Before this Court, in our original jurisdiction, are cross-applications for summary relief filed by Tommy Lee Jackson *471(Jackson) and the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) on Jackson's Petition for Review in the Nature of a Writ of Mandamus1 (Petition). In his Petition, Jackson asks this Court to direct the PSP to remove his name from the list of offenders required to comply with the provisions of the Act known as Megan's Law IV or the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)2 because he completed his registration period prior to the law's enactment or, in the alternative, hold that the application of SORNA to Jackson violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. For the following reasons, we grant Jackson's application on equal protection grounds and deny the cross-application of the PSP.
I.
The following facts are taken from the parties' joint stipulation of facts. In October 1990, Jackson was charged with violation of Texas Penal Code § 21.11, Indecency with a Child by Contact. On or about April 12, 1991, Jackson pleaded guilty to one count of Indecency with a Child by Contact and was sentenced to ten years' probation. In May 1993, Jackson violated his probation by failing, inter alia, to report to the probation office and pay court costs. He was subsequently resentenced to ten years imprisonment, for which he served five years in prison and the remaining five years on parole. Jackson was discharged from all supervision on January 15, 2003.
*472Pursuant to Texas' version of Megan's Law,3 Jackson registered as a sexual offender in the State of Texas in 1997, 2000, 2001 and 2002. Jackson moved to the State of Delaware in 2002 where he was likewise required to register as a sexual offender, and then moved to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in June 2004. By the time he moved to Pennsylvania, Jackson had been registering as a sex offender in his previous states of residence for approximately six years.
When Jackson moved to Pennsylvania in 2004, Megan's Law II4 was in effect and Jackson's Texas conviction for Indecency with a Child by Contact required him to register with the PSP for ten years.5 In 2008, Jackson requested a review of his sexual offender registration status to which the PSP responded that his period of registration began on June 25, 2004, when he ostensibly first registered with the PSP after moving to Pennsylvania, and would run until June 25, 2014.
SORNA was enacted on December 20, 2011, and went into effect a year later, establishing a three-tier classification system for sexual offenders. See Section 9799.14 of SORNA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14. On or about December 3, 2012, the PSP notified Jackson that pursuant to SORNA, he was now classified as a Tier III offender and would have to register quarterly every year for the rest of his life. Jackson is no longer on probation or parole for his Texas conviction and is still currently registering with the PSP as a sexual offender pursuant to SORNA.
II.
Both parties filed applications for summary relief.6 Jackson's application for summary relief asserts that under Megan's Law III,7 he was entitled to credit for the six years he registered as a sex offender out-of-state prior to moving to Pennsylvania. Jackson contends that under that version of Megan's Law, his ten-year registration period expired prior to the enactment of SORNA on December 20, 2012, and he is no longer required to register as a sex offender. In the alternative, Jackson asserts that the PSP's application of SORNA discriminates against him by not giving him credit for the years he complied with his out-of-state registration requirements, and he is treated differently than those sexual offenders who began their registration period in Pennsylvania.
*473The PSP's cross-application for summary relief asserts that Jackson is classified under SORNA as a Tier III sexual offender based on his Texas criminal conviction, which is the equivalent of the Tier III Pennsylvania offense of Indecent Assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7).8 The PSP argues that application of SORNA to Jackson does not violate equal protection because Jackson is treated the same as any Megan's Law II offender whose ten-year registration period was unexpired on the date SORNA went into effect. The PSP also asserts that SORNA is reasonably related to the legitimate state interests of promoting public safety and accountability by ensuring that foreign sex offenders do not move to Pennsylvania to avoid registering.
III.
A.
Jackson contends that he should not be required to register under SORNA because he completed his ten-year registration requirement prior to SORNA's effective date because he should be given credit for the approximate six years he registered in Texas and Delaware before moving to the Commonwealth. Megan's Law III did give credit "as a result of prior compliance with registration requirements" to sex offenders convicted in another jurisdiction and who met certain criteria. Section 9795.2(b)(iii) of Megan's Law III, formerly 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.2(b)(iii). However, Megan's Law III, including this provision that Jackson relies upon, was declared unconstitutional for violation of the single subject rule of Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Commonwealth v. Neiman, 624 Pa. 53, 84 A.3d 603 (2013).
Megan's Law II was in effect when Jackson moved to Pennsylvania in 2004 making it the operable statute. Under Megan's Law II, sex offenders entering the Commonwealth were required to register with the PSP: (1) if they were convicted of an offense that was similar to an enumerated Pennsylvania Megan's Law predicate offense, or (2) if they were convicted of an offense that required them to register as a sex offender in their originating jurisdiction. See section 9795.2(b)(1) of Megan's Law II, formerly 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.2(b)(1).
Jackson stipulates that neither Megan's Law II nor SORNA provide "credit" to sex offenders for the time period in which they properly registered in another jurisdiction. Jackson also admits that in October 1990, he pleaded guilty to the charge of Indecency With a Child by Contact in the state of Texas and that this offense is similar to the Pennsylvania offense of Indecent Assault, as the victim was under the age of 13, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7), which, in 2004, was graded as a first degree misdemeanor. Under Megan's Law II, a conviction for Indecent Assault graded as a first degree misdemeanor required individuals to register with the PSP for a period of ten years. See section 9795.1(a)(1) of Megan's Law II, formerly 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1(a)(1).
Because Jackson was convicted of an offense similar to an enumerated Pennsylvania Megan's Law predicate offense, he was required to register as a sex offender with the PSP for ten years. If Jackson is not given credit for the time he *474registered out of state, his ten-year period of required registration under Megan's Law II would not have expired until 2014. SORNA states that individuals "who had not fulfilled [their] period of registration as of December 20, 2012" were subject to its provisions, including the lifetime registration requirement. See section 9799.13(3)(i) of SORNA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13(3)(i). Jackson would fall under this provision of SORNA because he had not completed his ten-year period of registration prior to December 20, 2012, unless he was unconstitutionally denied credit for the years he registered in other states.9
B.
Jackson argues that even if he is subject to SORNA, its application to him violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.10 Jackson asserts that as an out-of-state offender, he is being treated differently than Pennsylvania offenders because SORNA does not provide credit for time spent registering in another jurisdiction, requiring him to register for a longer period of time than an individual who committed his predicate offenses in the Commonwealth.
The PSP, in essence, is saying that if you are convicted of an offense in another state, are required to register in that state for ten years, complete that registration, and then move to Pennsylvania, you are still required to register in the Commonwealth for another ten years or a lifetime, depending on how that offense is now classified under SORNA.
In general, economic and social legislation, including legislation creating classifications or categories among criminal offenders, receives rational basis review.
*475Doe v. Miller, 886 A.2d 310, 315 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005). Under this standard, we must first determine whether the challenged statute seeks to promote a legitimate state interest or public value. Id. at 316 (citing Commonwealth v. Albert, 563 Pa. 133, 758 A.2d 1149 (2000) ). If so, we "must next determine whether the classification adopted in the legislation is reasonably related to accomplishing that articulated state interest or interests." Miller, 886 A.2d at 316.
The question here then becomes is there a rational basis for requiring Jackson to register for a lifetime when a Pennsylvania offender who committed the same act, on the same day, and who registered for ten years with the PSP is not subject to a lifetime registration requirement under SORNA because he is considered to have completed his registration period prior to the law's enactment. More simply, is there a rational basis for this difference in registration requirements based solely on the fact that Jackson's offense occurred in another state.
When enacting Megan's Law I, the General Assembly stated that:
It is hereby declared to be the intention of the General Assembly to protect the safety and general welfare of the people of this Commonwealth by providing for registration and community notification regarding sexually violent predators who are about to be released from custody and will live in or near their neighborhood. It is further declared to be the policy of this Commonwealth to require the exchange of relevant information about sexually violent predators among public agencies and officials and to authorize the release of necessary and relevant information about sexually violent predators to members of the general public as a means of assuring public protection and shall not be construed as punitive.
Section 9791(b) of Megan's Law I, formerly 42 Pa.C.S. § 9791(b) ; see also Commonwealth v. Gaffney, 557 Pa. 327, 733 A.2d 616, 619 (1999). Megan's Law II contains identical language in that statute's declared purpose. See Commonwealth v. Gomer Williams, 574 Pa. 487, 832 A.2d 962, 969, 972 (2003). Relying solely on this statutory language, our Supreme Court, in both Gaffney and Williams, determined that the General Assembly's purpose in enacting the respective statutes was not retribution, but to protect public safety.11
In carrying out that purpose, our General Assembly in Megan's Law II classified individuals differently based on their perceived potential danger to the community. Specifically, sexually violent predators were required to register for their lifetime whereas individuals who were convicted of lesser offenses, referred to as merely sexual offenders, were only required to register for ten years. See Section 9795.1 of Megan's Law II, formerly 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1. Presumably under this classification system, sexual offenders were considered less of a danger to the community and, if not convicted of another like offense for ten years, the statute's registration and notification requirements were no longer needed to protect public safety. See Miller, 886 A.2d at 316 (stating "courts are free to hypothesize reasons why the legislature created the particular classification at issue" and hypothesizing that Megan's Law II identified the class of sexual offenders *476as "deserving of attention because of the character of the predicate offenses, the difficulties in rehabilitating offenders, and the consequent concern for re-offense.").
Jackson was classified a sexual offender when he moved to Pennsylvania in 2004 and the PSP admits that he was only required to register for ten years. We can assume then that the PSP did not consider Jackson to pose the same risk to the citizens of the Commonwealth as individuals classified as sexually violent predators who were required to register for life. Because Pennsylvania sexual offenders who completed their ten-year registration period before SORNA was enacted are not required to register for the rest of their lives, requiring Jackson to now register for the rest of his life under SORNA and not count all the years that he has registered in other states, merely because his offense was committed in another state, is not reasonably related to enhancing public safety and welfare. This fact was recognized in Megan's Law III, although that statute was found unconstitutional for other reasons. Consequently, the PSP's decision not to credit Jackson for the approximately six years he spent registering out-of-state is arbitrary and not reasonably related to the object of the Commonwealth's sex offender legislation; therefore, the PSP's application of the law violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.12
Jackson's ten-year registration period should have expired sometime in 2008 and there are no allegations that he has committed any new sexual offenses since his 1991 Texas conviction. Because Jackson had successfully completed his registration period prior to SORNA's effective date in December 2012, he was not subject to the act and the PSP erred in mandating that he continue to register as a sexual offender under SORNA.
For the foregoing reasons, we grant Jackson's application for summary relief, deny the PSP's cross-motion, and order that Jackson's name be removed from the list of offenders required to register under SORNA.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 7th day of July, 2016, we hereby grant Tommy Lee Jackson's application for summary relief, deny the Pennsylvania State Police's cross-application for summary relief, and hold that Jackson is no longer required to register as a sexual offender.