In 1980, Appellant, Ricky L. Olds, was convicted of second-degree murder and subsequently sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole ("LWOP"). During the incident in question, Appellant's co-conspirator shot and fatally wounded a patron while robbing a tobacco store. At that time, Appellant was 14 years old. After the Supreme Court of the United States' decisions in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012)1 and Montgomery v. Louisiana , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016),2 Appellant received a new sentencing hearing. At the new sentencing hearing on November 21, 2016, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 20 years to life imprisonment. Appellant appeals from that judgment of sentence arguing that the maximum term of life imprisonment imposed upon a juvenile convicted of second-degree murder violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution3 as interpreted by Miller and Montgomery .
*1191We hold that a mandatory life maximum for a juvenile convicted of second-degree murder is not cruel and unusual punishment. In so doing, we explain why this Court's interpretation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(b) in Commonwealth v. Seskey , 170 A.3d 1105 (Pa. Super. 2017) was legally correct and why it does not foreclose Appellant's constitutional challenge. Accordingly, we affirm.
The factual background of this case is as follows. In the early morning hours of October 9, 1979, Appellant (who was 14 years old), Claude Bonner ("Bonner") (who was 18 years old), and Tommy Allen ("Allen") (who was 16 years old) were driving around Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Allen suggested robbing Fort Wayne Cigar Store and Appellant agreed with this plan. When they entered the store, Allen and Appellant witnessed Thomas Bietler ("Bietler") make a purchase and noticed that he possessed a significant amount of United States currency. Allen followed Bietler from the store and shot him three times. Bietler died as a result of the attack. Bonner, Allen, and Appellant then fled the scene.
The procedural history of this case is as follows. On April 2, 1980, Appellant was convicted of second-degree murder,4 robbery,5 and criminal conspiracy.6 On April 28, 1981, the trial court reluctantly sentenced Appellant to the then-mandatory term of LWOP for the second-degree murder conviction.7 On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Appellant's judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Olds , 322 Pa.Super. 442, 469 A.2d 1072 (1983).
On August 24, 1984, Appellant filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act ("PCHA"), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541 et seq. (West 1984).8 Counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition. On March 9, 1990, the PCHA court denied the petition. This Court vacated that decision and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Commonwealth v. Olds , 409 Pa.Super. 656, 589 A.2d 1176 (1991) (unpublished memorandum). Our Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing and the dismissal of Appellant's PCHA petition should be reinstated. Commonwealth v. Olds , 530 Pa. 27, 606 A.2d 898 (1992) (per curiam ).
On July 13, 2010, Appellant filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541 - 9546. On October 15, 2015, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. This Court affirmed and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Olds , 32 A.3d 845 (Pa. Super. 2011) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied , 613 Pa. 663, 34 A.3d 828 (2011). On August 20, 2012, Appellant filed a second pro se PCRA petition. In it, Appellant alleged that his LWOP sentence was unconstitutional in light of Miller . Counsel was appointed. However, after our Supreme Court held that Miller did not apply retroactively, Commonwealth v. Cunningham , 622 Pa. 543, 81 A.3d 1, 9-11 (2013), the PCRA court dismissed the petition. This Court affirmed the denial of relief. Commonwealth v. Olds , 134 A.3d 108, 2015 WL 6509158 (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished memorandum). While Appellant's petition for allowance of appeal was pending, the Supreme Court of the United States issued Montgomery . Therefore, our *1192Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal and vacated this Court's order affirming the dismissal of Appellant's petition. Commonwealth v. Olds , 635 Pa. 184, 133 A.3d 3 (2016) (per curiam ). Subsequently, this Court reversed the PCRA court's order dismissing Appellant's petition and remanded for resentencing. Commonwealth v. Olds , 145 A.3d 778, 2016 WL 1436935 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished memorandum).
On remand, the trial court resentenced Appellant to 20 years to life imprisonment with credit for over 37 years of time served.9 Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion. This timely appeal followed.10
Appellant presents one issue for our review:
Did the [trial] court err [in] holding that it was required to impose a life maximum on an individual who did not kill or intend to kill?
Appellant's Brief at 2.
Appellant's lone appellate issue challenges the legality of his sentence.11 Challenges to the legality of a sentence present pure questions of law; therefore, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Rodriguez , 174 A.3d 1130, 1147 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
Appellant cites two reasons to support his claim that the trial court was not required to impose life imprisonment as a maximum sentence. First, he contends that the governing statutes do not mandate a maximum sentence of life imprisonment because, in light of Miller , no valid sentencing scheme exists for juveniles convicted of second-degree murder prior to June 25, 2012. Second, he contends that, to the extent the statutes require such a sentence, they are unconstitutional when applied to juveniles who did not kill or intend to kill.12 The Commonwealth argues that the disposition of both of these claims is controlled by Seskey .
We first address Appellant's argument that the trial court was not statutorily required to sentence him to a maximum term of life imprisonment. We agree with the Commonwealth that our decision in Seskey controls this question because it is almost on all fours with the present case. In Seskey , the defendant was convicted of *1193first-degree murder prior to June 25, 2012, i.e. , prior to the effective date of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1 (which sets forth the mandatory minimum and maximum sentences for juveniles convicted of first and second-degree murder). After Montgomery , Seskey was resentenced to 13 to 26 years' imprisonment. The Commonwealth appealed and this Court vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded for imposition of a sentence which included a maximum term of life imprisonment. In so doing, this Court held "that our Supreme Court's recent decision in Commonwealth v. Batts , 640 Pa. 401, 163 A.3d 410 (2017) (' Batts II ') requires that an individual convicted of first or second-degree murder for a crime committed as a minor be sentenced to a maximum term of life imprisonment." Seskey , 170 A.3d at 1105-1106 (footnote omitted).
In his brief, Appellant argues that this holding was too broad and that the language regarding second-degree murder was dicta. In Seskey , this Court quoted Batts II as follows:
For those defendants [convicted of first or second-degree murder prior to June 25, 2012] for whom the sentencing court determines a [LWOP] sentence is inappropriate, it is our determination here that they are subject to a mandatory maximum sentence of life imprisonment as required by section 1102(a), accompanied by a minimum sentence determined by the common pleas court upon resentencing[.]
Seskey , 170 A.3d at 1108 (internal alterations in original), quoting Batts II , 163 A.3d at 421.
Appellant notes that Batts II was a case in which the defendant received a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for first-degree murder. Our Supreme Court, in Batts II , did not confront a situation in which a juvenile had been convicted of second-degree murder. Thus, according to Appellant, Batts II should not extend to juveniles convicted of second-degree murder and Seskey 's statement incorrectly implies that it did. Appellant therefore contends that the above quoted passage was not an accurate representation of our Supreme Court's Batts II decision.
We conclude that Seskey 's holding is a correct statement of the law with respect to juveniles convicted of second-degree murder prior to June 25, 2012. To understand why, a brief review of sections 110213 and 1102.114 is necessary. On June *119424, 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States issued Miller . Thereafter, our General Assembly enacted section 1102.1 and made it retroactive for juveniles convicted of first or second-degree murder after June 24, 2012. Moreover, our General Assembly amended section 1102 to clarify that it does not apply to juveniles convicted of first or second-degree murder after June 24, 2012. Section 1102, therefore, applies to adults convicted of first or second-degree murder and juveniles convicted of first or second-degree murder prior to June 25, 2012. Section 1102.1 applies to juveniles convicted of first or second-degree murder after June 24, 2012. Hence, sections 1102 and 1102.1 must be read in pari materia . See Commonwealth v. Anderson , 169 A.3d 1092, 1102 (Pa. Super. 2017), citing 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1932.
Although Batts II was a case governed by section 1102(a) (which mandates a defendant convicted of first-degree murder be sentenced to life imprisonment), the same statutory construction principles apply to section 1102(b) (which mandates a defendant convicted of second-degree murder be sentenced to life imprisonment). First, the text of the two sections is almost identical. Section 1102(a) provides that "a person who has been convicted of a murder of the first degree or of murder of a law enforcement officer of the first degree shall be sentenced to death or to a term of life imprisonment[.]" 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(a)(1). Section 1102(b) similarly provides that "a person who has been convicted of murder of the second degree ... or of second degree murder of a law enforcement officer shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(b). "Absent contrary indication, words that have a clear meaning in one place are interpreted the same throughout a statutory section." Frank Burns, Inc. v. Interdigital Commc'ns Corp. , 704 A.2d 678, 681 (Pa. Super. 1997), appeal denied , 555 Pa. 719, 724 A.2d 935 (1998) (citation omitted). In Batts II , our Supreme Court held that the words in section 1102(a) have a clear meaning, i.e. , a person convicted of first-degree murder must be sentenced to a mandatory minimum of life imprisonment. Because there is no indication that the words in subsection (b) have a contrary meaning, section 1102(b) must be interpreted to require a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for juveniles convicted of second-degree murder.
Other tools of statutory interpretation produce the same result. Subsequent to Miller , our General Assembly enacted 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1 which governs the sentencing of juveniles convicted of first or second-degree murder after June 24, 2012. In determining whether section 1102(a) mandated a life maximum in Batts II , our Supreme Court found persuasive the fact that section 1102.1(a) maintains a mandatory life maximum for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder. See Batts II , 163 A.3d at 442-443. Similarly, section 1102.1(c) maintains a mandatory life maximum for juveniles convicted of second-degree murder. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(c).15 Section 1102.1(c) merely sets the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for juveniles convicted of second-degree murder lower than that for those convicted of first-degree murder. Compare 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(a)with 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(c). Hence, the General Assembly's enactment of section 1102.1(c) also indicates that juveniles convicted of second-degree murder *1195must be sentenced to a maximum term of life imprisonment.
Throughout Batts II , our Supreme Court emphasized that section 1102(a) is constitutionally sound. Our Supreme Court held that it is the interaction of section 1102(a) with 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6137(a)(3) (which bars parole for individuals sentenced to life imprisonment) that causes constitutional problems when applied to juvenile offenders. See Batts II , 163 A.3d at 439-441. Thus, our Supreme Court held that the appropriate remedy is to exempt juveniles convicted of first-degree murder prior to June 25, 2012 from the mandates of section 6137(a)(3). See id. at 439. In other words, the mandatory imposition of LWOP upon juveniles was deemed unconstitutional. Batts II , however, kept in place the requirements of section 1102(a), i.e. , that juveniles convicted of first-degree murder must be sentenced to a maximum term of life imprisonment. See id. at 439-441.
Seskey implicitly held that there was no reason to follow a different approach when assessing the constitutionality of section 1102(b). As our Supreme Court did in Batts II with respect to section 1102(a), we hold that it is not the term of life imprisonment that makes applying section 1102(b) to juvenile offenders unconstitutional. Instead, it is the mandatory nature of that punishment when section 6137(a)(3) (which prohibits parole) is applied that raises constitutional concerns. Thus, section 6137(a)(3) cannot be applied to juveniles convicted of second-degree murder prior to June 25, 2012. In other words, such juveniles must be sentenced to a maximum period of life imprisonment; however, they are eligible for parole after a term-of-years specified by the trial court.
Having set forth the correct statutory construction of section 1102(b), we turn to Appellant's argument that, with this construction, section 1102(b) is unconstitutional when applied to juvenile offenders who did not kill or intend to kill. Seskey did not address this constitutional challenge and, therefore, we are not bound by Seskey when determining if section 1102(b) violates the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by Miller . Thus, we next analyze whether application of section 1102(b), by itself and without resort to section 6137(a)(3), to juveniles convicted of second-degree murder prior to June 25, 2012, and who did not kill or intend to kill, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Appellant's argument is primarily based on Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Miller . The Supreme Court of the United States' opinion in Miller not only disposed of Miller's appeal but also disposed of Kuntrell Jackson's ("Jackson's") challenge to a LWOP sentence following his conviction for capital murder. See Miller , 567 U.S. at 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455. Jackson was convicted of capital murder under a co-conspirator theory of liability for a murder committed during the course of an enumerated felony. See id. at 467, 132 S.Ct. 2455. Like Pennsylvania, Arkansas law provides that intent is inferred when a defendant commits a homicide under such circumstances. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-101(a) (defining capital murder).
Justice Breyer, writing for himself and Justice Sotomayor, opined that if Arkansas
continues to seek a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for [ ] Jackson, there will have to be a determination whether Jackson killed or intended to kill the robbery victim. In my view, without such a finding, the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Graham [v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010)16 ] forbids sentencing Jackson to such a sentence, regardless *1196of whether its application is mandatory or discretionary under state law.
Miller , 567 U.S. at 489-490, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted; emphasis added). According to Appellant, this language indicates that a mandatory maximum sentence of life imprisonment for juvenile homicide offenders who did not kill or intend to kill violates the Eighth Amendment.
This argument is without merit. First, Justice Breyer authored a concurring opinion, not the majority. Thus, it is not binding authority. Moreover, the plain language of Justice Breyer's concurrence only references LWOP sentences. There is nothing in Justice Breyer's concurring opinion, or any other opinion in Graham , Miller , or Montgomery , indicating that the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing a juvenile convicted of homicide to a maximum term of life imprisonment if he or she has a meaningful opportunity for release based upon demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.
In essence, Justice Breyer suggested that juveniles convicted of second-degree murder under an accomplice or co-conspirator theory of liability for murders committed during the course of an enumerated felony are subject to the rule set forth in Graham , and not the rule set forth in Miller , if they did not join the conspiracy or agree to become an accomplice with the intent to murder the victim. Therefore, according to Justice Breyer, even if a state labels a crime homicide (as Pennsylvania has done with second-degree murder) that does not ipso facto permit the imposition of a discretionary LWOP term. Instead, a juvenile must have killed or intended to kill to be eligible for a discretionary LWOP sentence under Miller . See Miller , 567 U.S. at 490, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Given Graham 's reasoning, the kinds of homicide that can subject a juvenile offender to [LWOP] must exclude instances where the juvenile himself neither kills nor intends to kill the victim.").
Even assuming arguendo Justice Breyer's concurring opinion is a correct statement of the law,17 Appellant is not entitled to relief in this case. Graham makes clear that "[a] State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. What the State must do, however, is give defendants ... some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." Graham , 560 U.S. at 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011. In other words, consistent with the Eighth Amendment, a state can set a mandatory maximum term of life imprisonment, even for nonhomicide offenses, so long as it grants defendants the opportunity for parole based upon demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. That is exactly what occurred in this case. Specifically, the trial court made Appellant eligible for parole after 20 years' imprisonment and credited him with over 37 years for time served. Thereafter, Appellant was granted parole based upon his demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.
In reaching its conclusion that juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses can be sentenced to life imprisonment, but not LWOP, the Supreme Court of the United States explained that LWOP differs substantially from a life sentence during *1197which a defendant becomes eligible for parole. See id. at 70, 130 S.Ct. 2011, citing Solem v. Helm , 463 U.S. 277, 297, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). It concluded that these significant differences meant that different rules should apply for imposing LWOP sentences. Despite its adoption of such principles, the Supreme Court of the United States has never placed mandatory life maximums beyond the authority of a sentencing court to impose, even in nonhomicide cases.
Nothing in Pennsylvania case law indicates that our Supreme Court (or this Court) is prepared to expand Justice Breyer's concurrence and prohibit mandatory life maximums for juveniles who commit second-degree murder but did not kill or intend to kill. The sole reference by our Supreme Court to Justice Breyer's concurrence in Miller was not an attempt to extend his reasoning to life maximums. As noted above, in Commonwealth v. Batts , 620 Pa. 115, 66 A.3d 286 (2013), our Supreme Court was presented with a first-degree murder case that did not implicate the concerns expressed by Justice Breyer in his Miller concurrence. Thus, our Supreme Court stated that
despite the broad framing of the questions at hand, [Batts] confined his arguments to the context of first-degree murder; hence, the issues identified by Justice Breyer in his Miller concurrence (discussing additional constitutional concerns connected with the imposition of [LWOP] sentences on juveniles convicted of murder as a result of participation in a felony who have neither killed nor intended to kill), are not implicated in the present matter.
Id. at 293-294 (internal citation omitted). Again, Justice Breyer's concurrence speaks only to LWOP sentences-not life maximums which allow for parole eligibility based upon demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.
In the future, our nation's standards of decency may evolve to the point where sentencing a juvenile convicted of second-degree murder under an accomplice or co-conspirator theory of liability is considered disproportionate and, therefore, cruel and unusual punishment. Cf. Commonwealth v. Foust , 180 A.3d 416, 423-28 (Pa. Super. 2018) (setting forth the evolving standards of decency relating to the sentencing of juvenile offenders). Appellant does not cite a single appellate case,18 and we are unaware of any, which have extended the Eighth Amendment this far. Presently, mandatory life maximums for juveniles convicted of felony murder represent conventional sentencing practices. E.g. , Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-104(b) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-1(e)(1) ; Md. Code, Crim. Law, § 2-201(b)(1). Our society deems the taking of a life, either directly or as an accomplice or co-conspirator, sufficiently grievous as to require that the defendant not be entitled to release without first going through the parole process. Accordingly, we hold that the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of section 1102(b)'s mandatory maximum term of life imprisonment for juveniles convicted of second-degree murder, who did not kill or *1198intend to kill. In this case, Appellant was made eligible and received a meaningful opportunity for release as he was paroled after resentencing. Accordingly, his sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
In sum, we reaffirm that trial courts must sentence juveniles convicted of second-degree murder prior to June 25, 2012 to a maximum term of life imprisonment under section 1102(b). We hold that such mandatory maximums do not violate the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. As such, we affirm Appellant's judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.