**146The defendant, Robert Hornung, appeals1 from the judgment of the trial court setting forth financial orders incident to the dissolution of his marriage to the plaintiff, Marjorie Hornung. In those orders, the trial court directed the defendant to pay to the plaintiff, inter alia, lump sum alimony in the amount of $7.5 million and attorney's fees in the amount of $140,000. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court: (1) improperly rendered a lump sum alimony **147award that constitutes a property distribution in violation of the parties' prenuptial agreement (agreement); and (2) abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the plaintiff in light of its other awards to her. We disagree with the defendant's claim that the lump sum alimony award is actually an improper property distribution, but agree that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the plaintiff. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.2
The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. The plaintiff and the defendant were married in Greenwich in 1997 and have four minor children. The *915defendant earns $970,000 per year from employment and investments, and received $37 million from the sale of a software program in 2000. The plaintiff, a full-time homemaker and the primary caretaker of the children, presently earns no income. She suffers from a thyroid condition and is borderline diabetic.
Shortly before their marriage, the parties entered into the agreement. The agreement provided for sole ownership **148of separate property acquired before the marriage, which would not be subject to equitable distribution in the event of dissolution.3 Marital assets were to be divided in accordance with a formula based upon the length of the marriage and the number of children. The agreement stated that the issues of alimony and child support would be addressed by the courts.4
In 2011, the plaintiff brought the present action seeking a legal separation, and later amended her complaint to seek a dissolution of the marriage. After trial, the trial court ordered the defendant to pay, inter alia, $40,000 per month in periodic unallocated alimony and child support, and $7.5 million in lump sum alimony.5 With respect to the lump sum alimony award, the court noted that "under all the circumstances [the] award ... is appropriate to provide for continuing support of the [plaintiff]" in light of the following: "[the plaintiff's] health issues; her lack of recent employment; her primary child care responsibilities for four children, which limits her ability to enter the workforce on a full-time basis; and her limited opportunity to acquire assets in the future."6 In making the award, the court stated that **149it considered the factors in the alimony statute, General Statutes § 46b-82,7 as well as "other factors which may be appropriate for a just and equitable resolution." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In discussing *916alimony generally, the court noted that "both parties ... made significant contributions to the acquisition, maintenance, and preservation of the family assets, including the real estate." The court also ordered the defendant to contribute $100,000 toward the plaintiff's attorney's fees pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-62,8 reasoning that "to require the [plaintiff], who has minimal earning capacity and the responsibility for the primary care of four minor children age nine through fifteen, three of whom have learning issues, to pay these fees from her portion of the financial award ... would undermine the purposes of [the] same" and that "it would be fair and equitable for the [defendant] to pay [those fees]." The defendant then filed this appeal. See footnote 1 of this opinion.
The plaintiff subsequently moved for an award of appellate attorney's fees. After a hearing, the trial court **150ordered the defendant to contribute an additional $40,000 toward the plaintiff's appellate attorney's fees. The court stated that the plaintiff needed "reasonable access to the court system [to] defend an appeal that [the defendant] made" and that she "does not have ample liquid assets" or "resources that are readily available" to pay the fees because several of the trial court's orders were stayed pending the defendant's appeal. Thereafter, the defendant filed an amended appeal challenging the trial court's award of appellate attorney's fees. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the lump sum alimony award constitutes a functional property distribution in violation of the agreement; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay the plaintiff's attorney's fees. We address each claim in turn.
I
The defendant first claims that the lump sum alimony award is actually a property distribution in violation of the agreement because: (1) in making the award, the trial court considered two factors-the plaintiff's opportunity to acquire assets in the future and her contribution to the marital estate-that appear in the property distribution statute, General Statutes § 46b-81,9 but not the alimony statute, § 46b-82 ; and (2) the lump sum **151award is more than necessary for the plaintiff's continued support, thus indicating that it is functionally a property distribution.10 In response, the plaintiff contends that the trial court properly awarded lump sum alimony, rather *917than a disguised property distribution, because: (1) the trial court unambiguously characterized the lump sum award as alimony, and retained discretion to consider equitable factors beyond § 46b-82, including those listed in § 46b-81, in making the award; and (2) the award was appropriate in light of the standard of living of the marriage, the substantial assets awarded to the defendant under the agreement, and the equitable factors considered by the trial court. We agree with the plaintiff.
The question of whether the trial court properly applied the law when fashioning the lump sum alimony award is a question of law subject to plenary review.
**152See Crews v. Crews , 295 Conn. 153, 162, 989 A.2d 1060 (2010). Although financial orders in family matters are generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion; Ross v. Ross , 172 Conn. 269, 275, 374 A.2d 185 (1977) ; this court applies a less deferential standard "when the decision of the trial court is based not on an exercise of discretion but on a purported principle of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Loughlin v. Loughlin , 280 Conn. 632, 641, 910 A.2d 963 (2006). "Notwithstanding the great deference accorded the trial court in dissolution proceedings, a trial court's ruling ... may be reversed if, in the exercise of its discretion, the trial court applies the wrong standard of law." Borkowski v. Borkowski , 228 Conn. 729, 740, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994).
We conclude that the trial court properly awarded lump sum alimony, and not a property distribution in violation of the agreement, for two reasons: (1) the trial court unambiguously characterized the lump sum award as alimony and, as such, its incidental consideration of two factors in § 46b-81, the property distribution statute, does not demonstrate that the award is a functional property distribution; and (2) the fact that the combined alimony and child support awards apparently exceed the plaintiff's claimed expenses does not demonstrate that the award is actually a property distribution, in light of the standard of living of the marriage and the equitable and statutory factors considered by the trial court.11 See footnote 10 of this opinion. We discuss each rationale in turn.
First, the trial court consistently described the lump sum award as alimony in its decision, articulation, and comments. From the beginning of its decision, the trial court distinguished between the property distribution allowed under the prenuptial agreement and its broad authority to award alimony.12 Thereafter, the trial court explained that, "under all the circumstances," the purpose of the lump sum award was to provide "continuing support" to the plaintiff-the quintessential purpose of alimony. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Noyes - Dombrowski , 273 Conn. 127, 132, 869 A.2d 164 (2005). The purpose of a property distribution, by contrast, is "to unscramble existing marital property in order to give each spouse his or her equitable share at the time of dissolution." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 133, 869 A.2d 164 ; see also Blake v. Blake , 211 Conn. 485, 497, 560 A.2d 396 (1989) ( "[t]he difference between an assignment of a specific portion of an estate and alimony is in their purposes" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). The trial court made no reference or allusion to this equitable purpose in making the lump sum alimony award, and instead divided the property in accordance with the agreement. The trial court also specifically cited § 46b-82, the alimony statute, and two judicial opinions in which lump **154sum alimony was properly awarded when making the lump sum alimony award.13 See Maguire v. Maguire , 222 Conn. 32, 47, 608 A.2d 79 (1992) ("[a]ny ambiguity as to the criteria upon which the court relied for alimony was put to rest [when] the trial court indicated that it had relied upon the criteria in § 46b-82 for its award of alimony").
In light of this language, the trial court's mere mention of two factors in the property distribution statute, namely, the plaintiff's opportunity to acquire assets in the future and her contribution to the marital estate, did not render the lump sum award an improper property distribution.14 See id. at 46-47, 608 A.2d 79 (trial court did *919not improperly predicate alimony award on "impermissible statutory criterion [by] ... refer[ring] to § 46b-81 " in decision); Blake v. Blake , supra, 211 Conn. at 495-99, 560 A.2d 396 (trial court's characterization of lump sum payment as alimony in oral decision did not render it alimony, as opposed to property distribution, when court otherwise consistently characterized award as property distribution). In awarding lump sum alimony, the trial court pointed to several considerations, including "the [plaintiff's] health issues; her lack of recent employment; her primary child care responsibilities for four children, which limits her ability to enter the workforce on a full-time basis; and her limited opportunity to acquire **155assets in the future ." (Emphasis added.) The court also noted that throughout the marriage, "both parties ... made significant contributions to the acquisition, maintenance, and preservation of the family assets, including the real estate." (Emphasis added.)
We have repeatedly acknowledged that the statutory factors for awarding alimony and distributing property are "virtually identical."15 Sunbury v. Sunbury , 210 Conn. 170, 173-74, 553 A.2d 612 (1989) ; see also Greco v. Greco , 275 Conn. 348, 360, 880 A.2d 872 (2005) ("essentially identical"); Dombrowski v. Noyes - Dombrowski , supra, 273 Conn. at 137, 869 A.2d 164 (" 'almost identical' "). We have, further, declined to fault trial courts for considering the two factors that appear in the property distribution statute, but not the alimony statute, when awarding alimony, because dissolution actions are "essentially equitable in ... nature"; Robinson v. Robinson , 187 Conn. 70, 72, 444 A.2d 234 (1982) ; and the resulting financial orders are "entirely interwoven."16 (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
**156Greco v. Greco , supra, at 354 ; see, e.g., Blake v. Blake , 207 Conn. 217, 232, 541 A.2d 1201 (1988) ("[i]n determining the assignment of marital property under § 46b-81or alimony under § 46b-82 , a trial court must weigh ... the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income " [emphasis added] ); Koizim v. Koizim , 181 Conn. 492, 493, 498, 435 A.2d 1030 (1980) (alimony award not abuse of discretion in part because of wife's "very significant" contributions, "both financial and otherwise," to marriage; "even if we ... look *920solely at the other statutory criteria, especially ... the contributions that each spouse made to the marriage ... the court's [alimony] orders are neither mind boggling, outrageously excessive nor unreasonable" [emphasis added] ); Weinstein v. Weinstein , 18 Conn.App. 622, 634, 638, 561 A.2d 443 (1989) (after "properly assessing the parties' relative earning capacities, asset holdings, and ability to acquire assets , in accordance with ... § 46b-82," trial court did not abuse discretion in not awarding alimony to wife because of her "capacity to acquire assets in the future" [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted] ). In any event, the trial court had discretion to consider these equitable factors when awarding alimony, and their inclusion in the property distribution statute did not render them off-limits to the trial court's analysis.17 See Borkowski v. Borkowski , supra, 228 Conn. at 743-44, 638 A.2d 1060 (courts may consider "any **157other factors which may be appropriate for a just and equitable resolution of the marital dispute" when awarding alimony [internal quotation marks omitted] ); Demartino v. Demartino , 79 Conn.App. 488, 500, 830 A.2d 394 (2003) ("[b]ecause § 46b-82 does not contain an exhaustive list of factors, the court properly may consider other equitable factors when determining an alimony award" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); accord Smith v. Smith , 249 Conn. 265, 283-84, 752 A.2d 1023 (1999) (court could equitably consider husband's travel expenses in seeing children as factor when awarding alimony even though factor is "listed explicitly" in child support regulations).18
Although the defendant points to the fact that the trial court considered two factors that appear in the property distribution statute but not the alimony statute, he does not mention that the trial court also considered one factor that appears in the alimony statute, but not the property distribution statute. In awarding lump sum alimony, the trial court emphasized the plaintiff's "primary child care responsibilities for four children, which limits her ability to enter the workforce on a full-time basis ...." The alimony statute lists as a factor, "the desirability and feasibility of [the] parent's securing employment" in the case of parents to whom the custody of minor children is awarded. General Statutes § 46b-82 (a). The property distribution statute contains no such factor.19 See General Statutes § 46b-81 (c).
**158*921The trial court's articulation also supports the characterization of the award as alimony and not a property distribution. The plaintiff sought an articulation as to whether the trial court "considered, applied, or intended to apply" a factor in § 46b-81 when it awarded lump sum alimony. The trial court responded: "In making an equitable division of marital property or an award of alimony, whether periodic or lump sum, the court must, as it did, consider the statutory criteria set forth in ... §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82respectively ." (Emphasis altered.) The word "respectively" indicates the court's understanding that each statute applies to each type of financial order. This language therefore confirms the trial court's application of § 46b-82, not § 46b-81, when awarding lump sum alimony. The trial court also acknowledged its equitable power to consider "any appropriate additional factors, statutory or otherwise" in its articulation, noting that those powers gave "the court the authority to consider all the circumstances that may be appropriate for a just and equitable resolution of the marital dispute." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
The trial court further differentiated between the lump sum alimony award and its property distribution orders at a hearing on the plaintiff's motion to terminate an appellate stay on several of its orders. The court stated, "I crafted this order ... [a]nd I specifically separated what I consider property settlement from ... lump sum alimony ." (Emphasis added.) The court explained that it awarded both periodic and lump sum alimony in consideration of how the defendant's income "comes in" and "flow[s]" from his various income streams. The court noted that "there's a method to the ... madness in terms of how the decree is crafted." Thus, the court evidently did not intend to effectuate a functional property distribution by awarding lump sum alimony, but intended to account for the fact that **159the defendant received some components of his income only a few times per year.
B
Second, we disagree with the defendant's contention that, because the combined alimony and child support payments exceed the plaintiff's claimed expenses, the lump sum alimony award is a functional property distribution, in light of the standard of living of the marriage and the equitable factors considered by the trial court.20
**160See footnote 10 of this opinion. The plaintiff attested **161to having $65,444 *922per month in expenses at the time of trial.21 The $40,000 per month periodic alimony and child support payments would not cover this amount. The lump sum alimony *923payments, however, when combined with these payments, equate to $102,500 per month in total alimony and child support. Although this figure exceeds the plaintiff's claimed expenses, we cannot conclude that this fact alone means that the lump sum award constitutes a functional property distribution. See Koizim v. Koizim , supra, 181 Conn. at 493-94, 435 A.2d 1030 (upholding total alimony award of $9000 per month, when wife claimed approximately $7083 per month in expenses and marital expenses were $7500 per month).
First, it is not clear from the record to what extent the trial court considered the plaintiff's expenses, as stated in her financial affidavit, to represent the standard of living of the marriage.22 See, e.g., Mavilla v. Mavilla , Docket No. 2011-095, 2011 WL 4975100, *5 (Vt. August 31, 2011) (wife's financial affidavit showed that her "standard of living was far below that established during the marriage and that which husband currently enjoyed"); see also **162Stamper v. Stamper , Docket No. A10-109, 2010 WL 3119503, *4 (Minn.App. August 10, 2010) (wife's claimed expenses "reflect[ed] a significantly reduced standard of living compared to the standard enjoyed during the marriage"); cf. Thomas v. Thomas , Docket No. A13-0905, 2014 WL 802035, *3 (Minn.App. March 3, 2014) (wife's claimed expenses "accurately reflect[ed] the parties' standard of living during the marriage"). Although the primary purpose of alimony is to provide for continuing support of a disadvantaged spouse, the spouse is entitled to maintain the standard of living of the marriage after the dissolution, as closely as possible. See, e.g., Brody v. Brody , 315 Conn. 300, 313, 105 A.3d 887 (2015) ("[t]he generally accepted purpose of ... alimony is to enable a spouse who is disadvantaged through divorce to enjoy a standard of living commensurate with the standard of living during marriage" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). When the disadvantaged spouse's efforts "increased the other's earning capacity at the expense of [his or] her own," he or she is entitled to "sufficient alimony to ensure the continued enjoyment of [that] standard of living ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dan v. Dan , 315 Conn. 1, 11, 105 A.3d 118 (2014). Moreover, the parties' children are entitled to continue "the lifestyle to which [they were] accustomed and the standard of living [they] enjoyed before the divorce ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maturo v. Maturo , 296 Conn. 80, 108, 995 A.2d 1 (2010).
The parties apparently maintained a high standard of living during the marriage. The defendant valued the marital home at $6.75 million23 and the parties' vacation home at $1.2 million. Although the defendant's income fluctuated during the marriage, he earned more than $1 million per year in several years of the marriage.24
**163The trial court acknowledged that his employment has "proven to be very lucrative." In 2006, for example, he earned $1,687,677, which equates to approximately *924$140,640 per month. The following year, he earned $1,253,766, or approximately $104,480 per month. He also received an additional $37 million from the sale of a software program three years into the marriage. At the time of trial, the defendant's bank account contained $84,238. Because the plaintiff's efforts as a homemaker and the primary caretaker of the children increased the defendant's earning capacity at the expense of her own, she is entitled to maintain this standard of living after the divorce, to the extent possible. See, e.g., Dan v. Dan , supra, 315 Conn. at 11, 105 A.3d 118 ; Brody v. Brody , 136 Conn.App. 773, 790, 51 A.3d 1121 (2012) ("the parties had enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle during their marriage ... for the benefit of the [wife] and the parties' children, any award of alimony should reflect this quality of life"), rev'd in part on other grounds, 315 Conn. 300, 105 A.3d 887 (2015).
In addition to the marital standard of living, the trial court must also consider the factors in § 46b-82 when awarding alimony. See Golden v. Mandel , 110 Conn.App. 376, 385, 955 A.2d 115 (2008) ("[t]he standard of living ... was only one factor that the court considered in making its financial award"). Such factors include: "the length of the marriage, the causes for the ... dissolution of the marriage ... [and] the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties ...." General Statutes § 46b-82 (a). The trial court must also consider any property distributions made pursuant to § 46b-81 and, "in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children has been awarded, the desirability and feasibility of such parent's securing employment." General Statutes § 46b-82 (a).
**164Accordingly, the plaintiff's expenses do not represent the only factor that the trial court must consider when awarding alimony. On the contrary, § 46b-82 lists thirteen other factors that the court must consider when awarding alimony, in addition to the "needs" of the recipient spouse. The court must not only examine the spouse's financial situation at the time of trial, but look ahead to his or her ability to generate income in the future. See General Statutes § 46b-82 (instructing court to consider spouse's "age, health, station, occupation ... earning capacity, vocational skills, education, [and] employability"). Several of the factors relate in no way to the spouse's expenses, such as the length of the marriage and the cause of the breakdown of the marriage. The trial court must also look to the payor spouse's financial situation, in addition to that of the recipient spouse. Specifically, the trial court must consider the payor's age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, and employability. These factors have nothing to do with the recipient spouse's claimed expenses. Thus, it cannot be said that the trial court was constrained by the plaintiff's claimed expenses in awarding alimony. The trial court instead had "wide discretion" to ensure that the plaintiff and the parties' children continued to enjoy the standard of living of the marriage for years to come. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brody v. Brody , supra, 315 Conn. at 313, 51 A.3d 1121.
The trial court's resolution of these factors in the present case further militates against characterizing the lump sum alimony award as a property distribution.25
**165*925The parties were married for seventeen years and have four minor children. The children, now ages eleven, fourteen, fifteen, and seventeen, three of whom have learning issues, primarily reside with the plaintiff. The defendant was fifty years old at the time of trial and in "general good health." Although he described a "painful bout of neuropathy " at one point during the marriage, the trial court found that he "is not prevented from working full-time." The defendant has a business degree from Syracuse University, and his primary employment is with his family's window company and its subsidiaries. At the time of trial, the defendant earned nearly $1 million per year from his employment and investments. By contrast, the plaintiff was forty-five years old at the time of trial, suffers from a thyroid condition, and is borderline diabetic. She has a college degree from Emerson College, but did not work for the "greater portion" of the parties' seventeen year marriage. When she did work, she earned approximately $30,000 per year, with a maximum of $65,000 to $70,000 per year. She earned no income at the time of trial and claimed $65,444 per month in expenses. Significantly, the trial court also found that the defendant caused the breakdown of the marriage,26 characterizing him as a "controlling, emotional bully" and describing his "bizarre" and "demeaning" behavior.27
**166Moreover, the agreement left the defendant with significant assets as compared to the plaintiff. See General Statutes § 46b-82 (trial court "shall consider the ... estate ... of each of the parties"); Golden v. Mandel , supra, 110 Conn.App. at 386, 955 A.2d 115 ("[i]t is well established that the parties' estate is defined as the aggregate of the property and liabilities of each " [emphasis added] ); see also Schmidt v. Schmidt , 180 Conn. 184, 192, 429 A.2d 470 (1980) ("the 'estate' of the parties ... comprehends the aggregate of the property and liabilities of each"). The trial court *926ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff: $2,082,000, the amount owed her under the prenuptial agreement; $40,000 per month in periodic unallocated alimony and child support for fifteen years; and $7.5 million in lump sum alimony, payable in biannual installments of $375,000. The defendant, however, kept the marital home and the parties' vacation home, in addition to all of his commercial real estate, business ownerships, securities, bonds, bank accounts, and retirement accounts. He received, in total, more than $25 million in assets.28 By comparison, the plaintiff kept the home she purchased during this dissolution litigation, as well as her bank accounts, retirement accounts, and personal property, which totaled approximately $4.5 million.29 **167The trial court also did not specify how much of the periodic alimony and child support award should go toward the children's maintenance, as opposed to the plaintiff's support. The trial court, at least, found it appropriate to deviate from the presumptive minimum child support amount under the guidelines based on the defendant's income. Moreover, the parties' four minor children are entitled to maintain the standard of living of the marriage, to the extent possible. See Maturo v. Maturo , supra, 296 Conn. at 108, 995 A.2d 1 ; see also id., at 168-69, 995 A.2d 1 (Vertefeuille, J. , dissenting in part) (noting "new wave" of cases recognizing "the significance of the standard of living of children of affluent parents" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). The $40,000 per month award, which would not cover the plaintiff's $65,444 in expenses, was also limited to fifteen years.
In light of these principles, we disagree with the defendant's contention that, because the combined alimony and child support payments exceed the plaintiff's claimed expenses, the lump sum alimony award is functionally a property distribution. The agreement's waiver of equitable distribution of property does not change this result. Although the agreement limited the court's discretion to distribute property, it did not limit the trial court's discretion to award alimony in any way . The agreement simply stated that "a court of competent jurisdiction shall address the issues of alimony and/or child support ... in the event [of] ... divorce ...." Indeed, the Appellate Court recently rejected a nearly identical argument in Brody v. Brody , supra, 136 Conn.App. at 790, 51 A.3d 1121, in which the trial court properly awarded lump sum alimony despite the existence of a prenuptial agreement in which the parties waived equitable distribution. The husband argued, as here, that "the [trial] court improperly used the award of alimony to effectuate an improper distribution of property in violation of the parties' prenuptial agreement."
**168Id., at 788, 51 A.3d 1121. The Appellate Court disagreed, noting that the trial court had "broad discretion" to award alimony because the prenuptial agreement "by its clear terms, [was] concerned with equitable distributions of property ... not alimony awards." Id., at 791, 51 A.3d 1121. Accordingly, we conclude that the lump sum alimony award does not constitute a functional property distribution in contravention of the parties' agreement.30
*927II
We now turn to the defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay $100,000 of the plaintiff's trial attorney's fees and $40,000 of her appellate attorney's fees, in light of its other awards to her.31 Specifically, the defendant claims **169that the plaintiff received ample liquid funds from the trial court's judgment with which to pay her attorney's fees, and that the trial court's conclusion that not awarding her attorney's fees would undermine its other awards to her was unreasonable. In response, the plaintiff contends that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in awarding her attorney's fees, and reasonably concluded that not doing so would have undermined its other awards. Additionally, with respect to the appellate attorney's fees award, the plaintiff asserts that she did not have sufficient liquid assets to defend the appeal because several of the trial court's financial orders were stayed pending appeal. We agree with the defendant, and conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the plaintiff attorney's fees.
Section 46b-62 (a) authorizes the trial court to award attorney's fees in a dissolution action when appropriate in light of the "respective financial abilities" of the parties and the equitable factors listed in § 46b-82. Turgeon v. Turgeon , 190 Conn. 269, 280, 460 A.2d 1260 (1983) ; see also footnotes 7 and 8 of this opinion. "[W]e [have] stated three broad principles by which these statutory criteria are to be applied. First, such awards should not be made merely because the obligor has demonstrated an ability to pay. Second, where both parties are financially able to pay their own fees and expenses, they should be permitted to do so. Third, where, because **170of other orders, the potential obligee has ample liquid funds, an allowance of [attorney's] fees is not justified." Turgeon v. Turgeon , supra, at 280, 460 A.2d 1260. *928"A determination of what constitutes ample liquid funds ... requires ... an examination of the total assets of the parties at the time the award is made." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Anderson , 191 Conn. 46, 59, 463 A.2d 578 (1983). We have recognized, however, that "[t]he availability of sufficient cash to pay one's attorney's fees is not an absolute litmus test .... [A] trial court's discretion should be guided so that its decision regarding attorney's fees does not undermine its purpose in making any other financial award." Devino v. Devino , 190 Conn. 36, 38-39, 458 A.2d 692 (1983) ; see also, e.g., Grimm v. Grimm , 276 Conn. 377, 398, 886 A.2d 391 (2005) (not awarding $100,000 in attorney's fees to wife would have "necessarily eviscerate[d]" any benefit she would have received from $100,000 lump sum alimony award), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1148, 126 S.Ct. 2296, 164 L.Ed.2d 815 (2006).
"Whether to allow [attorney's] fees, and if so in what amount, calls for the exercise of judicial discretion" by the trial court. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Anderson , supra, 191 Conn. at 58, 463 A.2d 578. "An abuse of discretion in granting [attorney's] fees will be found only if [an appellate court] determines that the trial court could not reasonably have concluded as it did." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos , 297 Conn. 358, 386, 999 A.2d 721 (2010).
In the present case, the trial court ordered the defendant to pay $100,000 of the plaintiff's trial attorney's fees and $40,000 of her appellate attorney's fees. The trial court reasoned, with respect to the trial attorney's fees award, that "to require the [plaintiff], who has minimal earning capacity and the responsibility for the **171primary care of four minor children age nine through fifteen, three of whom have learning issues, to pay these fees from her portion of the financial award ... would undermine the purposes of [the] same" and that "it would be fair and equitable for the [defendant] to pay [those fees]." After the defendant filed an appeal, the trial court awarded the plaintiff an additional $40,000 in appellate attorney's fees, stating that the plaintiff needed "reasonable access to the court system [to] defend an appeal that [the defendant] made." The trial court noted that several of its financial awards to the plaintiff, including the $2,082,000 payment under the agreement, the $375,000 biannual lump sum alimony payments, and the $100,000 trial attorney's fees award, were automatically stayed pending the defendant's appeal. See Practice Book § 61-11 (a). The $40,000 per month periodic alimony and child support payments were not stayed, however, and the plaintiff continued to receive those payments. See Practice Book § 61-11 (c) ("no automatic stay shall apply ... to orders of periodic alimony, [or child] support"). The trial court also noted that the plaintiff had only $3700 in her bank accounts at that time and, thus, she was "land rich but cash poor."32 The trial court therefore concluded that **172the plaintiff did "not have ample liquid assets" or "resources that are readily *929available" to pay the fees. Four months later, the plaintiff successfully moved to terminate the stay on the $2,082,000 payment and the lump sum alimony award. Specifically, the plaintiff was scheduled to receive the $2,082,000 payment and the first $375,000 installment of the lump sum alimony award by December 19, 2014.
We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in making the attorney's fees awards because the plaintiff received ample liquid funds as a result of the trial court's judgment, and the trial court's determination that not awarding attorney's fees to the plaintiff would undermine its other awards was unreasonable. See, e.g., Koizim v. Koizim , supra, 181 Conn. at 501, 435 A.2d 1030. We further disagree with the plaintiff's contention that the appellate stay on the trial court's financial orders justifies the appellate attorney's fees award because the trial court could have terminated the stay sua sponte, and because the plaintiff did, in fact, successfully move to terminate the stay on several of those orders.
**173First, the trial attorney's fees award represents a very small portion of the liquid assets awarded to the plaintiff in the trial court's judgment. Pursuant to the judgment, the plaintiff would receive: $2,082,000, the amount owed to her under the agreement, within sixty days of the judgment; $40,000 per month in periodic alimony and child support, starting twelve days from the judgment; and $7.5 million in lump sum alimony, payable in biannual installments of $375,000, starting two and one-half months from the judgment. Thus, the plaintiff would receive liquid assets totaling $2,577,000 within three months of the judgment.33 The trial attorney's fees award represents only 4 percent of this amount.34 We have previously held attorney's fees awards amounting to a low portion of the payee's liquid assets to constitute an abuse of discretion, since the payee could easily have paid the fees out of those assets, despite the existence of equitable factors supporting the award. See, e.g., Maguire v. Maguire , supra, 222 Conn. at 34-35, 44, 608 A.2d 79 ($50,000 attorney's *930fees award, which amounted to 10 percent of wife's $500,000 in liquid assets, was abuse of discretion, even though parties were married for forty years and had children, husband caused breakdown of marriage, and wife had limited earning capacity);35 **174Blake v. Blake , supra, 211 Conn. at 488-89, 560 A.2d 396 (concluding that wife could not "reasonably" claim that failure to award $14,948 in attorney's fees and expenses, which amounted to 2 percent of wife's $630,000 in liquid assets, "would undermine or skew the substantial financial awards granted to her" and noting that awarding attorney's fees would be "gilding the lily" where husband had $5,503,000 in total assets and wife had $1,535,000 in total assets); see also Blake v. Blake , supra, 207 Conn. at 218-19, 541 A.2d 1201 (parties were married for twelve years and had three children).36 By contrast, this court and our Appellate **175Court have deemed attorney's fees awards that represent a more substantial part of the payee's liquid *931assets proper, because not doing so could result in the immediate depletion of those assets, especially when equitable factors support the award. See, e.g., Unkelbach v. McNary , 244 Conn. 350, 375-77, 710 A.2d 717 (1998) (wife amassed $3250 in attorney's fees and had liquid assets of only $1686); Eslami v. Eslami , 218 Conn. 801, 818-21, 591 A.2d 411 (1991) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding wife total of $48,230 in attorney's fees and expert witness fees, amounting to 15 percent of wife's total assets, which were comprised of $95,000 in deposits and securities and $300,000 lump sum alimony award, less $70,650 in claimed liabilities, in case where parties were married for thirty years, husband caused breakdown of marriage, there was "great disparity" in parties' income and assets, and wife was in "poor health" and had "substantial continuing medical expenses"); Ehrenkranz v. Ehrenkranz , 2 Conn.App. 416, 417, 424, 479 A.2d 826 (1984) ( $7500 attorney's fees award, which amounted to 50 percent of wife's $15,000 in liquid assets, was not abuse of discretion; parties were married for thirty years and husband caused breakdown of marriage).37
Viewed another way, the trial attorney's fees award in the present case represents less than 2 percent of the lump sum alimony award alone, not including the $2,082,000 payment under the agreement or the $40,000 per month periodic alimony and child support payments. Similar to the comparison with the payee's liquid **176assets, attorney's fees awards that represent a small portion of the payee's lump sum alimony award have been held improper, because the payee could easily pay his or her own attorney's fees out of that award, even in the wake of strong equitable factors. See, e.g., Turgeon v. Turgeon , supra, 190 Conn. at 270, 279-81, 460 A.2d 1260 ($10,000 in attorney's fees and $1500 in expert witness fees awards, amounting to 8 percent of $140,000 in total lump sum alimony awards to wife, was abuse of discretion, though parties were married for twenty-three years and husband received $309,000 in assets, compared to wife's $100,000; property and alimony awards to wife were "generous" and "liquid assets being made available [to her were] ample"); Koizim v. Koizim , supra, 181 Conn. at 493-501, 435 A.2d 1030 ($55,000 in attorney's fees award, amounting to 9 percent of $600,000 lump sum alimony award and 4 percent of $1,410,000 in total assets, not including periodic alimony award, was abuse of discretion where parties were married for twenty-seven years, husband earned $208,000 per year, wife earned $1000 per year, husband was unfaithful, and wife made "significant" contributions to marriage, "both financial and otherwise").38 Conversely, attorney's fees awards reflecting a more significant portion of the payee's lump sum alimony *932award, thereby potentially undermining that award, have been held proper, especially when equitable factors support the award. See, e.g., Holley v. Holley , 194 Conn. 25, 26-27 and n. 1, 478 A.2d 1000 (1984) (attorney's fees award of $7500, amounting to 50 percent of **177$15,000 lump sum alimony award, not including periodic alimony and child support award, not abuse of discretion where parties were married for approximately fifteen years, had one minor child, husband earned $100,000 per year, wife earned $23,000 per year, and husband had $280,000 in separate assets); Costa v. Costa , 11 Conn.App. 74, 75-77, 526 A.2d 4 (1987) (attorney's fees award of $6000, amounting to 30 percent of $20,000 lump sum alimony award, not including periodic alimony award, not abuse of discretion where husband had $280,000 in assets, wife had $170,000 in assets, husband earned $58,400 per year, and wife "needed treatment for deep depression and had no immediate prospect of being able to work"); see also Weiman v. Weiman , 188 Conn. 232, 235-37, 449 A.2d 151 (1982) ($10,000 attorney's fees award to wife proper when trial court "could reasonably have concluded that [her] financial resources ... were necessary to meet her future needs" and alimony awarded to her "was not substantial in amount nor was it for a long period of time").39
In the present case, given the vast liquid assets awarded to the plaintiff, and the modest nature of the attorney's fees when compared with those assets, the equitable factors in § 46b-82, as incorporated into § 46b-62, do not justify the award. See Koizim v. Koizim , supra, 181 Conn. at 500-501, 435 A.2d 1030 (equitable factors justified lump sum and periodic alimony awards, but not attorney's fees award). As grounds for the trial attorney's **178fees award, the trial court cited the plaintiff's "minimal earning capacity" and responsibility for caring for the parties' four minor children. The trial court further stated that it would be "fair and equitable" for the defendant to pay the fees. The trial court cited similar concerns with regard to the appellate attorney's fees award. We have stated, however, that attorney's fees "are not to be awarded merely because the obligor has demonstrated an ability to pay" and that "[w]here, because of other orders, both parties are financially able to pay their own counsel fees they should be permitted to do so." Koizim v. Koizim , supra, at 500-501, 435 A.2d 1030. Although these factors strongly support the validity of the lump sum alimony award, they are outweighed in the attorney's fees context by the fact that the fees represent but a small fraction of the substantial liquid assets awarded to the plaintiff.40 Cf. *933**179Mistho poulos v. Misthopoulos , supra, 297 Conn. at 383-87, 999 A.2d 721 ($64,000 attorney's fees award was proper when "the overwhelming majority of the assets awarded to the [wife] were not liquid assets," given that "[$2.6 million] of the approximately [$3.2 million] in assets awarded to the [wife] consisted of the family home in which the [wife] and the parties' three minor children resided" and "also included her interest in a trust ... certain retirement accounts, vested stock and vested stock options").41
Lastly, the plaintiff argues that the $40,000 appellate attorney's fees award was, at least, proper, because the $2,082,000 payment under the agreement and the lump sum alimony payments were stayed pending the defendant's appeal. Thus, she claims that she did not have ample liquid funds with which to defend the appeal. We are unpersuaded that the stay on these orders justifies the appellate attorney's fees award. The plaintiff always had the option of seeking to terminate the stay.
**180See Practice Book § 61-11 (c). As stated previously, the plaintiff did, in fact, successfully move to terminate the stay several months after the trial court's award of appellate attorney's fees. Furthermore, the trial court had the discretion to terminate the stay sua sponte at any time. See Practice Book § 61-11 (d). Additionally, although the plaintiff's amended financial affidavit showed only $3700 in her bank accounts, she was still receiving *934$40,000 per month in periodic alimony and child support, and attested to having personal property worth $305,810, a home worth $2.1 million, and other assets worth $79,794.42 See Anderson v. Anderson , supra, 191 Conn. at 60, 463 A.2d 578 (attorney's fees award was abuse of discretion when home would be sold at later date, because sale of home would "yield liquid assets for both parties"). These factors, when considered in light of the substantial liquid assets awarded to the plaintiff, offset the significance of the temporary stay on the orders.43
We, therefore, conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the plaintiff attorney's fees under these circumstances, thus requiring reversal of the trial court's judgment with respect to those awards.44 Furthermore, because we conclude that the **181attorney's fees awards are severable from the trial court's other financial orders, it is not necessary to remand the case for reconsideration of all financial matters. See Smith v. Smith , supra, 249 Conn. at 277, 752 A.2d 1023. "This court and the Appellate Court have often described financial orders appurtenant to dissolution proceedings as entirely interwoven and as a carefully crafted mosaic, each element of which may be dependent on the other. ... Every improper order, however, does not necessarily merit a reconsideration of all of the trial court's financial orders. A financial order is severable when it is not in any way interdependent with other orders and is not improperly based on a factor that is linked to other factors." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Here, the attorney's fees awards are severable from the trial court's other financial orders and a new hearing on all financial matters is not required.
The judgment is reversed only with respect to the attorney's fees awards to the plaintiff, and the case is remanded with direction to deny the plaintiff's motions for trial and appellate attorney's fees; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion ROGERS, C. J., and PALMER and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., concurred.