delivered the opinion of the court.
Wagg v. Stacy, 186 Ill. App. 109 (1914)
April 23, 1914
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Illinois Appellate Court
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Gen. No. 19,215
186 Ill. App. 109
Howard N. Wagg, Plaintiff in Error, v. Hobert A. Stacy, Defendant in Error.
Gen. No. 19,215.
(Not to be reported in full.)
Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Joseph S. LaBut, Judge, presiding.
Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1913.
Affirmed.
Opinion filed April 23, 1914.
Statement of the Case.
Action by Howard N. Wagg against Hobert A. Stacy and Mrs. Hobert A. Stacy, Ms wife, to recover an amount claimed to be due on two promissory notes, a copy of one of which notes is as follows:
“$300. Chicago, June 8, 1896.
On or before Oct. 15, 1896, after date we promise to pay to the order of Howard N. Wagg three hundred dollars, at CMcago. Value received with interest at seven per cent, per annum.
C. P. STACY,
HOBEBT A. STACY,
FBANCES H. STACY.”
The other note was of the same date, for the same amount and similarly signed. On the back of each note appeared the following: “August 21, 1902. Beceived on the within note twenty-five dollars ($25).” The defense of Mrs. Stacy was that she was not a comaker of either of the notes and the suit was dismissed as to her. The defense of Hobert A. Stacy was that the cause of action was barred by the statute of limita*110tions. The trial court found the issues against the plaintiff and entered judgment against him for costs. To reverse the judgment, plaintiff brings error.
Charles G. Bose, for plaintiff in error.
Sims, Welch & Godman, for defendant in error; Elwood G. Godman, of counsel.
Abstract of the Decision.
Limitation of actions, § 90 * —when part payment on note by comalcer does not toll the statute of limitations. In an action against one of the makers on a promisory note where the statute of limitations was interposed as a defense under section 16, ch. 83, Hurd’s R. S„ J. & A. f 7211, and plaintiff contended that a sum paid on the notes by a comaker with the defendant was subsequently acquiesced in and ratified by the defendant and that the statute started to run anew from that date, held that a judgment for defendant was not contrary to the evidence or to the law.