During the trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the state from making any reference to the incident involving Febles. The defendant contended that the evidence constituted inadmissible propensity evidence under § 4-5 (a) of the 2012 edition of the Connecticut **261Code of Evidence.22 The state contended that, to the contrary, the evidence was admissible under § 4-5 (c)23 because the state intended to use it to establish the defendant's intent and to rebut his claim that the victim's death was the result of a mistake or an accident.
The trial court concluded that the evidence was admissible because it was relevant to prove intent and the absence of a mistake or an accident. The court noted that there were "substantial similarities between the prior conduct and the conduct *645at issue here. Specifically, the conduct occurred in the context of a domestic dispute, the conduct involved a firearm ... and ... there were allegations of bruising in both situations." The court also found that, "even though the Febles incident occurred approximately [fourteen] years prior to the events in question here, that time frame does not preclude the state's inquiry ...."
Thereafter, during cross-examination of the defendant, the prosecutor described the incident involving Febles and asked the defendant if he recalled it. The defendant testified that he did not. He admitted, however, that he had had a relationship with Febles and that they eventually had broken up. On redirect examination, the defendant testified that he purchased the Glock handgun with which the victim was killed in 2000 and he did not own a Glock handgun in 1995. The **262trial court instructed the jury that it could consider the evidence concerning the incident with Febles only to the extent that it bore on the absence of mistake or accident.
With this background in mind, we turn to the legal principles governing the defendant's claim that the evidence concerning the incident involving Febles was inadmissible propensity evidence.24 "In order to determine whether [evidence of prior misconduct] is admissible, we use a two part test. First, the evidence must be relevant and material to at least one of the circumstances encompassed by the exceptions. Second, the probative value of [the prior misconduct] evidence must outweigh [its] prejudicial effect .... Because of the difficulties inherent in this balancing process, the trial court's decision will be reversed only whe[n] abuse of discretion is manifest or whe[n] an injustice appears to have been done.... On review by this court, therefore, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the trial court's ruling." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Merriam , 264 Conn. 617, 661, 835 A.2d 895 (2003).
**263"Because intent is almost always proved, if at all, by circumstantial evidence, prior misconduct evidence, where available, is often relied upon." State v. Baldwin , 224 Conn. 347, 355, 618 A.2d 513 (1993). Evidence of uncharged misconduct is particularly probative on the issue of intent when the uncharged misconduct is similar to the charged conduct. Id. ; see also State v. Tucker , 181 Conn. 406, 415, 435 A.2d 986 (1980) (evidence of uncharged misconduct may be used to establish "a pattern of behavior and an attitude ... that is indicative of the defendant's state of mind").
In the present case, the defendant claims that the probative value of the purported *646evidence25 concerning the incident involving Febles was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Specifically, he contends that Febles' statement to the police was unreliable because it was given seventeen years after the incident and she had never reported the incident before that time. The defendant further contends that, even if the incident occurred, it was too remote in time to be relevant. Finally, he claims that the evidence was unreliable and prejudicial because there was no evidence that he owned a Glock handgun in 1995.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the state to question the defendant about the incident involving Febles. The evidence was relevant to prove intent and the absence of mistake or accident because of the substantial similarities between the incidents. Specifically, in both incidents, a woman with whom the defendant was romantically **264involved had been absent from the residence that they shared under circumstances that caused the defendant to become upset and then, after the woman returned to the residence, the defendant produced a Glock handgun. Given these similarities, if the jury believed Febles' account that the defendant intentionally pinned her to the wall and held the gun to her head, it reasonably could have inferred that he followed the same pattern of behavior during the argument with the victim. Thus, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the evidence rebutted the defendant's testimony that the gun accidentally discharged while he was trying to put it in his bag.
We further conclude that, given the strong similarities between the two incidents and the strongly aberrational nature of the defendant's conduct-producing a gun during an argument with a domestic partner-the fourteen year gap between the incidents of misconduct did not render the evidence of the incident involving Febles irrelevant. With respect to the defendant's claim that the evidence was unreliable because Febles never reported the incident to the police before she gave the statement in 2012, the defendant does not provide the evidentiary basis for this representation. In any event, even if that is the case, Febles' failure to report the incident to the police immediately would not render the evidence inadmissible, but would be grist for the jury mill.
Finally, with respect to the defendant's claim that there was no evidence that he owned a Glock handgun in 1995, Febles' statement that he threatened her with a Glock handgun was, in and of itself, evidence that the jury was free to credit or discredit in light of the defendant's denial that he owned such a gun at the time that he was involved with Febles.26 Moreover, *647even if **265the jury did not believe Febles' statement on that point, that would not render her statement irrelevant or unduly prejudicial because the brand of the gun that the defendant held to Febles' head was tangential to the evidence of the assault. Accordingly, we reject this claim.27 **266The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court with direction to vacate the legally inconsistent *648guilty verdicts of murder and manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm and to grant the defendant's motion for a new trial.
In this opinion PALMER, EVELEIGH, ESPINOSA, ROBINSON and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., concurred.