amendment's guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of the right to disseminate the resulting recording." American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v. Alvarez , 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012). The right to make an audiovisual recording is not absolute, however; "[i]t may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions." Glik , 655 F.3d at 84. Thus, acknowledging that the right to record is an activity protected by the First Amendment, we proceed to examine the activity in the context of an educational institution.
In this regard, we find Tinker to be instructive. Tinker involved the right of high school students to wear black armbands in protest of the war in Vietnam. Tinker , 393 U.S. at 504, 89 S.Ct. 733. Recognizing the First Amendment rights of the students, the Supreme Court held that speech could be restricted in an educational setting under two circumstances: if the speech "might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities," or if the speech "colli[des] with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone." Id. at 508, 514, 89 S.Ct. 733.
As the hearing justice noted in her decision in the present case, "several students expressed their discomfort with Felkner's publication and editorializing of class discussions and activities, which they had previously believed were held in confidence." Clearly, the privacy rights "of other students to be secure and to be let alone" were implicated by Felkner's recordings. Tinker , 393 U.S. at 508, 89 S.Ct. 733. Felkner alleges that Professor Pearlmutter retaliated against his exercise of his First Amendment rights by filing a complaint against him with the ASC. The ASC found that Felkner had "failed to adhere to academic standards of the School when [he] deceptively audio-taped a conversation with Dr. Pearlmutter in violation of Section 4.04 of the NASW Code of Ethics." The recommendation of the ASC was that the SSW department chair, Dr. Olsen, request Felkner "to declare immediately, in writing, that [he] will henceforth refrain from any deceptive audio or video copying of conversations with social work colleagues and refrain from any audio or video copying without express permission from them."
Under the Tinker standard, it is apparent that Felkner's recordings "might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption" and "collid[e] with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone." Tinker , 393 U.S. at 508, 514, 89 S.Ct. 733. Moreover, as the hearing justice noted, "Felkner was not disciplined for the actual act of recording; rather, he was prohibited from engaging in deceptive behavior by making surreptitious recordings of his colleagues." He was required to obtain permission before recording any conversations, a condition that is seemingly reasonable in the context *452of higher learning and academic freedom. We conclude, therefore, that Felkner has failed to provide evidence of a disputed issue of material fact demonstrating that any defendant interfered with or retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights with respect to his recording activities.
With respect to Felkner's other claims of retaliatory conduct, as discussed above, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Felkner's activities were protected by the First Amendment. If Felkner is able to clear that first hurdle, clearly factual issues abound with respect to whether his conduct was a "substantial or motivating factor for the adverse" actions allegedly taken against him by defendants. McCue , 807 F.3d at 338 (quoting Padilla-García , 212 F.3d at 74 ). He may rely on circumstantial evidence to prove this second prong of his retaliation claim. Lewis v. City of Boston , 321 F.3d 207, 219 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating that, in cases where parties' motivations are at issue, the "so-called smoking gun[,]" or direct evidence, is not required). Examples of actions that can give rise to an inference of the required causal nexus include: temporal proximity between the speech and the adverse action; ongoing actions of antagonism; inconsistent justifications for an adverse action; and any evidence of conduct between the time of the speech and the adverse action from which the totality of the circumstances can give rise to a reasonable inference that the adverse action was taken in response to the speech. Id. ; Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Company , 206 F.3d 271, 280-81 (3d Cir. 2000).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment as to count two with respect to Felkner's claim that defendants retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment right to record classroom discussions and his conversations with faculty members. We also hold, however, that defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Felkner's remaining claims of retaliatory actions because there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether defendants retaliated against Felkner for expressing his political beliefs.
4
Compelled Speech
Felkner also alleges that defendants violated his right to freedom of speech and expression by "compell[ing] [him] to express ideas that are contrary to his political beliefs." Before us, Felkner argues that he has made a prima facie claim for compelled speech in violation of his First Amendment rights, but he does not specify the speech he claims was compelled. The hearing justice focused on Felkner's allegations that Professor Ryczek compelled him to espouse a political viewpoint contrary to his own when Felkner was not permitted to switch sides of a project topic.
We start off by noting that, on summary judgment, the issue is not whether a litigant has established a prima facie claim to his stated cause of action, but rather, whether he has demonstrated the presence of genuine issues of material fact to be resolved by a factfinder. We also note that, to the extent Felkner alleges that a requirement of the "Policy and Organizing" course curriculum was to lobby the General Assembly, the issue is moot. There is no dispute that, although Professor Ryczek initially told Felkner he would be required to lobby from a perspective contrary to his own views, Felkner never was compelled to lobby or testify at a public hearing. The question, therefore, is more appropriately whether the "speech" required by his class assignments, integrative project, and other educational activities were reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns *453or, as Felkner contends, either an impermissible form of compelled speech or a "pre-text[ ] for political discrimination." See Hazelwood , 484 U.S. at 273, 108 S.Ct. 562. As we have previously indicated, based on our de novo review and in the context of this case, this inquiry is more amenable to resolution by a factfinder than to summary judgment. We therefore vacate the entry of summary judgment on count three of Felkner's amended complaint.
5
Unconstitutional Conditions
In count four, Felkner invokes the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, under which the government "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech." Perry v. Sindermann , 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). Felkner argues that "[d]efendants' actions placed unconstitutional conditions upon [him] and attempted to compel him to change his political beliefs as a condition of obtaining his master's degree."
"The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions bars government from arbitrarily conditioning the grant of a benefit on the surrender of a constitutional right, regardless of the fact that the government appropriately might have refused to grant the benefit at all. * * *
"Not all conditions are prohibited, however; if a condition is germane-that is, if the condition is sufficiently related to the benefit-then it may validly be imposed. In the final analysis, the legitimacy of a governmental proposal depends on the degree of relatedness between the condition on a benefit and the reasons why government may withhold the benefit altogether." National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham , 43 F.3d 731, 747 (1st Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted).
For the reasons we have stated above, including a record rife with disputed, material facts, we conclude that count four is not amenable to summary disposition, and we therefore vacate the entry of summary judgment on Felkner's unconstitutional conditions claim.
6
Equal Protection
In count five, Felkner alleges that defendants "treated [him] differently than similarly situated graduate students[,]" discriminated against him, and violated his right to equal protection under the law by "denigrating [his] beliefs, penalizing his grades, trumping up ethics charges against him, delaying his graduation, and denying him the opportunity to work on welfare reform in the Governor's Office[,]" actions that were allegedly taken in retaliation for exercising the right to express himself as he wished. The hearing justice focused her analysis on the grading process and result in the "Policy and Organizing I" course and concluded that Felkner, as a class of one, had not demonstrated he was treated differently from similarly-situated students because the undisputed facts showed Professor Ryczek had not previously disaggregated a group grade or needed to ask for another faculty member's input during the grading process.
Before us, Felkner argues that the hearing justice ignored evidence that other students with conservative sociopolitical viewpoints similar to his were affected by defendants' intolerance of conservative ideologies. Felkner points to emails with classmates demonstrating that they either did not speak up in class or did speak up about their personal views and ideologies *454but not with the same resulting poor grades and consequences as Felkner.
"The Equal Protection Clause requires states to treat alike all persons similarly situated."15 Toledo v. Sánchez , 454 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Plyler v. Doe , 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982) ). "Unless state action burdens a suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right, we review equal protection claims for a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and a legitimate government purpose." Id. (citing Heller v. Doe , 509 U.S. 312, 319, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993) ). Because Felkner is not alleging discrimination based on his membership in a suspect class and because education is not a fundamental right under the United States Constitution, see San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 1, 35, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973), he must ultimately demonstrate that defendants' conduct was "irrational and not motivated by any conceivable legitimate reason." Toledo , 454 F.3d at 33. In our opinion, Felkner has failed to demonstrate any disputed fact regarding whether defendants' actions toward him were "irrational and not motivated by any conceivable legitimate reason." Id.
The hearing justice considered Felkner as a "class of one." The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a plaintiff can prevail on a claim that he "has been irrationally singled out as a so-called 'class of one' " rather than as a member of a larger "identifiable group" because the Equal Protection Clause is fundamentally concerned about arbitrary government classification. Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture , 553 U.S. 591, 601, 602, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008). In Engquist , the Supreme Court discussed the case of Village of Willowbrook v. Olech , 528 U.S. 562, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000) (per curiam), in which a property owner had been properly considered a class of one when she pursued a claim for an equal protection violation after her municipality conditioned approval for a connection to reach a municipal water supply on the grant of a larger easement than that required for other similarly situated property owners. Id. at 601-02, 128 S.Ct. 2146 ; see Olech , 528 U.S. at 563, 120 S.Ct. 1073. The Supreme Court cautioned in Engquist , however, against undermining the discretionary decisionmaking inherent in some contexts by mistaking an exercise of discretion for an act of discrimination simply because one person has been treated differently from others who are similarly situated. Id. at 603, 128 S.Ct. 2146. Indeed, the Supreme Court held in that case that the class-of-one theory was not cognizable in the public employment context, id. at 605, 128 S.Ct. 2146, and the First Circuit Court of Appeals has extended that reasoning limiting the application of the class-of-one theory to other arenas. See, e.g. , Caesars Massachusetts Management Company, LLC v. Crosby , 778 F.3d 327, 336 (1st Cir. 2015) (recognizing Engquist and declining to apply the class-of-one theory to the context of licensure for operating a casino).
Similar to the context of employment, the educational realm is replete with discretionary decisions. Individual professors have the necessary authority to evaluate their students' work and to assign a grade for their students' performances on the assignments required for successful course and degree program completion. Administrators have the authority to set the academic *455requirements for completing specific degree programs. In our opinion, the class-of-one theory is not applicable to Felkner's equal protection claim arising out of his educational experience for the same reasons discussed by the Supreme Court when it declared that the theory was not applicable to an equal protection claim arising out of an employment experience. See Engquist , 553 U.S. at 605, 128 S.Ct. 2146 ("To treat employees differently is not to classify them in a way that raises equal protection concerns. Rather, it is simply to exercise the broad discretion that typically characterizes the employer-employee relationship."). Moreover, Felkner himself has neither relied on the class-of-one theory nor suggested that we consider his equal protection claim pursuant to this framework.
Notably, the First Circuit's jurisprudence on equal protection claims in the context of postsecondary education clearly focuses on whether a defendant's actions have been different toward plaintiffs compared to other students and whether the disparate treatment has been rationally related to a legitimate purpose. For example, a student teacher's equal protection claim against his university and the city in which he had been engaged in a student-teaching practicum was summarily dismissed because the plaintiff had "failed to show that others, similarly situated, were treated differently." Hennessy v. City of Melrose , 194 F.3d 237, 244 (1st Cir. 1999). In Toledo , the First Circuit also affirmed the dismissal of an equal protection claim because a university student who had claimed a disability by virtue of a mental illness had failed to allege that the university's refusal to acquiesce to his demands for class scheduling and course assignment changes to accommodate his disability was a result of irrational prejudice, and the university's decisions were obviously rationally related to its academic mission and budgetary constraints. Toledo , 454 F.3d at 29, 33-34.
Felkner asserts that some of his peers who held similar sociopolitical ideologies also did not speak up in class to share these views. The email exchanges with these students that Felkner provided as support for his argument do not show that defendants treated students with conservative ideologies differently than they treated students with liberal ideologies; instead, the emails simply provide evidence to support Felkner's claim that some other students felt that their sociological and political opinions should not be shared with the other students and faculty in the MSW program. This assertion is clearly more relevant to Felkner's claims based on freedom of expression than to claims based on equal protection violations.
Felkner also relies on a mosaic of allegations about the various professors and administrators whose actions against him-he claims-tend to show a pattern of disparate treatment due to his political affiliation. As litigants are apt to do, Felkner cherry-picks from the myriad written communications between him and fellow students, as well as between him and RIC professors and administrators, in his attempt to demonstrate that defendants' actions were motivated by their disagreement with his political ideology. Our review of the record of this case, however, shows that the academic actions taken with respect to Felkner were, ultimately, to enforce the required components of the MSW degree at RIC. Felkner focuses on Professor Ryczek disaggregating his grade and giving him a failing grade when he refused to complete an assignment as instructed, various professors and administrators enforcing the requirement that Felkner complete both a field placement and an integrative project as a prerequisite to *456obtaining the MSW degree, and administrators denying Felkner a further extension of time in which to complete the integrative project after he failed to respond to the SSW's offer for completing the project long after the previous deadlines set for him. In our view, these are actions that involve "discretionary decisionmaking" that do not implicate equal protection concerns. Engquist , 553 U.S. at 603, 128 S.Ct. 2146.
Accordingly, we affirm summary judgment with respect to count five.
7
Procedural Due Process
In count six, Felkner alleges that defendants violated his procedural due process rights in several different ways related to the ASC hearings. The hearing justice concluded that Felkner had been provided with sufficient opportunity to challenge the complaints against him as well as to address his own complaints before the ASC, and that the ASC carefully decided the outcome of each complaint filed with it related to Felkner. On appeal, Felkner argues that he was not provided with sufficient process. The defendants, for their part, argue that Felkner received the notice and opportunity to which he was entitled and that the ASC process was not deficient in any way.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized a "legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest * * * protected by the Due Process Clause[,] which may not be taken away for misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures required by that Clause," Goss v. Lopez , 419 U.S. 565, 574, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975), namely, "notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case," id. at 579, 95 S.Ct. 729 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co. , 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) ).
"The authority possessed by the State to prescribe and enforce standards of conduct in its schools, although concededly very broad, must be exercised consistently with constitutional safeguards. * * *
"The Due Process Clause also forbids arbitrary deprivations of liberty. 'Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him,' the minimal requirements of the Clause must be satisfied." Id. at 574, 95 S.Ct. 729 (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau , 400 U.S. 433, 437, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971) ).
"Due process, which may be said to mean fair procedure, is not a fixed or rigid concept, but, rather, is a flexible standard which varies depending upon the nature of the interest affected, and the circumstances of the deprivation." Gorman v. University of Rhode Island , 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) ; Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) ). The span of procedural protections required to ensure fairness to students, aside from the right to notice and hearing, is uncertain, and must be determined on a case-by-case basis by balancing the competing interests in each case. Id. at 13. The First Circuit in Gorman explained that we must balance the "paramount" interest students hold "in completing their education, as well as avoiding unfair or mistaken exclusion from the educational environment, and the accompanying stigma" against the promotion and protection of educational institutions. Id. at 14.
At a minimum, a student is entitled to know "what he is accused of doing and what the basis of the accusation is."
*457Goss , 419 U.S. at 582, 95 S.Ct. 729. In the context of a student disciplinary action, the Supreme Court has specifically "stop[ped] short of construing the Due Process Clause to require * * * that hearings in connection with short suspensions must afford the student the opportunity to secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses supporting the charge, or to call his own witnesses to verify his version of the incident." Id. at 583, 95 S.Ct. 729 ; see also Gorman , 837 F.2d at 12 (concluding that disciplinary actions taken against students implicate students' liberty and property interest in education and, therefore, require due process).
Although it is not entirely clear to us that Felkner's hearing before the ASC was disciplinary in nature, we shall assume that it was, thereby implicating his liberty and property interests. Before us, Felkner alleges six specific violations of his procedural due process rights:
"(1) to adequate notice of Pearlmutter's complaint by not informing him of the critical 'assumption' upon which the ASC would base its decision, i.e., that he had been told that tape-recording faculty and students was 'unethical'; (2) to counsel for the hearings; (3) by engaging in ex parte communications; (4) by denying him the right to question his accusers at all the hearings; (5) by depriving him of a record for a meaningful appeal[;] and (6) by providing him with meaningless appeals that consisted only of 'rubber-stamping' the ASC's decision."
We discuss Felkner's contentions seriatim .
We start with the adequacy of Felkner's notice of Professor Pearlmutter's complaint to the ASC. Felkner received a letter advising him of Professor Pearlmutter's complaint and the date of the hearing. Professor Pearlmutter's complaint and other materials were enclosed with this notice. A review of these materials shows that Felkner was undisputably told the basis for the complaint against him, see Goss , 419 U.S. at 582, 95 S.Ct. 729, and Felkner has not provided any material to the contrary. The fact that the notice did not include an express statement of permitted and unpermitted behavior by SSW students does not lead to a violation of Felkner's due process rights regarding his entitlement to notice prior to the ASC hearing.
Second, Felkner claims he was deprived of his right to have counsel at the ASC hearing. He does not direct us, however, to any authority establishing a right to counsel in similar academic circumstances. Indeed, "the weight of authority is against representation by counsel at disciplinary hearings, unless the student is also facing criminal charges stemming from the incident in question." Gorman , 837 F.2d at 16.
Third, Felkner's challenge regarding "ex parte communications"-referring to the deposition of Diane Martell, Ph.D., chair of the ASC, in which she testified that Dean Bennett-Speight asked Dr. Martell to assure her that Felkner would be treated fairly and that all the policies and practices would be followed-fares no better. It is difficult to see how this particular communication might compromise Dr. Martell's impartiality, and Felkner has not demonstrated a factual issue to be resolved by a jury.
Fourth, we address Felkner's claim that he was denied the opportunity to question his "accusers" at the ASC hearing. Although the MSW Academic and Field Manual expressly provides a student at an ASC hearing with "the right to question all participants on pertinent matters[,]" the failure to adhere to that policy is not necessarily of constitutional magnitude because Felkner did not have a constitutional *458right to confront and cross-examine Professor Ryczek as his accuser. See Goss , 419 U.S. at 583, 95 S.Ct. 729. Moreover, Felkner has not shown any material, disputed facts for a factfinder to resolve on this point.
Lastly, as to Felkner's assertion about a "meaningless appeal" resulting from the absence of a formal record of the ASC hearings and alleged "rubberstamp" of the ASC's decisions, we note that courts have held that due process does not mandate that a student be afforded an opportunity to appeal from an adverse decision at a disciplinary proceeding. See Flaim v. Medical College of Ohio , 418 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Smith on Behalf of Smith v. Severn , 129 F.3d 419, 428-29 (7th Cir. 1997) ; Winnick v. Manning , 460 F.2d 545, 549 n.5 (2d Cir. 1972) ). While a record of an academic disciplinary proceeding is desirable and may be required by individual educational institutions as part of the process provided, see Gorman , 837 F.2d at 15, 16, Felkner has not demonstrated any disputed, material facts to resolve regarding whether the process here was constitutionally insufficient.
In summary, Felkner has failed to establish any factual disputes with respect to his procedural due process claims and has also failed to establish that defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these claims. The undisputed facts and persuasive federal law lead us to hold that Felkner received adequate notice and opportunity to be heard before the ASC. We therefore affirm the judgment with respect to count six.
8
Conspiracy
Felkner alleges that defendants conspired to deny him his constitutional rights to freedom of speech and due process "on account of his political beliefs" in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The hearing justice concluded Felkner had not alleged "a racial or class-based animus as motivation for the alleged conspiracy" as required by federal law and, as a result, defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Felkner's conspiracy claim. On appeal, Felkner argues that a conspiracy to "deprive [him] of his constitutional rights and drive him out of the MSW program" could reasonably be inferred by the evidence presented in Superior Court that: (1) members of the faculty discussed Felkner on several occasions16 ; (2) Professor Ryczek kept notes about Felkner and had other faculty members review a paper on which he was going to give Felkner a bad grade; and (3) Professor Mueller testified in his deposition that the ASC had not found that Felkner violated the NASW Code of Ethics but Dr. Martell stated that the ASC unanimously found Felkner had violated the code because the ASC tried to reach a consensus.
Felkner's argument, however, misses the mark entirely. To prove a claim under § 1985(3),17 a plaintiff must demonstrate:
*459"(1) a conspiracy, (2) a conspiratorial purpose to deprive a person or class of persons, directly or indirectly, of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, (3) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) either (a) an injury to person or property, or (b) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right or privilege." Aulson v. Blanchard , 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge , 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) ).
We have previously acknowledged that a valid claim pursuant to § 1985(3) must include an allegation "that a conspiracy was not only established to deprive the claimant of the equal protection and privileges or immunities of the law but also was predicated upon a racial or suspect class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus." Salisbury v. Stone , 518 A.2d 1355, 1361 (R.I. 1986) (citing United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. Scott , 463 U.S. 825, 828-29, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983) ) (holding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim when he did not allege his dismissal from employment was "the act of a conspiracy motivated by racial or class-based animus"); see also Hennessy , 194 F.3d 237, 244 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that a student teacher's conspiracy claim against his undergraduate school and field-placement teaching school "founder[ed]" because he had "made no showing that the defendants' conduct originated in an invidiously discriminatory class-based animus"). The First Circuit is clear "that a class is cognizable for purposes of § 1985(3)'s class-based animus requirement only when it is comprised of a distinctive and identifiable group." Aulson , 83 F.3d at 5. The First Circuit has declined an opportunity to extend the protection against conspiracy to classes based on political affiliation, holding "that § 1985(3) provides no remedy for animus on the basis of political beliefs." Pérez-Sánchez v. Public Building Authority , 531 F.3d 104, 108, 109 (1st Cir. 2008) (acknowledging the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Cameron v. Brock , 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973), that supporters of a political candidate are a clearly defined class entitled to protection under § 1985(3) but also collecting other federal circuit court cases holding that political affiliation is not a class entitled to protection).
Felkner's conspiracy claim is based entirely on the cause of action created by § 1985(3), yet he has not alleged that the deprivation of his constitutional rights stemmed from an "invidiously discriminatory animus" directed at a class entitled to protection under this statute. See Aulson , 83 F.3d at 3 ; Salisbury , 518 A.2d at 1361 ; see also Diva's Inc. v. City of Bangor , 411 F.3d 30, 39 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding appellants failed to state a claim for conspiracy pursuant to § 1985(3) and any presumed class inferred from the facts would be "at best, a vague and amorphous grouping of individuals" and therefore insufficient for stating class-based animus) (internal quotation *460marks omitted). Accordingly, defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Felkner's conspiracy claim and we therefore affirm the judgment as to count seven.
C
Qualified Immunity
In defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment, they argued that the doctrine of qualified immunity barred Felkner's claims against them. After the hearing justice determined that defendants were entitled to summary judgment on all of Felkner's claims, she declined to consider defendants' argument that they were qualifiedly immune from the claims. Instead, she found this issue to be moot. In a cursory manner before us, Felkner asserts that two of the individually named defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. Felkner also acknowledges that the hearing justice did not address this issue. The defendants, for their part, have asked us-if we vacate the judgment the hearing justice entered in their favor-to conclude that qualified immunity bars Felkner's claims against them. The defendants argue that, even if their actions are deemed to have violated any of Felkner's constitutional rights, none of the violations were against clearly established constitutional rights, thereby entitling the individual defendants to qualified immunity.
While defendants have presented their qualified immunity arguments to the trial court on three separate occasions, there is no dispute that a hearing justice has yet to substantively consider these arguments. We have held that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment in defendants' favor on several of Felkner's claims, but we decline defendants' invitation to consider or decide whether the potential violations of Felkner's constitutional rights were violations of clearly established rights because we generally do not opine on legal issues that have not been explored and analyzed in the first instance by the trial court. See Pontarelli v. Rhode Island Board Council on Elementary and Secondary Education , 151 A.3d 301, 307 n.5 (R.I. 2016) ; State v. Gaylor , 971 A.2d 611, 614-15 (R.I. 2009). Part of the Superior Court's task on remand will be, therefore, to consider whether any of the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, should defendants continue to press this argument.
D
Punitive Damages
Felkner also asserts that the hearing justice erred when she granted defendants' motion to strike his demand for punitive damages. As previously recounted, Felkner sought punitive damages for defendants' alleged infringement of his right to exercise freedom of speech and for delaying his completion of the MSW degree program. In response to a request for interrogatories seeking the individual defendants' personal financial details, defendants moved to strike Felkner's claim for punitive damages. After conducting a Palmisano hearing, the hearing justice found that defendants' conduct toward Felkner had not "rise[n] to the level of recklessness or callous indifference" to his constitutional rights and therefore concluded that he had not established the required prima facie case for punitive damages. Felkner argues that he did establish a prima facie case for punitive damages because the record demonstrates that defendants, by their actions, were either recklessly or callously indifferent to his constitutional rights. The defendants, not surprisingly, argue that the hearing justice did not err in her decision to grant their motion to strike Felkner's punitive damages claim.
*461We must first determine what standard applies to our review of this issue. Felkner seems to suggest we should review this issue de novo , applying the summary judgment framework in which we view the undisputed facts in the light most favorable to him. The defendants suggest we reverse the hearing justice's ruling only if we hold that her findings of fact and ultimate decision to strike the punitive damages claim were clearly erroneous. " Palmisano established a procedure whereby a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing at an evidentiary hearing that a viable claim exists for an award of punitive damages before discovery of defendant's financial worth may be undertaken." Castellucci v. Battista , 847 A.2d 243, 247 (R.I. 2004) (footnote omitted). Our caselaw is clear that the trial justice determines, as a matter of law, "[w]hether a party seeking punitive damages has met the high standard imposed on such an award[.]" Palmisano , 624 A.2d at 318 ; see also Castellucci , 847 A.2d at 248 ; Simeone v. Charron , 762 A.2d 442, 444 (R.I. 2000). "Such findings on questions of law are reviewed de novo by this Court." Simeone , 762 A.2d at 444. Accordingly, we proceed with a de novo review of this issue.
Punitive damages are available in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983"when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Kolstad v. American Dental Association , 527 U.S. 526, 536, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999) (quoting Smith v. Wade , 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983) ). In order to recover punitive damages under Rhode Island law, a plaintiff must present "evidence of such willfulness, recklessness or wickedness, on the part of the party at fault, as amounts to criminality, which for the good of society and warning to the individual, ought to be punished." Palmisano , 624 A.2d at 318 (alteration omitted) (quoting Sherman v. McDermott , 114 R.I. 107, 109, 329 A.2d 195, 196 (1974) ). Also, "there must be a showing that the defendant acted with malice or in bad faith." Id. This standard "is rigorous and will be satisfied only in instances wherein a defendant's conduct requires deterrence and punishment over and above that provided in an award of compensatory damages." Id. (citing Davet v. Maccarone , 973 F.2d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1992) ). We have previously commented that "[a]n award of punitive damages is considered an extraordinary sanction and is disfavored in the law, but it will be permitted if awarded with great caution and within narrow limits." Id.
In Felkner's objection to the defendants' motion to strike his claim for punitive damages, he provided dozens of pages of allegations against both individually named defendants and unnamed individuals he alleges acted as coconspirators. After reviewing these allegations, the hearing justice's decision on the motion, and Felkner's arguments before this Court, it is evident that, despite the sheer volume of allegations, the substance of his claims against each individual does not reveal either "evil motive or intent" on their part or their "reckless or callous indifference" to his federal constitutional rights. Kolstad , 527 U.S. at 536, 119 S.Ct. 2118 (quoting Smith , 461 U.S. at 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625 ). The hearing justice made an exhaustive and meticulous review of the abundant exhibits before she concluded that Felkner had not met his burden to demonstrate a prima facie case for punitive damages. Based upon our de novo review of the record, we agree with the hearing justice. Accordingly, we affirm the order granting the defendants' motion to strike Felkner's claim for punitive damages.
*462III
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court with respect to counts one, three, and four. We affirm the judgment with respect to counts five, six, and seven. As to count two, we affirm the judgment as it relates to Felkner's claim that the defendants retaliated against him for his audio recordings, and we vacate the judgment in all other respects. We also affirm the order striking Felkner's claim for punitive damages. We remand this case to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.