*290Michael Berger ("Berger") appeals from the Decree denying his Motion to Issue Citation for Appointment of Personal Representative ("Motion for Appointment") for the Estate of Ingrid Huber, deceased ("Estate"), granting the Petition for Grant of Letters of Administration C.T.A. ("Petition for Letters") filed by Kathleen Lewis Yarbrough ("Kathleen"), and directing the Register of Wills to issue Letters of Administration C.T.A. for the Estate to Kathleen. We vacate the Decree.
Ingrid Huber ("the Deceased") died testate on November 25, 2016, without issue. The Deceased was survived by her sister, Christiane Yarbrough ("Yarbrough"), as well as Berger and Andrew Linton ("Linton"), her nephews (Yarbrough's sons). The Deceased's Last Will and Testament (the "Will"), dated January 7, 2003, named Yarbrough as her sole beneficiary.1 The Will named Berger as the alternative residual beneficiary, notwithstanding a $5,000 specific bequest to Linton. Additionally, the Will designated Yarbrough as the Executrix of the Estate.
On April 13, 2017, Berger filed a Motion for Appointment, asserting that Yarbrough was incapacitated and incapable of performing her duties as Executrix.2 Berger requested that the Orphans' Court issue a Citation to Yarbrough and Linton to show cause why the court should not appoint Berger, or another competent party, to serve as the personal representative of the Estate. The Orphans' Court subsequently issued Citations to Yarbrough and Linton, directing them to show cause why Berger's Petition should not be granted.
On May 19, 2017, Kathleen, as attorney-in-fact for Yarbrough, filed an Answer and New Matter, as well as a Petition for Letters, asserting that Yarbrough had executed a Power of Attorney in Kathleen's favor before her incapacitation. Kathleen stated that Yarbrough, through Kathleen as her attorney-in-fact, refused to renounce in favor of Berger "under any circumstances." Kathleen also stated that she had obtained a renunciation in her favor from Linton. Additionally, Kathleen argued that Berger had subsequently procured Yarbrough's signature on a Power of Attorney, appointing him as her attorney-in-fact, despite her incapacity. Kathleen asked the court to deny Berger's Motion for Appointment, and requested that the court direct Berger to show cause why Letters of Administration C.T.A. should not be issued to her. On May 25, 2017, the Orphans' Court filed a Preliminary Decree, directing Berger to show cause why Kathleen should not be issued Letters of Administration C.T.A. for the Estate. Berger filed an Answer on June 30, 2017.
By Decree entered on July 17, 2017, the Orphans' Court denied Berger's Motion for Appointment, granted Kathleen's Petition for Letters, and directed the Register of Wills to issue Letters of Administration C.T.A. for the Estate to Kathleen. Berger filed both a Motion for Reconsideration and a Notice of Appeal on August 16, 2017.
On August 24, 2017, the Orphans' Court entered an Order, indicating that because Berger filed both his Motion for Reconsideration and his Notice of Appeal on the thirtieth day after the entry of the Decree, the court did not have jurisdiction to act on the Motion for Reconsideration. On August *29125, 2017, the Orphans' Court ordered Berger to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), within 21 days of the date of the Order, and instructed him that "[i]ssues not properly included in the statement timely filed and served pursuant to this [O]rder and Rule 1925(b) are waived." Order, 8/25/17. Berger did not file his Concise Statement until September 22, 2017.3 ,4
On appeal, Berger raises the following question for our review:
Did the [Orphans' C]ourt err in making findings and failing to hold a hearing on [Berger's] Motion for Citation for Appointment of Personal Representative despite the existence of substantial factual issues raised in the pleadings?
Brief for Appellant at 1.
Berger claims that the Orphans' Court improperly entered its Decree, without first conducting an evidentiary hearing, and in spite of the following factual issues: (1) Yarbrough claimed that Berger is unemployed and a convicted felon, but he has been employed for 25 years, and had been pardoned for his crime; (2) Yarbrough had no contact with the Deceased for several years prior to her death; (3) Yarbrough had "effectively blocked" the Deceased's cremation, and did not promptly come forward as the personal representative; (4) there is pending litigation in Florida regarding Kathleen's Power of Attorney; and (5) Berger is named as an alternative residual beneficiary in the Will. Brief for Appellant at 5-7. Berger also argues that, as a residual beneficiary, he should have been appointed personal representative pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3155(b)(1).5 Brief for Appellant at 8-9. Berger asserts that the Register of Wills should have granted him Letters of Administration *292C.T.A. , or the Orphans' Court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing to make factual findings. Id. at 9.
Initially, we examine whether the Orphans' Court had the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to grant Kathleen's Petition and direct the Register of Wills to issue to her Letters of Administration C.T.A. for the Estate.
"It is well-settled that the question of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, by any party, or by the court sua sponte. " B.J.D. v. D.L.C. , 19 A.3d 1081, 1082 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting Grom v. Burgoon , 448 Pa. Super. 616, 672 A.2d 823, 824-25 (1996) ). Our standard of review is de novo , and our scope of review is plenary. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Jones , 593 Pa. 295, 929 A.2d 205, 211 (2007) ). "Generally, subject matter jurisdiction has been defined as the court's power to hear cases of the class to which the case at issue belongs." Verholek v. Verholek , 741 A.2d 792, 798 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citing Lowenschuss v. Lowenschuss , 396 Pa. Super. 531, 579 A.2d 377, 380 n.2 (1990) ).
Jurisdiction is the capacity to pronounce a judgment of law on an issue brought before the court through the due process of law. It is the right to adjudicate concerning the subject matter in a given case.... Without such jurisdiction, there is no authority to give judgment and one so entered is without force or effect. The trial court has jurisdiction if it is competent to hear or determine the controversies of the general nature of the matter involved sub judice. Jurisdiction lies if the court had power to enter upon the inquiry, not whether it might ultimately decide that it could not give relief in the particular case.
Aronson v. Spring Spectrum, L.P. , 767 A.2d 564, 568 (Pa. Super. 2001) (quoting Bernhard v. Bernhard , 447 Pa. Super. 118, 668 A.2d 546, 548 (1995) ).
In re Estate of Ciuccarelli , 81 A.3d 953, 958 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Pursuant to the Decedents, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, jurisdiction over decedents' estates and their fiduciaries is vested in the Orphans' Court division. See 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 711. However, jurisdiction to grant letters to a personal representative is vested in the Register of Wills. Id. § 901 (providing that "the register shall have jurisdiction of ... the grant of letters to a personal representative"); see also id. § 711(12) (stating that the Orphans' Court shall have jurisdiction over, inter alia , the appointment of fiduciaries, "except that the register shall continue to grant letters testamentary and of administration to personal representatives as heretofore. " (emphasis added) ); In re Estate of Tigue , 926 A.2d 453, 456 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating that "it is the register who has the authority and duty to issue letters.").
The Orphans' Court may, in some instances, exercise jurisdiction over matters concerning letters of administration. The Orphans' Court may review the Register's decision if a party files an appeal from the *293Register's grant of letters.6 See In re Estate of Tigue , 926 A.2d at 456 ; see also 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 711(18) (providing that the Orphans' Court has jurisdiction over "[a]ppeals from and proceedings removed from registers."). If the Orphans' Court determines that the Register abused its discretion in appointing a particular administrator, the court may then direct the Register to issue letters of administration to the appropriate individual. See In re Estate of Simmons-Carton , 434 Pa.Super. 641, 644 A.2d 791, 795 (1994). Additionally, the Orphans' Court has the authority to remove a personal representative. See In re Estate of Mumma , 41 A.3d 41, 49 (Pa. Super. 2012) ; see also 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3183 (providing that "[t]he court on its own motion may, and on the petition of any party in interest alleging adequate grounds for removal shall, order the personal representative to appear and show cause why he should not be removed, or, when necessary to protect the rights of creditors or parties in interest, may summarily remove him."); id. § 3182 (setting forth the grounds for removal of a personal representative). "Upon removal [of a personal representative], the court may direct the grant of new letters testamentary or of administration by the register to the person entitled...." 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3183 (emphasis added).
Here, there is no confirmation in the certified record of when-or even whether-the Will was admitted to probate. The certified record also lacks any indication of whether the Register of Wills had, at any time prior to the filing of Berger's Motion for Appointment, issued letters testamentary to Yarbrough, or letters of administration to any other party. There is additionally no other indication that an initial Register of Wills determination was appealed to the Orphans' Court. Cf. 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 711(18). Further, although the parties seem to agree that Yarbrough lacks capacity to serve as Executrix of the Estate, the Orphans' Court did not remove Yarbrough as Executrix before issuing Letters of Administration C.T.A. to Kathleen. Cf. id. § 3183. Accordingly, this case does not fall within one of the circumstances in which the Orphans' Court may direct the Register of Wills to grant new letters. Moreover, it does not appear that the Register of Wills had the opportunity to consider the parties' respective statuses and order of priority under section 3155(b), or to determine whether there was good cause to deviate from the statutory order of priority, as it is required to do. See In re Estate of Tigue , 926 A.2d at 459 (vacating the Order of the Orphans' Court, which affirmed the register's appointment of an administrator, where the register appointed appellee "without any evidence that the register applied the relevant law, either by following the order of appointees set forth in [ section] 3155(b) or by exercising his discretion to deviate from that order for good cause."). Thus, as the Register of Wills, rather than the Orphans' Court, had jurisdiction to grant letters of administration in this matter, see 20 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 711(12), we must vacate the Orphans' Court Decree, which denied Berger's Motion for Appointment, granted Kathleen's Petition for Letters, and directed the Register of Wills to issue Letters of Administration C.T.A. for the Estate to Kathleen.
*294Decree vacated. Jurisdiction relinquished.