*706RCW 9A.56.065 makes it a class B felony to commit theft of a motor vehicle. In State v. Barnes , 189 Wash.2d 492, 403 P.3d 72 (2017), the lead and concurring opinions held that a riding lawn mower was not a "motor vehicle" for purposes of that statute. In so holding, six justices agreed that a "motor vehicle" was a car or other automobile. Because a snowmobile is not a car or other automobile, we reverse Julia Tucker's conviction for theft of a motor vehicle.
*707FACTS
In February 2016, Ms. Tucker and Imra Van Wolvelaere broke into a cabin near Stampede Pass. The cabin was accessible only by snowmobiles. The pair stole several items of personal property, including a snowmobile.
The State charged Ms. Tucker with residential burglary, second degree theft, theft of motor vehicle, and third degree malicious mischief. A jury found Ms. Tucker guilty of first degree criminal trespass and theft of motor vehicle, but could not reach a verdict on the charge of second degree theft. The trial court declared a mistrial on that count, and it later was dismissed without prejudice.
Defense counsel, relying on Barnes , filed a motion to arrest judgment on the theft of a motor vehicle conviction. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the snowmobile was licensed and has a motor. Ms. Tucker timely appealed this aspect of her conviction.
ANALYSIS
A. THEFT OF MOTOR VEHICLE
RCW 9A.56.065 makes it a class B felony to commit theft of a motor vehicle. The question before us is whether a snowmobile is a "motor vehicle" for purposes of this statute. Barnes is dispositive, and the answer is no.
In Barnes , the court held that a riding lawn mower was not a "motor vehicle" for purposes of RCW 9A.56.065. Barnes , 189 Wash.2d at 498, 403 P.3d 72. The lead opinion, signed by three justices, resorted to the dictionary to define the meaning of "motor vehicle." Id. at 496, 403 P.3d 72. "Motor vehicle" was defined as " 'an automotive vehicle not operated on rails; esp[ecially] : one with rubber tires for use on highways.' " Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1476 (2002)). "Automotive" was defined as " 'relating to, or concerned with vehicles or machines that propel *708themselves (as automobiles, trucks, airplanes, motorboats).' " Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S , supra , at 148). The court stated, "In the context of [ RCW 9A.56.065 ], these definitions contemplate cars and other automobiles designed for transport of people or cargo, but not machines designed for other purposes yet capable of transporting people or cargo." Id. at 496-97, 403 P.3d 72. The rest of the lead opinion explained the purpose of the "Elizabeth Nowak-Washington auto theft prevention act," which was to "curb[ ] the rising rate of auto thefts." Id. at 497, 403 P.3d 72 ; see LAWS OF 2007, ch. 199, § 29. The lead opinion concluded, "The plain meaning of 'motor vehicle' is clear. The legislature has explicitly indicated it intended to focus this statute on cars and other automobiles. It was responding to increased auto theft, not increased *1007riding lawn mower theft." Id. at 498, 403 P.3d 72.
The concurring opinion, authored by Justice Wiggins, garnered the signatures of two other justices. Id. at 508, 403 P.3d 72 (Wiggins, J., concurring). Justice Wiggins first determined whether "motor vehicle" in the auto theft prevention act was clear or whether it was ambiguous. Id. at 499, 403 P.3d 72. He examined the title of the act, the enacted legislative findings and statements of intent, and the definitions of "motor vehicle theft," "motor vehicle," and "vehicle." Id. at 500-08, 403 P.3d 72. Justice Wiggins concluded that "motor vehicle" is an ambiguous phrase. Id. at 507, 403 P.3d 72.
Justice Wiggins next discussed the purpose of RCW 9A.56.065 : "[T]he Washington legislature adopted the auto theft prevention act, including RCW 9A.56.065, to address increased car theft and the use of stolen cars in the commission of crimes." Id. at 507, 403 P.3d 72. He also noted that adopting a broad definition would raise a constitutional question because a broad definition would not conform to the narrow title of the act. Id. at 508, 403 P.3d 72. He then concluded:
Thus, because the act's title refers to auto theft, because the legislature appeared concerned with addressing automobile theft in particular, and because a narrow reading avoids a constitutional *709dilemma, I conclude that theft of a motor vehicle does not include theft of a riding lawn mower.
Between the lead opinion and the concurring opinion, six justices concluded that "motor vehicle" was limited to cars and other automobiles, and did not include a riding lawn mower.1 Here, a snowmobile is not a car or other automobile. To paraphrase the Barnes lead opinion, the legislature was responding to increased auto thefts, not increased snowmobile thefts.
The State argues that the stolen snowmobile should be classified as a motor vehicle because at the time and place it was stolen, a snowmobile was the only vehicle capable of transporting people or cargo. But transporting people or cargo is not the touchstone agreed to by six justices. The concurring justices never stated that transporting people or cargo was a relevant consideration. Also, the lead and concurring justices also required the vehicle to be a car or other automobile. A snowmobile obviously is not a car or other automobile.
Because a snowmobile is not a car or other automobile, we hold that a snowmobile is not a motor vehicle for purposes of RCW 9A.56.065. We reverse Ms. Tucker's conviction for theft of motor vehicle and instruct the trial court to dismiss that conviction.
B. CRIMINAL FILING FEE AND DEOXYRIBONUCLEIC (DNA) FEE
Ms. Tucker asks this court to strike her $ 200 criminal filing fee and her $ 100 DNA collection fee pursuant to the holding in State v. Ramirez , 191 Wash.2d 732, 426 P.3d 714 (2018).
House Bill 1783, which became effective June 7, 2018, prohibits trial courts from imposing discretionary *710legal financial obligations (LFOs) on defendants who are indigent at the time of sentencing. LAWS OF 2018, ch. 269, § 6(3); Ramirez , 191 Wash.2d at 738, 747, 426 P.3d 714. This change to the criminal filing fee statute is now codified in RCW 36.18.020(2)(h). As held in Ramirez , these changes to the criminal filing fee statute apply prospectively to cases pending direct appeal prior to June 7, 2018. Ramirez , 191 Wash.2d at 747, 426 P.3d 714. Accordingly, the change in law applies to Ms. Tucker's case. Because Ms. Tucker is indigent, the criminal filing fee must be struck pursuant to Ramirez .
The change in law also prohibits imposition of the DNA collection fee when the State has previously collected the offender's DNA as a result of a prior conviction. LAWS OF 2018, ch. 269, § 18. The uncontested record establishes that Ms. Tucker has multiple Washington State felonies since 1990. Since that time, Washington law has required defendants with a felony conviction to provide a DNA sample. LAWS OF 1989, ch. 350, § 4; RCW 43.43.754. Ms. Tucker's prior felonies give rise to a presumption that the State has previously collected a DNA sample from her. Because this issue was not raised below, we permit the State to rebut this presumption by offering contrary evidence on remand. Should the State fail to rebut the presumption, we direct the trial court to strike the DNA collection fee.
Reversed.
I CONCUR:
Siddoway, J.