— after stating the case: The plaintiff offered the letters as evidence, saying that he could “ prove ” them by the witness whom they were intended to corroborate. The defendant objected to such evidence. The Court did not sustain the objection, but said, “properly identified, the letters would be competent; not otherwise.” Thus, the plain*146tiff was encouraged, but he refused or neglected to identify the letters, as he at first said he could do by the witness before the Court. Why he did so, does not appear. He seems to have abandoned his purpose to offer them, perhaps upon the ground thatsuch evidence, generally, is not of much importance, and particularly so in this case, as the witness to be corroborated by it had not been cross-examined, and it appeared — was admitted — that her character was good. But whatever may have been his motive, he did not act upon the ruling and suggestion of the Court; he did not offer to identify the letters, but after the jury had rendered their verdict adverse to him, he then insisted that he ought to have a new trial because the letters were not admitted 1 That they were not, was the laches of himself if he could have identified them by the witness named, or otherwise— it was not in any just sense the fault of the Court, for it obviously, in effect, told him he might identify the letters and they would be received.
In our judgment, there is no legal or just ground upon which the exception can be sustained, and it would savor of trifling with a serious matter to allow a new trial for the cause assigned.
Affirmed.